Restrictions on trading by insider agents are analyzed using an optimal contracting framework. Prohibition of insider trading is shown to be Pareto preferred if, and only if, a revelation or moral hazard problem exists. If prohibition of insider trading is valuable, then trade registration with a delay is shown to be as valuable as complete prohibition. Short selling restrictions, however, are generally of less value than complete prohibition. Finally, regulation of insider agent trading by governmental institutions and/or professional associations is discussed.

Restrictions on trading by insider agents are analyzed using an optimal contracting framework. Prohibition of insider trading is shown to be Pareto preferred if, and only if, a revelation or moral hazard problem exists. If prohibition of insider trading is valuable, then trade registration with a delay is shown to be as valuable as complete prohibition. Short selling restrictions, however, are generally of less value than complete prohibition. Finally, regulation of insider agent trading by governmental institutions and/or professional associations is discussed.

We suggest that transparent bias in management disclosures may result from managers processing information in a heuristic, as distinct from Bayesian, fashion when they face imperfect or head-to-head competition. We predict that transparent bias in disclosures is positively related to the extent of head-to-head competition. In addition, when disclosure is discretionary, we show that managers who exhibit viable, heuristic behavior are less likely to disclose than managers who exhibit Bayesian behavior. Finally, when disclosure is discretionary, we show that the increase in the proportion of uninformed managers who exhibit viable, heuristic behavior encourages more disclosure by an informed manager.

We characterize the steady-state equilibrium in which informed traders who exhibit heuristic (i.e., representativeness, as opposed to Bayesian) and Bayesian behaviors achieve the same expected utility. Then, we show how the endogenous, steady-state proportion of heuristic traders is affected by the quality of public information and other exogenous features of our model. Finally, we discuss how the presence of heuristic traders potentially alters the link between improved public disclosure and market liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and market efficiency.

Analyst forecasts, Analyst forecast errors, Correlated forecast errors, Private information

In addition to being a function of traditional fundamentals such as cash-flow persistence and the discount rate, the equilibrium association between a security price and a value-relevant statistic can simply be a function of what rational investors believe the association will be. We refer to this phenomenon as beliefs-driven price association (BPA). By explicitly considering the phenomenon of BPA, we show that the price response to information releases can vary over time even if the risk-free interest rate and investor preferences are static and the earnings/cash flow generating process is stable. This observation suggests, for example, that price-to-earnings associations and price volatility can vary over time even if a stable pattern of economic fundamentals suggests otherwise. The possibility of BPA suggests that measures of the cost of capital, information content, and growth prospects inferred from observed market prices will be confounded. While we do not predict when periods of BPA will arise, we provide empirically testable predictions about how prices should behave during periods of BPA. In particular, we predict that, during sufficiently long periods of high (positive or negative) BPA, price volatility, price levels, and expected returns will be higher than would be implied by a fundamental valuation framework. Finally, while BPA in the pricing of one security does not cause BPA in the pricing of other securities, the price levels of those other securities will be affected if the securities with BPA are sufficiently large relative to the market as a whole.

We present a simple model of managerial reporting bias for a setting in which the capital market is uncertain about the manager's reporting objective. In this setting, the manager's reporting bias reduces the value relevance of the manager's report; that is, it adds noise to the report. Through comparative static results, our model yields insights into factors that affect the slope and intercept terms in a regression of price on earnings. Specifically, we find that the information content of the manager's report, as captured by the earnings slope coefficient, falls as the private cost to the manager of biasing reports falls, and as the uncertainty about the manager's objective increases. We also find that the magnitude of the adjustment for the expected amount of bias, as captured by the absolute value of the intercept, falls as the uncertainty about the manager's objective increases. Finally, to highlight conditions under which managers would lobby to retain an option to bias reports (i.e., retain reporting flexibility), we analyze the effect of the option to bias on the manager's welfare. For example, we show that the ex ante benefit from biasing the report is positive if there is sufficient uncertainty about the manager's reporting objective.

Reviews the book "Intermediate Accounting," 7th ed., by Jay M. Smith and K. Fred Skousen.