Examines and determines the effect of client characteristics on auditor judgments in litigation risks. Financial condition considerations; Audit fees; Effect of rate of growth and market value to litigation risks; Table showing the summary of dependent and independent variables.
This classroom laboratory study compares the effects of two methods of teaching the Statement of Changes in Financial Position and two homework assignment strategies on student performance, time spent, and attitudes. The results indicate that students exposed to the direct teaching method scored higher on objective examination questions, spent more time on homework problems and examination problems, and perceived greater levels of understanding than students exposed to the add-back teaching method. Also, students assigned cash-basis homework problems showed higher levels of satisfaction with their instructor than students assigned working capital-basis homework problems. No interaction effects were significant.
This study reports the results of an experiment showing that auditor assessments of litigation risk and planned audit investments are higher when potential errors overstate financial performance than when those errors understate performance. This result is much stronger in the presence of high levels of litigation risk in the client’s industry. These results suggest that in industries where litigation risk is high audited financial statements may contain more unintentional material understatement errors than overstatement errors. Thus, litigation risk—through its effect on auditors—may encourage financial statements that understate firm performance
C. Bryan Cloyd, Jamie Pratt, Toby Stock, The Use of Financial Accounting Choice to Support Aggressive Tax Positions: Public and Private Firms, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Spring, 1996), pp. 23-43
James R. Frederickson, Sean A. Peffer, Jamie Pratt, Performance Evaluation Judgments: Effects of Prior Experience Under Different Performance Evaluation Schemes and Feedback Frequencies, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 151-165
This study identifies conditions under which the audit risk model does, and does not, describe audit-planning (investment and pricing) decisions. In an experiment, audit partners and managers examined one of two cases where a material misstatement—error or irregularity—was discovered. The auditors assessed the elements of the audit risk model, assessed business risk and provided recommendations for the audit investment and fee. When the likelihood of an error was high, the audit risk model dominated business risk in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee did not contain a risk premium. When the likelihood of an irregularity was high, business risk dominated the audit risk model in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee contained a risk premium. These results suggest that the ability of the audit risk model to describe auditor behavior and the inclination of auditors to charge a risk premium depend upon the nature of the risks present in the audit. In the presence of errors, the audit risk model adequately described audit-planning decisions; in the presence of irregularities it did not.
We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by (i) the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs. consistent with shareholders' interests) and (ii) the method of earnings management (accruals vs. real methods). Using a controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is impaired when the outcome of earnings management suggests that managers have put their interests above shareholders' interests and/or when the method of earnings management suggests that managers misreported the firm's economic performance. We argue that shareholders assess managers putting their interests above shareholders' interests as a signal of untrustworthiness because it involves a transfer of the firm's resources away from shareholders to managers. We argue that shareholders also assess managers' use of accruals to manage earnings as a signal of untrustworthiness because, in this instance, managers misreport the firm's economic performance. Finally, we show that trust mediates the combined effects of the outcome of earnings management and the method of earnings management on investment decisions. Our study incrementally contributes to the literature by highlighting the adverse implications of managers' use of accruals to manage earnings even when its outcome serves shareholders' interests.
In this study we conduct an experiment to examine how qualifying an income‐decreasing accounting change in years of strong financial performance affects financial report users' assessments of strategic reporting, current financial performance, and future financial performance (performance over the next three years). We find that without the qualification, users viewed the income‐decreasing accounting change as relatively nonstrategic and that user assessments of current and future performance were not different. In the presence of the qualification, users believed that the accounting change was relatively strategic, and they discounted the income effect of the accounting change. We find further that their assessments of future performance were below their assessments of current performance but no different from the assessments of future performance in the absence of the qualification. Although our findings suggest that audit qualifications encourage users to be skeptical of income‐decreasing accounting changes, we find no evidence that they impose negative consequences on management in terms of lower assessments of financial performance.