Knowledge that Transforms

This study provides evidence of the role of both legal and extra‐legal institutions in limiting the income management induced by the detachment of control rights from the cash flow rights of ultimate owners. The tests use a unique, comprehensive data set for firm‐level control and ownership structures from 9 East Asian and 13 Western European countries. Univariate regressions show that income management that is induced by the wedge between control rights and cash flow rights is significantly limited in countries with high statutory protection of minority rights (proxied by legal tradition, minority rights protection, the efficiency of the judicial system, or disclosure standards) and effective extra‐legal institutions (proxied by the effectiveness of competition laws, diffusion of the press, and tax compliance). Furthermore, multiple regression results show that a common law tradition and an efficient judicial system subsume the effects of the other legal institutions, and that a high rate of tax compliance subsumes the effects of the other extra‐legal institutions in curbing insider income management. It is surprising that a high rate of tax compliance ultimately has a greater effect than legal tradition and the efficiency of the judicial system. Although this finding is unexpected, given prior evidence on the dominant roles of legal institutions in macroeconomic issues and corporate policies, it is consistent with the recent argument that effective tax enforcement is like a public good in that it can reduce insiders' private control benefits. An implication of this finding is that closer attention to extra‐legal institutions has the potential to enhance our understanding of the institutional reforms needed to limit insider private control benefits.

This paper extends the variance decomposition framework of Campbell [1991], Campbell and Ammer [1993], and Vuolteenaho [2002] to address the relative value relevance of accrual news, cash flow news, and expected‐return news in driving firm‐level equity returns. The extension is based on the Feltham‐Ohlson [1995, 1996] clean surplus relations. Using three models, this study shows that all three factors, accruals, cash flows, and expected future discount rates are value relevant. Moreover, accrual news is found to significantly dominate expected‐return news in driving firm‐level stock returns. Operating income news is also found to significantly dominate both expected‐return news and free cash flow news in driving firm‐level stock returns. Furthermore, after splitting net income into cash flow and accrual earnings components in the Vuolteenaho model, accrual earnings news and cash flow earnings news are found to equally drive firm‐level stock returns and to dominate expected‐return news. Further disaggregation of the data yields some evidence that accrual earnings news is a more important factor than cash flow earnings news in driving current stock returns. Overall, the three models indicate that changes in expected future accruals are a primary driver, if not the primary driver, of current stock returns.

This paper uses a sample of more than 2,500 firms from 27 countries to investigate the relation among ownership structure, analyst following, investor protection, and valuation. We find that analysts are less likely to follow firms with potential incentives to withhold or manipulate information, such as when the family/management group is the largest control rights blockholder. Furthermore, this relation is stronger for firms from low‐shareholder‐protection countries. Using valuation regressions that take into account potential endogeneity between analyst following and firm value, we find a positive valuation effect when analysts cover firms that have both potentially poor internal governance and weak country‐level external governance. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate governance plays an important role in analysts' willingness to follow firms and that increased analyst following is associated with higher valuations, particularly for firms likely to face governance problems.

This paper considers how the presence of a speculative investor, who bets on a firm's future earnings report, affects how the firm's management manipulates that report. We examine the influence of the speculator's information on earnings management behavior, quality of reported earnings, and stock price efficiency. We also provide predictions for, and interpretations of, short‐window event studies and long‐window association studies.

Recent research asserts that an essential feature of good corporate governance is strong investor protection, where investor protection is defined as the extent of the laws that protect investors' rights and the strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement . The purpose of this study is to test this assertion by investigating whether these measures of investor protection are associated with an important role of good corporate governance: identifying and terminating poorly performing CEOs. Our tests indicate that strong law enforcement institutions significantly improve the association between CEO turnover and poor performance, whereas extensive investor protection laws do not. In addition, we find that in countries with strong law enforcement, CEO turnover is more likely to be associated with poor stock returns when stock prices are more informative. Finding that strong law enforcement institutions are associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is consistent with good corporate governance requiring law enforcement institutions capable of protecting shareholders' property rights (i.e., protecting shareholders from expropriation by insiders). Finding that investor protection laws are not associated with improved CEO turnover‐performance sensitivity is open to several explanations. For example, investor protection laws may not be as important as strong law enforcement in fostering good governance, the set of laws we examine may not be the set that are most important in promoting good governance, or measurement error in our surrogate for extensive investor protection laws may reduce the power of our test of this variable.

