Knowledge that Transforms

Has the dominance of the dollar in global trade rendered monetary policy ineffective? An emerging view contends that if a country invoices its exports in dollars, exchange rates cannot stabilize economic activity, as the classical expenditure-switching channel is muted. This view rests on the premise that export prices are sticky in dollars, breaking the link between export demand and depreciations. But this assumption is not borne out by the data: goods priced in dollars tend to have more flexible prices, along with higher elasticities of substitution. We propose a model with more realistic assumptions and show that even with dollar pricing, depreciating the currency by loosening monetary policy can still boost exports and activity materially. The limit to any expansion is not demand, but supply capacity. We also show that low exchange rate pass-through to dollar prices is not informative about price stickiness. The price response to exchange rates is small when demand elasticities are high, even with flexible prices: low pass-through is an equilibrium result, not evidence of a nominal friction.

This article examines the global adoption of technology in the late nineteenth century. We construct several novel data sets to test the idea that the codification of technical knowledge in the vernacular was necessary for countries to absorb the technologies of the first Industrial Revolution. We find that comparative advantage shifted to industries that could benefit from these technologies in countries and colonies with access to codified technical knowledge, but not in other regions. Using the rapid and unprecedented codification of technical knowledge in Meiji Japan as a natural experiment, we show that this pattern emerged only after the Japanese government codified vast amounts of technical knowledge. Our findings shed new light on the frictions associated with technological diffusion and offer a novel explanation for why Meiji Japan was unique among non-Western countries in successfully industrializing during the first wave of globalization.

This article studies the returns to enrolling in U.S. public universities by comparing the long-term outcomes of barely admitted versus barely rejected applicants. I use administrative admission records spanning all 35 public universities in Texas, which collectively enroll 10% of all American public university students, to systematically identify and employ decentralized cutoffs in SAT/ACT scores that generate discontinuities in admission and enrollment. The typical marginally admitted student gains an additional year of education in the four-year sector, becomes 12 percentage points more likely to ever earn a bachelor’s degree, and eventually earns 8% more than their marginally rejected but otherwise identical counterpart. Marginally admitted students pay no additional tuition costs thanks to offsetting grant aid; cost-benefit calculations show internal rates of return of 26% for the marginal students themselves, 16% for society (which must pay for the additional education), and 7% for the government budget. Earnings gains are similar across admitting institutions of varying selectivity, but smaller for students from low-income families, who spend more time enrolled but complete fewer degrees and major in less lucrative fields. Finally, I develop a method to separately identify effects for students on the extensive margin of attending any university versus those on the margin of attending a more selective one, revealing larger effects on the extensive margin.

We trace the evolution of the language of science, religion, and political economy in the centuries leading to the British Industrial Revolution. Using textual analysis of 264,443 works printed in England between 1500 and 1900, we test whether British culture manifested a belief in progress associated with science and industry. Our analysis yields three main findings. First, there was a separation in the languages of science and religion beginning in the mid-eighteenth century. Second, volumes using language at the nexus of science and political economy became more progress-oriented during the Enlightenment. Third, volumes using industrial language—especially those at the science-political economy nexus—were more progress-oriented beginning in the eighteenth century.

We present a theory of choice in which attention to the features of options is determined by the decision maker’s categorization of the current problem in a set of problems she solved in the past. Categorization depends on goal-relevant and contextual problem-level features. The model yields heterogeneity in attention and choice in a given problem based on different past experiences and instability when changes in irrelevant context cause recategorization. We show that heterogeneous and unstable representations of a choice problem unify major biases in judgment and decision making.

Why do banks fail? We create a panel covering most commercial banks from 1863 through 2024 to study the history of failing banks in the United States. Failing banks are characterized by rising asset losses, deteriorating solvency, and an increasing reliance on expensive noncore funding. These commonalities imply that bank failures are highly predictable using simple accounting metrics from publicly available financial statements. Failures with runs were common before deposit insurance, but these failures are strongly related to weak fundamentals, casting doubt on the importance of non-fundamental runs. Furthermore, low recovery rates on failed banks’ assets suggest that most failed banks subject to runs were fundamentally insolvent, barring large value destruction of receiverships. Altogether, our evidence suggests that the primary cause of bank failures and banking crises is almost always and everywhere a deterioration of bank fundamentals.

This article empirically studies the effects of the early law and economics movement on the U.S. judiciary. We focus on the Manne Economics Institute for Federal Judges, an intensive economics course that trained almost half of federal judges between 1976 and 1999. Using the universe of published opinions in U.S. Circuit Courts and 1 million District Court criminal sentencing decisions, we estimate the within-judge effect of Manne program attendance. Selection into attendance was limited, as the program was popular among judges of all backgrounds, frequently oversubscribed, and admitted participants on a first-come, first-served basis. We find that after attending economics training, participating judges use more economics language in their opinions, rule against regulatory agencies more often, and impose more severe criminal sentences. We argue that economics, as a rigorous social science, was especially effective in persuading judges.

We examine whether financial performance metrics in CEO compensation contracts provide incentives for environmental performance improvement, and the conditions under which such incentives arise. Using toxic pollution as our primary outcome, we find that relative financial performance evaluation (RPE) is negatively associated with future pollution in firms whose environmental impacts are subject to greater scrutiny, whereas other financial incentives, such as equity portfolio delta and new equity grants, show no such association. This pattern is consistent with theories of corporate social responsibility and, as supported by complementary tests, with the idea that stronger environmental performance can improve a firm’s relative financial position by attracting customers, employees, and shareholders from less responsible peers. We further show that the RPE-pollution relation varies predictably with various RPE plan characteristics and stakeholder switching costs, persists when we instrument for the use of RPE, and operates in part through increased environmental innovation.

We propose life history (LH) theory as an overarching theoretical explanation of CEO preferences and decision-making. LH theory has the potential to integrate prior research on variation in top executives’ impact on decision outcomes and to demonstrate how observable differences in behavior can be explained by evolutionary drivers. According to LH theory, individuals pursue fast or slow LH strategies. Fast individuals tend to follow accelerated reproduction strategies and engage in impulsive, opportunistic, and risk-seeking behavior. We theorize how CEO LH strategies shape both on-the-job and off-the-job decisions and thus add to a growing body of research on evolutionary drivers of preferences and decision-making in accounting. We measure CEO LH strategies based on biodemographic micro-data related to reproductive behavior. Our findings linked to on-the-job decisions suggest that firms managed by CEOs who pursue fast LH strategies exhibit more financial irregularities, lower accounting conservatism, and higher earnings management. Findings related to CEO off-the-job decisions show that fast CEOs are more likely to engage in criminal behavior and to have a higher conspicuous consumption and a higher personal leverage. By applying an LH theory lens, we reconcile and advance prior fragmented research on CEO preferences by showing a clear theoretical link between on-the-job and off-the-job decisions.