This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady-state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to discovering qualitatively improved products and other firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined on the basis of the outcomes of $R & D$ races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is enhanced, however, only if the steady-state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level

This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model of economic growth. The model has a steady-state equilibrium in which some firms devote resources to discovering qualitatively improved products and other firms devote resources to copying these products. Rates of both innovation and imitation are endogenously determined on the basis of the outcomes of $R & D$ races between firms. Innovation subsidies are shown to unambiguously promote economic growth. Welfare is enhanced, however, only if the steady-state intensity of innovative effort exceeds a critical level

We predict that a firm's greater accounting comparability with its industry peers facilitates its learning from those peer firms' research and development (R&D) investments, allowing that firm to have greater innovative efficiency. We estimate accounting comparability using pro forma capitalized R&D earnings that link lagged R&D expenditures to future profitability employing the Almon (1965) distributed lag model. We find that greater accounting comparability leads to enhanced ability to predict future cash flows generated by R&D investments of peer firms. In the cross-section, we observe that the relation between accounting comparability and innovative efficiency is stronger if peer firms exhibit higher accounting (accrual) quality and are themselves successful innovators. In sum, this study shows that a shared qualitative characteristic of accounting, namely, accounting comparability, is positively associated with innovative efficiency

We study how relationship lending determines the financing of innovation. Exploiting a negative shock to relationships, we show that it reduces the number of innovative firms, especially those that depend more on relationship lending such as small, opaque firms. This credit supply shock leads to reallocation of inventors whereby young and productive inventors leave small firms and move out of geographical areas where lending relationships are hurt. Overall, our results show that credit markets affect both the level of innovation activity and the distribution of innovative human capital across the economy.Received April 11, 2013; editorial decision May 25, 2016 by Editor Andrew Karolyi

By integrating staggered interstate banking deregulation into a gravity model following Goetz, Laeven, and Levine (2013), (2016), we construct a time-varying, bank-specific instrument for geographic diversification and investigate its causal effect on corporate innovation via the lending channel. We find that bank geographic diversification spurs corporate innovation and enhances the economic value of innovation. We identify relaxing debt covenants and alleviating borrowers’ financial constraints as the two underlying mechanisms explaining the documented effects. Moreover, by offering lenient covenants, geographically diversified banks provide greater financial and operational flexibility to borrowing firms, enabling them to engage in future mergers and acquisitions

We examine the relevance of informal contracting mechanisms for corporate innovation. Using social capital to capture the social costs imposed on opportunistic behavior by management, we report evidence that firms headquartered in states with higher levels of social capital are associated with more innovation. This result is more pronounced when employees are more susceptible to holdup (e.g., firms with low labor union coverage, firms located in states with weak legal protections for employees, and firms surrounded by few external employment opportunities) and when employees face higher levels of information asymmetry. Our study highlights the importance of informal contracts for innovation

We examine how financial disclosure policy affects a firm manager's strategy to innovate within a two‐period bandit problem featuring two production methods: an old method with a known probability of success, and a new method with an unknown probability. Exploring the new method in the first period provides the manager with decision‐useful information for the second period, thus creating a real option that is unavailable under exploiting the old known production method. Voluntary disclosure of the firm's financial performance provides the manager with another option to potentially conceal initial failure from the market. The interaction of these two options determines the manager's incentive to explore. In equilibrium, a myopic manager who cares about the interim market price may over‐ or under‐explore compared to the optimal exploration strategy that maximizes firm value. Our analysis shows that firms operating in an environment with voluntary disclosure early in the trial stage and mandated requirement later are most motivated to explore, while firms subject to early mandated disclosure and late voluntary disclosure are least likely to do so. We also provide empirical predictions about the link between the disclosure environment and the intensity and efficiency of corporate innovation

The purpose of this paper is to explain why some markets for financial products take off while others vanish as soon as they have emerged. To this end, we model an infinite sequence of CAPM-economies in which financial products can be used for insurance purposes. Agents' participation in these financial products, however, is restricted. Consecutive stage economies are linked by a mapping (“transition function”) which determines the next period's participation structure from the preceding period's participation. The transition function generates a dynamic process of market participation which is driven by the percentage of informed traders and the rate at which a new asset is adopted. We then analyse the evolutionary stability of stationary equilibria. In accordance with the empirical literature on financial innovation, it is obtained that the success of a financial innovation, a mutation, depends on a sufficiently high trading volume, marketing, and new and differentiated hedging opportunities. In particular, a set of complete markets forming a stationary equilibrium is robust with respect to any further financial innovation while this is not necessarily true for a set of incomplete markets

We examine the role of inventor CEOs—those with personal hands-on experience of innovation—in the financing of innovation. Using a sample of technology initial public offerings (IPOs) in the US, we document that inventor CEOs are associated with lower underpricing at the time of the IPOs. Inventor CEOs also appear more capable of taking their firms public during “cold” IPO market periods when financing conditions are more difficult. Analyses based on regulatory changes and a founder-only sample suggest that these relationships are causal. Further, inventor-led firms appear to invest the IPO proceeds more productively, as reflected in the firms’ superior innovation outcomes in the post-IPO period. The stock market fails to fully understand these relationships, and IPOs led by inventor CEOs produce large positive abnormal returns in the three years following the offering. Our findings are consistent with inventor CEOs facilitating innovation financing for startup firms by effectively reducing information asymmetry and valuation uncertainty of firm's innovation capital for outside investors

Using the case of the pogroms that took place in the historical region of the 'Pale of Settlement' in Eastern Europe, this paper analyzes the cultural legacy of ethnic violence and its long-term economic impact on access to finance and on corporate innovation. We find that firms in regions with a higher historical intensity of ethnic persecution face greater financial constraints, relying more on internal finance and experiencing reduced access to external finance. These financial limitations are linked to sluggish innovation activities among present-day firms. We propose that a mechanism of financial antipathy, rooted in a persistent anti-market culture fostered by historical ethnic animosity, explains these effects and reflects a long-term degradation of local social capital. Our results are supported by causal evidence using instrumental variables based on the precursors of historical inter-ethnic violence. The animosity and discrimination against the minority group appear to transfer to the broader economic activities in which that group was involved, creating lasting economic consequences for the majority population – consequences that continue to affect financial development and innovation to the present day