To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
3 results ✕ Clear filters

CFO social capital, liquidity management, and the market value of cash✰

Journal of Banking & Finance 2024 163, 107163 open access
We find that firms with CFOs who have extensive social connections within the finance industry hold less precautionary cash. CFO connections matter more than CEO connections, reflecting the preeminence of CFOs among C-level executives in cash management and negotiating access to corporate finance. Firms reduce the proportion of assets held in cash by seven percentage points in the two years following CFO turnover and the appointment of a CFO with finance industry connections. The stock market valuation of incremental cash holdings of firms with well-connected CFOs is lower than for other firms, consistent with investor recognition of CFO social capital as an alternative means to address constraints on external capital.

Director networks and informed traders

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2016 62(1), 1-23 open access
We provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial institutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board members. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest and lowest quintile of informed trading ranges from 4% to 7.2% compared to the same return difference in firms with less connected directors. Sophisticated investors better predict outcomes of upcoming earnings surprises and firm-specific news sentiment for companies with more connected directors. Changes in board connectedness are positively associated with changes in measures of adverse selection.

Indirect Insider Trading

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2023 58(6), 2327-2364 open access
Insiders must disclose indirect trades made through accounts they control, including family, trust, retirement, and foundation accounts. Indirect trades through these accounts are more profitable than direct trades in the insider’s own account. They are also more likely to be made by “opportunistic” insiders who make nonroutine trades, or who trade profitably before earnings announcements, or who have a short investment horizon. These trades contain more predictive information about earnings surprises and large price changes, and they tend to be made by insiders at firms with high information asymmetry. Insiders also make fewer indirect trades following periods of intense regulatory scrutiny.