This review of liquidity traps unifies three landmark economic downturns—the US Great Depression, the Great Recession, and Japan’s Long Recession—into a single analytical framework. We examine various forces that drive natural interest rates negative: temporarily (such as banking crises and debt overhangs) or permanently (such as demographic shifts and inequality). When policy rates hit the zero lower bound, conventional monetary tools lose traction. Under a standard monetary policy regime, counterintuitive paradoxes emerge: Greater price flexibility deepens recessions, and positive supply shocks become contractionary. We show how policy effects—including the size of fiscal multipliers, forward guidance, and these paradoxes—depend critically on the monetary-fiscal regime and on central bank credibility. The paper explains how regime changes, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1933 abandonment of the gold standard and balanced-budget dogmas, successfully reversed deep slumps by credibly shifting expectations. We examine whether secular-stagnation forces are likely to assert themselves in the coming decades.

Factor models yield an R 2 insignificantly different from 0 for one-third of hedge funds in a broad sample. These funds illustrate the concept of market neutrality and feature lower volatilities, higher Sharpe ratios, and higher alphas than other funds, indicating that they provide a successful alternative investment. However, large portfolios of zero- R 2 funds contain fully half the volatility of portfolios of other funds, suggesting that they feature substantial systematic risk. Furthermore, these funds display an increased probability of failure even after controlling for idiosyncratic volatility. These results indicate the presence of an omitted factor that exposes investors to significant downside risk.

I study the dynamics of investor cash flows in socially responsible mutual funds. Consistent with anecdotal evidence of loyalty, the monthly volatility of investor cash flows is lower in socially responsible funds than in conventional funds. I find strong evidence that cash flows into socially responsible funds are more sensitive to lagged positive returns than cash flows into conventional funds, and weaker evidence that cash outflows from socially responsible funds are less sensitive to lagged negative returns. These results indicate that investors derive utility from the socially responsible attribute, especially when returns are positive.

This article studies the determinants of college major choice using an experimentally generated panel of beliefs, obtained by providing students with information on the true population distribution of various major-specific characteristics. Students logically revise their beliefs in response to the information, and their subjective beliefs about future major choice are associated with beliefs about their own earnings and ability. We estimate a rich model of college major choice using the panel of beliefs data. While expected earnings and perceived ability are a significant determinant of major choice, heterogeneous tastes are the dominant factor in the choice of major. Analyses that ignore the correlation in tastes with earnings expectations inflate the role of earnings in college major choices. We conclude by computing the welfare gains from the information experiment and find positive average welfare gains.

Externalities between buyers are shown to induce delays in negotiations between a seller and several buyers. Delays arise in a perfect and complete information setting with random matching even when there is no deadline. While with a deadline we identify delays both for positive and negative externalities, without a deadline we find that (1) when externalities are positive, there exists no SPNE in pure strategies with bounded recall that exhibits delay; (2) when externalities are negative, it may happen that all SPNE with bounded recall have the property that long periods of waiting alternate with short periods of activity: This is the cyclical delay phenomenon.

We consider an economy with pure factors of production, private ownership of endowments and constant returns to scale in production. Typically in such an economy, the weak axiom of revealed preference for market demand does not hold. The main reason for this is that the income distribution in such a private ownership economy depends too sensitively on the price system.

Journal Article Social Choice and Individual Ranking I Get access B. Fine, B. Fine Birkbeck College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar K. Fine K. Fine University of Edinburgh Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 41, Issue 3, July 1974, Pages 303–322, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296751 Published: 01 July 1974

R. Bentzel, B. Hansen; On Recursiveness and Interdependency in Economic Models1, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 22, Issue 3, 1 January 1954, Pages