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Early History of the Term Capital

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 40(2), 329
Journal Article Early History of the Term Capital Get access R. D. Richards R. D. Richards London, England Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 40, Issue 2, February 1926, Pages 329–338, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884622 Published: 01 February 1926

Wages, Risk, and Profits in the Whaling Industry

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 40(4), 644
I. Wages. — The lay system of wage payment, 641. — Partial shifting of industrial risk from entrepreneur to worker, but no corresponding change in the proportion of profits and wages, 644. — The fall of the fractional lay, 648. — Real wages further lowered by abuses and extortionate charges, 650. — Lack of incentive under the lay system, 651. — Cosmopolitan character of the whaling crews, 653. — Whaling properly regarded as a trade, 654. II. Risk. — The whaling entrepreneur preeminently a dealer in risks. — Three main types: labor, physical, and business risks, 655. — Extraordinary fluctuations in whaling cargoes, 657. — Measures designed to offset risks: the lay system, diversified ownership, marine insurance, 659. III. Profits. — Extreme fluctuations, 662. — Average profits, 663. — Normal rate of profit a modest one, 665. — Illustration of "prizes and blanks" theory, 666. — Relative proportions of profits and wages, 667. — Despite large element of chance, business ability essential for long-run success, 667.

Theories of Business Fluctuations

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 41(1), 94
Definition of the phrases "business fluctuations, " 94; "business cycle, " 95; "periodic cycle, " 95. — Concept of normal, 96. — Old and new meanings attached to "commercial crisis, " 98. — Classification of the theories according to emphasis placed on causes, 99. — Extracts from writers emphasizing factors other than economic institutions, 104. — Extracts from writers emphasizing economic institutions, 109.

Partial Elasticity of Demand

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 40(3), 393
Elasticity of demand and flexibility of prices, 394. — Equations to simple demand curves, 395. — Partial flexibility of prices, and partial elasticity of demand, 396. — Equations to demand functions revealing the partial elasticities and partial flexibilities, 398. — Conclusions, 400.

A Theory of Economic Oscillations

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 41(1), 1
Introduction, 1. — Walrasian equations, 3. — Partial elasticity of demand, 9. — Partial elasticity of supply, 15. — Coefficients of production, 17. — A moving general equilibrium, 23. — Economic oscillations, 26. — Conclusions, 28.

The Nature and Fundamental Elements of Costs

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 41(1), 30
The historical development of the theory of costs has been away from the disutility analysis of the classicists. — The view that costs are payments for the means of production, arising out of the resistances which they occasion, and set in a competitive price-bidding process, 36. — These resistances resolved into eight scarcity-factors, which are the fundamental elements of costs, 41. — The analysis applied to costs encountered in business enterprise: wages, interest, rents, depreciation, insurance, taxes, and profits. — All can be broken down into the eight elements named 47. — The introduction of monopoly profits into the prices of materials necessitates a distinction between competitive and restrictive costs, 59. — This analysis of costs suggests that an approach to the theory of distribution along similar lines would be fruitful, 62.

Industrial Invention: Heroic, or Systematic?

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 40(2), 232
I. Purpose of this paper: to survey the literature, to examine current practice, and to classify the facts needed for a tenable theory, 233. — II. The heroic explanation, commonly found in biographies, 237. — Inventive abilities not so rare as commonly supposed, 241. — III. Theories of successive increments, 242. — Cumulative character of contribution and discovery, 243. — This intensified by our greater willingness both to accept and to give, 251. — IV. Organized industrial research and invention on the part of large corporations, 253. — Methods by which new devices are developed, 255. — Cooperative character of the procedure, 258. — V. Materialistic explanations, 260. — The profit motive not so essential in some instances as in others, 266. — The real question: what proportion of usable inventions comes from professional inventors? 268. — VI. Conclusion: what sort of inductive study is needed, 269.

The Doctrine of Comparative Cost

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 41(1), 63
I. The value problem in international trade theory, 63. — II. Relation of real costs to value in general theory and in the theory of international trade, 65. — The importance of a unit of measurement of real costs. 66. — III. Position of the doctrine of comparative cost in international trade theory, 72. Treatment by Ricardo and Mill of the relation of real costs to value, 72. — IV. Cairnes and the doctrine of non-competing groups, 77. — Importance of this for the doctrine of comparative cost, 81. — V. Treatment by Bastable and Marshall of therelation of real costs to value in value theory and in the theory of comparative cost, 83. —V I. Summary and conclusion, 92.

Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 40(3), 353
Restricted voting control comparatively recent, 353. — I. Non-voting industrial stocks. Preferred issues, 357. — Common stock, 360. — II. Contingent voting industrial stocks; their importance and characteristics, 362. — Non-voting contingent voting issues, 364. — Non-voting with exceptions — contingent voting, 364. Non-voting for directors — contingent voting, 366. — Full voting — contingent voting, 367. — III. Conditions which render operative the contingent voting rights. Dividend defaults, 367. — Other contingencies, 372. — IV. Extent of contingent voting control when operative. Exclusive voting, 374. — Extra voting, 375. — Full voting, 376. — Exclusive voting for directors, 377. — Contingent voting common shares, 378. — V. Railroad and public utility non-voting and contingent voting stocks: Utilities, 378; Railroads, 381. — VI. Arguments for and against non-voting stocks, 382. — Advisable to prohibit strictly non-voting issues, 385. — Ineffectiveness of full voting rights to prevent centralized voting control, 386. — VII. Conclusion. Advantages of strong contingent voting issues, 388.

The Sea Loan in Genoa in the Twelfth Century

Quarterly Journal of Economics 1926 40(3), 495
Introductory: connection between the ancient Greek and Roman sea loan and the medieval Genoese type, 495. — Position of the sea loan before the Civil and Canon Law, 499. — The bona fide sea loan, 501. — Interest rates charged, 505. — Time and method of repayment, 507. — Security required, 508. — The pignus type of sea loan, 510. — Its importance as an addition to the credit machinery of Genoa, 511. — As a means of speculation, 518. — The usury-evasion type, 520. — Operation of the insurance principle, 523. — Relationship of medieval sea loan and modern bottomry bond, 526. — Conclusion, 528.