Knowledge that Transforms

Real-Time Macroeconomic Monitoring: Real Activity, Inflation, and Interactions by S. Borağan Aruoba and Francis X. Diebold. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 20-24 of American Economic Review, May 2010

Americanae nace como un proyecto conjunto que surge dentro de la Red Europea de Información y Documentación sobre América Latina (REDIAL), y que ha afrontado la Biblioteca de la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (AECID). Esta nueva biblioteca virtual hace más accesibles los libros digitales de tema americanista a los investigadores y usuarios interesados de cualquier parte del mundo.

Troy Davig and Eric Leeper (2007) have proposed a condition they call the generalized Taylor principle to rule out indeterminate equilibria in a version of the new-Keynesian model where the parameters of the policy rule follow a Markov-switching process. We show that although their condition rules out a subset of indeterminate equilibria, it does not establish uniqueness of the fundamental equilibrium. We discuss the differences between indeterminate fundamental equilibria included by Davig and Leeper's condition and fundamental equilibria that their condition misses

Stop the Clock Policies and Career Success in Academia by Colleen Flaherty Manchester, Lisa M. Leslie and Amit Kramer. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 219-23 of American Economic Review, May 2010

Financial crashes were followed by deep recessions in the Sudden Stops of emerging economies. An equilibrium business cycle model with a collateral constraint explains this phenomenon as a result of the amplification and asymmetry that the constraint induces in the responses of macro-aggregates to shocks. Leverage rises during expansions, and when it rises enough it triggers the constraint, causing a Fisherian deflation that reduces credit and the price and quantity of collateral assets. Output and factor allocations fall because access to working capital financing is also reduced. Precautionary saving makes Sudden Stops low probability events nested within normal cycles, as observed in the data.

Offshoring and Wage Inequality: Using Occupational Licensing as a Shifter of Offshoring Costs by Chiara Criscuolo and Luis Garicano. Published in volume 100, issue 2, pages 439-43 of American Economic Review, May 2010

We study how conflict in contest games is influenced by rival parties being groups and by group members being able to punish each other. Our motivation stems from the analysis of sociopolitical conflict. The theoretical prediction is that conflict expenditures are independent of group size and of whether punishment is available. We find, first, that conflict expenditures of groups are substantially larger than those of individuals, and both are above equilibrium. Second, allowing group members to punish each other leads to even larger conflict expenditures. These results contrast with those from public goods experiments where punishment enhances efficiency.

We show, using novel data on currency and prices for US imports, that even conditional on a price change, there is a large difference in the exchange rate pass-through of the average good priced in dollars (25 percent) versus nondollars (95 percent). We document this to be the case across countries and within disaggregated sectors. This finding contradicts the assumption in an important class of models that the currency of pricing is exogenous. We present a model of endogenous currency choice in a dynamic price setting environment and show that the predictions of the model are strongly supported by the data.

Economics

We study an open economy where a pro-labor and a pro-business candidate compete in an election. The winner chooses taxes, which affect investment returns. Electoral outcomes depend on the size of the foreign debt, but the debt itself reflects expectations about the election. The resulting interaction is novel and has several implications. Elections are associated with increased volatility. Politico-economic crises can occur. Inefficiencies vanish if the candidates commit to an appropriate tax policy, but such commitments have predictable effects on the election. Empirical evidence supporting the theory is discussed.