Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the magnitude and determinants of transactions costs for a sample of institutional traders with different investment styles. Using order-level data for recent equity transactions totaling $83 billion, we find that trading costs are economically significant and increase with trade difficulty. In addition, costs vary with traderspecific factors such as investment style and order submission strategy, as well as stock-specific factors such as exchange listing. We find evidence that institutional trades in exchange-listed stocks have lower costs than in comparable Nasdaq stocks.

This paper studies contingent claim valuation in a Lucas-type exchange economy. The derived fundamental valuation equation differs from its Cox-Ingersoll-Ross production-economy counterpart in that it is expressed in terms of the direct utility function and an exogenous output process, thus offering superior tractability. We apply our approach to derive closed-form solutions for bond, bond option, individual stock, and stock option prices, under a more general setting than allowable in the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross framework. The resulting interest rate and stock price dynamics are empirically plausible. Moreover, our stock option pricing formula with stochastic volatility and interest rates can reconcile certain puzzling empirical regularities, including the volatility smile.

We report that ownership structure significantly affects the likelihood of a change in top executive. Controlling for stock price performance, the probability of top executive turnover is negatively related to the ownership stake of officers and directors and positively related to the presence of an outside blockholder. In addition, the likehood of a change in top executive is significantly less sensitive to stock price performance in firms with higher managerial ownership. Finally, we document an unusually high rate of corporate control activity in the twelve months preceding top executive turnover. We conclude that ownership structure has an important influence on internal monitoring efforts and that this influence stems in part from the effect of ownership structure on external control threats.

The trading structure differences between the NYSE and the Nasdaq market could produce different levels of trading liquidity. Several studies have attempted to measure these differences by comparing bid-ask spreads. This paper uses an alternative approach to compare liquidity. We analyze three issues: (1) the frequencies of the sizes and types of block trades found in the two markets, (2) the immediate price effects of the block transactions, and (3) the temporary and permanent price effects of the blocks. We find evidence that the NYSE system provides more liquidity for block transactions.

This paper develops a model of the optimal investment strategy for a firm confronted with a sequence of technological innovations. We incorporate many of the most important characteristics of real-world technology markets. For example, we permit innovations to be stochastic in their arrival times and their profitability. We also incorporate learning so that firms adopting current innovations become better able to benefit from future innovations. The model yields four distinct investment strategies. The model is then used to predict actual firm policy. These implications are discussed and compared with observed firm behavior.

This paper examines the value effects of improvements in the trading mechanism. Selected stocks on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange were transferred gradually from a daily call auction to a mechanism where the call auction was followed by iterated continuous trading sessions. This event was associated with a positive and permanent price appreciation. The cumulative average market-adjusted return over a period that started five days prior to the announcement and ended 30 days after the stocks started trading by the new method was approximately 5.5%. In addition, we find positive liquidity externalities (spillovers) across related stocks, and improvements in the value discovery process due to the improved trading method. Finally, there was a positive association between liquidity gains and price appreciation.

We examine execution costs for trades in NYSE issues completed on the NYSE, the NASD dealer market, and the regional stock exchanges during 1994. We find that effective bid-ask spreads are only slightly smaller at the NYSE. However, realized bid-ask spreads, which measure market-making revenue net of losses to betterinformed traders but gross of inventory or order-processing costs, are lower on the NYSE by a factor of two to three. This differential is attributable to the successful ‘cream skimming’ of uninformed trades by off-NYSE market makers. These findings reinforce existing concerns about whether orders are routed so as to receive the best possible execution.

Stadard asset pricing models generally exclude corporate control and liquidity considerations as joint explanatory factors of the stock price formation process. This empirical study investigates their influence on Swiss Bearer and Registered share prices issued by the same firm. It is shown that the statistical properties of both shares' returns differ without implying profitable arbitrage opportunities. A multifactor model of the ‘premium’ between Bearer and Registered stock prices is then proposed and tested. The results show that the freely negotiable equity book value, the existence of dominant shareholder positions and ownership transfer regime changes are significant variables in explaining the dual class share price differential.

This paper presents an asymmetric information model of share repurchases when shareholders have heterogeneous reservation values. Consistent with empirical evidence, managers in the model repurchase shares at a premium above the post-repurchase share value — transferring wealth from shareholders who do not tender to those who do — in order to signal that the firm is undervalued. Such dilutive repurchases would not occur under the classical assumption of perfectly elastic share supply; they depend critically on shareholder heterogeneity. It is also shown that repurchases are more efficient signals than other strategies like dividends and ‘burning money’. The model's implications are consistent with much empirical evidence regarding announcement returns, repurchase size, repurchase premiums and expiration-day price drops.

A model of the equity takeover premium is developed that demonstrates a direct link between the percentage premium paid to target shareholders and the target firm's capital structure and asset structure. We test the model using a sample of 145 cash tender offers and find that target abnormal returns increase with the target's liability to equity ratio and decrease with the target's financial asset to equity ratio. The addition of these variables dramatically improves the explanatory power of regressions explaining percentage takeover premiums paid to target shareholders.