Knowledge that Transforms

On the online auction site eBay, by convention, sellers do not ship goods to winning bidders until after they have received payment, so there is an opportunity for sellers to take advantage of bidders' trust. Realizing this, the designers of eBay created a system that relies on self-enforcement using reputation. Several recent studies have found that bidders give little or no reward to sellers who have better reputations. I show that in fact, sellers are strongly rewarded for the first few reports that they have behaved honestly, but marginal returns to additional reports are severely decreasing.

Growth stability is an important objective—because development requires sustained increases in income, because volatility is costly for the poor, and because volatility deters growth. We study the determinants of average growth and its volatility as a two-equation system, and find that higher levels of democracy and diversification lower volatility, whereas volatility itself reduces growth. Muslim countries instrument for democracy, and measures of diversification identify volatility. In contrast to the lack of consensus on the democracy—growth relationship, the democracy—stability link is robust. Rather than focus on growth, this paper forges an alternative link between democracy and development through the volatility channel.

Because of its unique institutional and regulatory features, the generic drug industry provides a useful laboratory for understanding how competition evolves. We exploit these features to estimate a system of structural relationships in this industry, including the relationship between price and the number of competitors, and between drug characteristics and the entry process. Our methodology yields a number of findings regarding industry dynamics. We find that generic drug prices fall with increasing number of competitors, but remain above long-run marginal cost until there are eight or more competitors. We also find the size and time paths of generic revenues, rents, and the number of firms are greatly affected by expected market size. Finally, we show how estimates derived from a system of structural equations can be used to simulate the effect of changes in an exogenous variable.

We assess the total factor productivity of 35,752 manufacturing establishments before and after management buyouts (MBOs). MBO plants are less productive than comparable plants before the transfer of ownership. They experience a substantial increase in productivity after a buyout, which appears to be due to measures undertaken by new owners to reduce the labor intensity of production, via outsourcing of intermediate goods and materials. These findings, which are pervasive across industries, imply that MBOs reduce agency costs and enhance economic efficiency. Our evidence is consistent with Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002), who suggest that ownership changes shift resources to more efficient uses and to better managers.

I derive conditions under which a class of fixed-effects estimators consistently estimates the population-averaged slope coefficients in panel data models with individual-specific slopes, where the slopes are allowed to be correlated with the covariates. In addition to including the usual fixed-effects estimator, the results apply to estimators that eliminate individual-specific trends. I apply the results, and propose alternative estimators, to estimation of average treatment in a class of nonlinear unobserved-effects models.

In bridging the technology gap with the OECD nations, developing economies have access to three avenues of technological advance: domestic R&D, technology transfer, and foreign direct investment. This paper examines the contributions of each of these avenues, as well as their interactions, to productivity within Chinese industry. Based on a large data set for China's large and medium-size enterprises, the estimation results show that in-house R&D significantly complements technology transfer—whether of domestic or foreign origin. Foreign direct investment, which we assume is an important channel of proprietary technology transfer, does not facilitate the transfer of market-mediated foreign technology.

This paper is concerned with the effect of nonmonetary incentives on behavior, in particular with the study of social pressure as a determinant of corruption. We offer empirical evidence that shows how professional soccer referees favor home teams in order to satisfy the crowds in the stadium. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game to compensate for lost time due to unusual stoppages. We find that referees systematically favor home teams by shortening close games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games where the home team is behind. They show no such bias for games that are not close. We further find that when the rewards for winning games increase, referees change their bias accordingly. Lastly, we identify that the mechanism through which bias operates is to satisfy the crowd, by documenting how the size and composition of the crowd affect referee favoritism.

In numerous studies, economists have found little empirical evidence that environmental regulations affect trade flows. In this paper, we propose and test several common explanations for why the effect of environmental regulations on trade may be difficult to detect. We demonstrate that whereas most trade occurs among industrialized economies, environmental regulations have stronger effects on trade between industrialized and developing economies. We find that for most industries, pollution abatement costs are a small component of total costs, and are unrelated to trade flows. In addition, we show that those industries with the largest pollution abatement costs also happen to be the least geographically mobile, or footloose. After accounting for these distinctions, we measure a significant effect of pollution abatement costs on imports from developing countries, and in pollution-intensive, footloose industries.

In recent decades, growth of world trade has been driven largely by rapid growth of trade in intermediate inputs. Much of input trade involves multinational firms locating input processing in their foreign affiliates, thereby creating global vertical production networks. We use firm-level data on U.S. multinationals to examine trade in intermediate inputs for further processing between parent firms and their foreign affiliates. Among our main findings are that demand for imported inputs is higher when affiliates face lower trade costs, lower wages for less-skilled labor, and lower corporate income tax rates.

Knowledge flows within and across countries may have important consequences for both productivity and innovation. We use data on 1.5 million patents and 4.5 million citations to estimate knowledge flows at the frontier of technology across 147 subnational regions during 1975-1996 within the frame of a gravity-like equation. We estimate that only 20% of average knowledge is learned outside the average region of origin, and only 9% is learned outside the country of origin. However, knowledge in the computer sector flows substantially farther, as does knowledge generated by technological leaders. In comparison with trade flows, we see that knowledge flows reach much farther. External accessible R&D gained through these flows has a strong positive effect on innovative activity for a panel of 113 European and North American regions over 22 years.