We investigate corporate transparency, defined as the availability of firm‐specific information to those outside publicly traded firms. We conceptualize corporate transparency within a country as output from a multifaceted system whose components collectively produce, gather, validate, and disseminate information. We factor analyze a range of measures capturing countries' firm‐specific information environments, isolating two distinct factors. The first factor, interpreted as financial transparency, captures the intensity and timeliness of financial disclosures, and their interpretation and dissemination by analysts and the media. The second factor, interpreted as governance transparency, captures the intensity of governance disclosures used by outside investors to hold officers and directors accountable. We investigate whether these factors vary with countries' legal/judicial regimes and political economies. Our main multivariate result is that the governance transparency factor is primarily related to a country's legal/judicial regime, whereas the financial transparency factor is primarily related to political economy.

Inflation and foreign exchange raise new issues with respect to accounting representations of equity value. For example, inflation creates an earnings illusion as an artifact of the mismatching of expenses based on allocations of historical costs with current revenues in determining earnings. This mismatching distorts mappings of aggregate earnings and book values into equity value such that value‐relevant information is lost. In this article we consider the consequences of inflation and foreign exchange accounting policies, including those contained in accounting standards, on the value relevance of bottom‐line accounting numbers. Policies are identified that achieve efficient accounting in the sense that aggregate (comprehensive) earnings and book values are sufficient for an accounting representation of equity value. The linear relations that emerge provide predictions on capitalization coefficients that help explain results of empirical inquiries. As well, our analysis provides a theoretical foundation for policies contained in accounting standards that contributes to the resolution of controversies such as that concerning foreign exchange accounting.

This paper studies how an accountant's method of aggregating information in a financial report is affected by differences in the reliability and relevance of components of the report. We study a firm that hires an accountant to produce a report that reveals information to investors regarding the returns to the firm's past investments. In constructing the report, the accountant must combine information elicited from the firm's manager with other information directly observable to the accountant. The manager's information is assumed to be directly observable only by the manager and to be of superior quality to the other information available to the accountant. Reliability‐relevance trade‐offs arise because as the accountant places more weight on the manager's report, potentially more useful information gets included in the report, at the cost of encouraging the manager to distort his or her information to a greater extent. Capital market participants anticipate this behavior and price the firm accordingly. We show how the market's price response to the release of the firm's aggregate report, the efficiency of the firm's investment decisions, and the manager's incentives to manipulate the soft information under his or her control are all affected by—and affect—the aggregation procedure the accountant adopts. In addition, we identify a broad range of circumstances under which aggregated reports are strictly more efficient than disaggregated reports because aggregation tempers the manager's misreporting incentives. We also demonstrate that, as any given component of the aggregated accounting report becomes softer, the equilibrium level of the firm's investment diminishes and the market places greater weight on the remaining components of the report.

For a sample of U.S. firm years from 1980 through 1996 we document a positive association between the excess value of diversification as defined by Berger and Ofek [1995] and security analyst ratings of voluntary disclosure as developed by the Association for Investment Management and Research. We also examine an alternative proxy for disclosure quality that captures the degree of segment disaggregation and document a positive association between this measure and excess value. Our results are robust to controls for firm performance and information environment. Taken together, these phenomena suggest that disclosure plays a monitoring role in disciplining management's investment decisions. However, tests of the association between disclosure and the value of firms' investment spending yield mixed results.

This study empirically examines the impact of various competitive cost proxies on the extent of product‐related information disclosed by biotech initial public offerings (IPOs) in their prospectuses. The choice of biotech companies, which operate in a fiercely competitive environment, crystalizes the importance of competitive disclosure costs. The focus on product‐related information is aimed at a disclosure set for which potential competitive harm is a priori substantial. Our empirical analyses establish three disclosure determinants: the stage of product development, availability of patent protection, and venture capital backing. Additionally, we find the relative size of ownership retained by pre‐IPO owners to be negatively related to the extent of disclosure, as predicted by signaling models. We also document the expected inverse relation between the extent of information conveyed by the biotech IPOs and widely used measures of information asymmetry: the bid‐ask spread and quoted depth, as well as stock return volatility.