Knowledge that Transforms

Theories of valuation in process of development by Commissions, 269. — Plant and equipment. "Reproductive" value or original cost? 271. — Treatment of land value; peculiar position of St. Louis and New York Commissions, 274. — Pavements, 279. — Overhead charges; two methods of computing, 281. — Development expense and going values; Wisconsin method and New York method, 284. — Peculiar method in New Jersey, 287. — Conclusion, 291.

First attempt to dissolve the combination of the Harriman lines, 772. — Opinion of the Supreme Court, 773. — Second unmerging plan, 774. — Difficulties encountered in separating the Southern Pacific from the Central Pacific, 775. — Attitude of the Pacific Coast, 778. — The State Railroad Commission of California refuses to approve proposed leases and other contracts in California, 785. — Modified version of the second unmerging plan, 786. — Third plan successful, 787. — Distribution of Baltimore and Ohio Stock, 789. — Final outcome of the proceedings, 790.

Journal Article The Development of Alaska by Government Railroads Get access Alfred H. Brooks Alfred H. Brooks U. S. Geological Survey, Washington, D. C. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 28, Issue 3, May 1914, Pages 586–596, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884991 Published: 01 May 1914

The War and the Financial Situation in the United States Get access O. M. W. Sprague O. M. W. Sprague Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, November 1914, Pages 181–186, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885302 Published: 01 November 1914

Journal Article Hobson's Work and Wealth Get access J. M. Clark J. M. Clark Amherst College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 29, Issue 1, November 1914, Pages 177–180, https://doi.org/10.2307/1885301 Published: 01 November 1914

Over-capitalization in (1) construction, 602. — (2) Replacement of property as inviting stock-watering, 602. — Incompetence or fraud, 603. — The Rock Island and Boston & Maine affairs, 604. — (3) Division of an accumulated surplus, 606. — Indirect devices therefor, 607.— Magnitude of railway surpluses, 608. — Equitable interest of the public therein, 609. — The opposing views stated, 610. — The just intermediate opinion, 611. — The Massachusetts gas companies, 613. — Difficult to apply in practice, 614. — (4) Refunding as a concomitant of inflation, 616. — (5) Stock-watering incidental to consolidation, 617. — Financial advantage of mergers, 618. — The New Haven collapse, 619. — Connecticut trolley finance, 620. — The Rhode Island companies, 621. — The Boston & Maine road and the Westchester Co., 622. — (6) Reorganization and stock-watering, 624. — The Third Avenue Railroad case, 626. — Conclusion, 628.

Public Ownership of Telegraphs and Telephones Get access A. N. Holcombe A. N. Holcombe Harvard University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 28, Issue 3, May 1914, Pages 581–586, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884990 Published: 01 May 1914

III. Difficulty of limiting the number and scope of trusts under a policy of regulation, 665. — Regulation implies fixing of prices or profits, or both, 668. — Difficulties of cost accounting, 670; of fluctuations in demand, 671. — Railroad regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commission proves nothing for trust regulation, 672. — The policy a stepping stone to socialism, 675. IV. The alleged advantages of combinations, 677. — Desire to secure monopoly and promoter's profits in fact the cause of combinations, 678. — A monopolistic combination not necessarily more efficient than a limited one, 679. — Inductive evidence inconclusive, 680.General reasoning, on advantages from magnitude of operations, 685; from combination as such, 686; from elimination of competition, 689. — Monopoly tends to stagnation, 695. — Summary of conclusions, 696.

I. Introductory. Definitions of trust, pool, industrial combination, 382. — Theory that elimination of unfair competition and special privileges would rob combinations of monopoly power, 383. — Difficulty of proof or disproof from experience, 385. — Power of pools to advance prices, 389. — Trust prices, 390. — Oil, sugar, tobacco and steel trusts, 391. — Unfair competitive methods and special privileges not sufficient explanation of monopoly power, 393. — The power of combinations as such to maintain monopoly prices, 395. — Theoretical reasoning on the probable influence of combination and the impossibility of competition, 396. — Consequent necessity of regulation or prohibition, 400. II. Possibility of preventing combination, 402. — Success of certain Federal cases against combinations, 402. — Deterrent effect of more severe penalties, 404. — Reasons for failure of certain trust dissolutions to restore competition, 405. — Possibility of destroying and preventing formal trusts and pools, 408. — Weakness of informal understandings, 410.