This paper shows that the existing estimates of prewar gross national product exaggerate the size of cyclical fluctuations. The source of the exaggeration is that the original Kuznets estimates are based on the assumption that GNP moves one-for-one with commodity output valued at producer prices. New estimates of GNP for 1869-1918 are derived using the estimated aggregate relationship between GNP and commodity output for the interwar and postwar eras. The new estimates of GNP indicate that the business cycle is only slightly more severe in the pre-Worid War I era than in the post-World War II era.

This paper examines the aftermath of postwar financial crises in advanced countries. We construct a new semiannual series on financial distress in 24 OECD countries for the period 1967–2012. The series is based on assessments of the health of countries' financial systems from a consistent, real-time narrative source, and classifies financial distress on a relatively fine scale. We find that the average decline in output following a financial crisis is statistically significant and persistent, but only moderate in size. More important, we find that the average decline is sensitive to the specification and sample, and that the aftermath of crises is highly variable across major episodes. A simple forecasting exercise suggests that one important driver of the variation is the severity and persistence of financial distress itself. At the same time, we find little evidence of nonlinearities in the relationship between financial distress and the aftermaths of crises.