Prior studies suggest that earnings and non-earnings information can be complementary to each other (Lundholm, 1988). Given the co-existence of both components, a lack of non-earnings information can end up boosting earnings explanatory power on returns in certain circumstances, producing spuriously high earnings transparency (ET) in Barth et al. (2013). This scenario is plausible when insiders are motivated to exploit their information advantage and discretionarily alter non-mandatory disclosure strategy. Conditional on higher insider trading profit, we uncover a positive relation between the firm-specific earnings transparency and crash risk. In addition, the above relation is more pronounced with respect to selling and profitable insider transactions. Overall, we demonstrate a potential dark side of high earnings explanatory power on stock returns, conditional on higher likelihood of non-earnings information hoarding.

This study examines the rather controversial practice of managerial hedging, which allows CEOs to delink their compensation from stock price performance. We presume that boards are aware of these practices and adjust the weights placed on accounting‐based and stock‐based performance measures in executive compensation contracts to mitigate the problem. Empirically, we find that, in the presence of managerial hedging opportunities, accounting‐based performance measures receive more weight, whereas stock‐based performance measures receive less weight in determining executive compensation. Moreover, these results are more pronounced when managerial hedging needs are high. Regarding the effects of earnings management resulting from accounting‐based incentives, we find that good auditing and strong governance mechanisms strengthen the benefit of placing more weight on accounting‐based performance measures. Taken together, our findings suggest that corporate boards shift the relative weights of performance measures in compensation contracts in response to managerial hedging opportunities, which is consistent with optimal contracting.

We investigate the impact of mutual fund herding behaviours on stock price crashes. There are competing hypotheses with respect to how investors’ herding behaviours are associated with information processing. Our empirical evidence shows that mutual fund herding is associated with a poor information environment and low disclosure quality. More importantly, mutual fund herding amplifies stock price crash risk afterwards. The main finding is concentrated on buy-herding rather than sell-herding. To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we use the 2004 SEC mutual fund disclosure regulation change as an exogenous shock and the results hold. We further use propensity score matching to alleviate the impact of information asymmetry. Finally, additional analysis reveals that our results are not driven by the price impact hypothesis.