Knowledge that Transforms

We provide general conditions under which principal-agent problems admit mechanisms that are optimal for the principal. Our result covers as special cases those in which the agent has no private information – i.e., pure moral hazard – as well as those in which the agent’s only action is a participation decision – i.e., pure adverse selection. We allow multi-dimensional actions and signals, as well as both …nancial and non-financial rewards. Beyond measurability, we require no a priori restrictions on the space of mechanisms. Consequently, our optimal mechanisms are optimal among all measurable mechanisms. A key to obtaining our result is to permit randomized mechanisms. We also provide conditions under which randomization is unnecessary.

A growing number of school districts use centralized assignment mechanisms to allocate school seats in a manner that reflects student preferences and school priorities. Many of these assignment schemes use lotteries to ration seats when schools are oversubscribed. The resulting random assignment opens the door to credible quasi-experimental research designs for the evaluation of school effectiveness. Yet the question of how best to separate the lottery-generated randomization integral to such designs from non-random preferences and priorities remains open. This paper develops easily-implemented empirical strategies that fully exploit the random assignment embedded in a wide class of mechanisms, while also revealing why seats are randomized at one school but not another. We use these methods to evaluate charter schools in Denver, one of a growing number of districts that combine charter and traditional public schools in a unified assignment system. The resulting estimates show large achievement gains from charter school attendance. Our approach generates efficiency gains over ad hoc methods, such as those that focus on schools ranked first, while also identifying a more representative average causal effect. We also show how to use centralized assignment mechanisms to identify causal effects in models with multiple school sectors.

We characterize optimal mechanisms for the multiple-good monopoly problem and provide a framework to find them.We show that a mechanism is optimal if and only if a measure µ derived from the buyer's type distribution satisfies certain stochastic dominance conditions.This measure expresses the marginal change in the seller's revenue under marginal changes in the rent paid to subsets of buyer types.As a corollary, we characterize the optimality of grand-bundling mechanisms, strengthening several results in the literature, where only sufficient optimality conditions have been derived.As an application, we show that the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items each supported on [c, c + 1] is a grand-bundling mechanism, as long as c is sufficiently large, extending Pavlov's result for 2 items [Pav11].At the same time, our characterization also implies that, for all c and for all sufficiently large n, the optimal mechanism for n independent uniform items supported on [c, c + 1] is not a grand bundling mechanism.

We present a flexible and scalable method for computing global solutions of highdimensional stochastic dynamic models.Within a time iteration or value function iteration setup, we interpolate functions using an adaptive sparse grid algorithm.With increasing dimensions, sparse grids grow much more slowly than standard tensor product grids.Moreover, adaptivity adds a second layer of sparsity, as grid points are added only where they are most needed, for instance, in regions with steep gradients or at nondifferentiabilities.To further speed up the solution process, our implementation is fully hybrid parallel, combining distributed and shared memory parallelization paradigms, and thus permits an efficient use of high-performance computing architectures.To demonstrate the broad applicability of our method, we solve two very different types of dynamic models: first, high-dimensional international real business cycle models with capital adjustment costs and irreversible investment; second, multiproduct menu-cost models with temporary sales and economies of scope in price setting.

We solve a general class of dynamic rational-inattention problems in which an agent repeatedly acquires costly information about an evolving state and selects actions. The solution resembles the choice rule in a dynamic logit model, but it is biased towards an optimal default rule that does not depend on the realized state. We apply the general solution to the study of (i) the sunk-cost fallacy; (ii) inertia in actions leading to lagged adjustments to shocks; and (iii) the tradeoff between accuracy and delay in decision-making.

In this paper we prove the existence of recursive equilibria in stochastic production economies with infinitely lived agents and incomplete financial markets. We consider a general dynamic model with several commodities, which encompasses heterogeneous agent versions of both the Lucas asset pricing model and the stochastic neo-classical growth model as special cases. Our main assumption is that there are atomless shocks to fundamentals that have a purely transitory component and a component that does not depend on last period's shocks directly.

We study a dynamic principal–agent relationship with adverse selection and limited commitment. We show that when the relationship is subject to productivity shocks, the principal may be able to improve her value over time by progressively learning the agent's private information. She may even achieve her first‐best payoff in the long run. The relationship may also exhibit path dependence, with early shocks determining the principal's long‐run value. These findings contrast sharply with the results of the ratchet effect literature, in which the principal persistently obtains low payoffs, giving up substantial informational rents to the agent.

We develop econometric tools for studying jump dependence of two processes from high-frequency observations on a fixed time interval. In this context, only segments of data around a few outlying observations are informative for the inference. We derive an asymptotically valid test for stability of a linear jump relation over regions of the jump size domain. The test has power against general forms of nonlinearity in the jump dependence as well as temporal instabilities. We further propose an efficient estimator for the linear jump regression model that is formed by optimally weighting the detected jumps with weights based on the diffusive volatility around the jump times. We derive the asymptotic limit of the estimator, a semiparametric lower efficiency bound for the linear jump regression, and show that our estimator attains the latter. The analysis covers both deterministic and random jump arrivals. In an empirical application, we use the developed inference techniques to test the temporal stability of market jump betas.

Robust Confidence Intervals for Average Treatment Effects under Limited Overlap *Estimators of average treatment effects under unconfounded treatment assignment are known to become rather imprecise if there is limited overlap in the covariate distributions between the treatment groups.But such limited overlap can also have a detrimental effect on inference, and lead for example to highly distorted confidence intervals.This paper shows that this is because the coverage error of traditional confidence intervals is not so much driven by the total sample size, but by the number of observations in the areas of limited overlap.At least some of these "local sample sizes" are often very small in applications, up to the point where distributional approximation derived from the Central Limit Theorem become unreliable.Building on this observation, the paper proposes two new robust confidence intervals that are extensions of classical approaches to small sample inference.It shows that these approaches are easy to implement, and have superior theoretical and practical properties relative to standard methods in empirically relevant settings.They should thus be useful for practitioners.

We study the estimation of (joint) moments of microstructure noise based on high frequency data. The estimation is conducted under a nonparametric setting, which allows the underlying price process to have jumps, the observation times to be irregularly spaced, and the noise to be dependent on the price process and to have diurnal features. Estimators of arbitrary orders of (joint) moments are provided, for which we establish consistency as well as central limit theorems. In particular, we provide estimators of autocovariances and autocorrelations of the noise. Simulation studies demonstrate excellent performance of our estimators in the presence of jumps, irregular observation times, and even rounding. Empirical studies reveal (moderate) positive autocorrelations of microstructure noise for the stocks tested.