This paper investigates how competition for scarce corporate resources impacts innovation incentives within multidivisional firms and, consequently, shapes firms’ preferences for fostering or restricting intra-firm competition. In our model, divisions become privately informed about the potential value of new investment opportunities generated through their innovation initiatives. We demonstrate that intra-firm competition unambiguously reduces divisions’ ex ante innovation incentives. However, it benefits ex post resource allocation by enabling the firm to (i) select the most promising project and (ii) limit the rents divisions earn from their private information. Consequently, a firm’s preference to limit or encourage interdivisional competition hinges on balancing ex post allocative efficiency, which favors increased intra-firm competition, against ex ante innovation incentives, which favor reduced competition. Our analysis identifies plausible conditions under which each organizational design—competitive or exclusive innovation—emerges as the optimal choice

Stocks with increases in idiosyncratic risk tend to earn low subsequent returns for a few months. However, high idiosyncratic risk stocks eventually earn persistently high returns. These results are consistent with positively priced idiosyncratic risk and temporary underreaction to idiosyncratic risk innovations. Because risk levels and innovations are correlated, the relation between historical idiosyncratic risk and returns may reflect both risk premiums and underreaction and yield misleading inference regarding the price of risk. The results reconcile previous work offering conflicting evidence on the price of idiosyncratic risk and help to discriminate among explanations for the idiosyncratic risk-return relation

We examine how metric intensity—that is, the quantity, frequency, and extent to which performance metrics are tracked and used—varies with a firm's dependency on innovation for business success. Although performance metrics are essential in an organization's management control system, little is known about how the use of metrics differs in organizations with varying dependencies on incremental and radical innovation. Drawing on data from a sample of small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), we hypothesize and find that firms' dependency on incremental (radical) innovation is positively (negatively) associated with metric intensity. Furthermore, we find that (1) the positive relationship between the dependency on incremental innovation and metric intensity is stronger when the organizational culture is focused more on “control” and (2) the negative relationship between the dependency on radical innovation and metric intensity is mitigated when the organizational culture is focused more on “flexibility.” Additional analysis shows that the positive (negative) relationship between incremental (radical) innovation dependency and metric intensity can be mitigated by greater use of metrics for decision‐facilitating purposes. Our findings suggest that metrics‐based formal controls are designed to match the types of innovation dependencies and pre‐existing informal controls such as organizational culture. This study highlights the importance of distinguishing different types of innovation dependency in studying management control systems

We exploit the deregulation of interstate bank branching laws to test whether banking competition affects innovation. We find robust evidence that banking competition reduces state-level innovation by public corporations headquartered within deregulating states. Innovation increases among private firms that are dependent on external finance and that have limited access to credit from local banks. We argue that banking competition enables small, innovative firms to secure financing instead of being acquired by public corporations. Therefore, banking competition reduces the supply of innovative targets, which reduces the portion of state-level innovation attributable to public corporations. Overall, these results shed light on the real effects of banking competition and the determinants of innovation

The article shows that innovations are induced, since they become more profitable with the expansion of output. The amount of resources devoted to innovating activity, however, is in general not the optimal one because of the pressure of two opposing forces. On the one hand, competition between potential innovators tends to make this amount too large, on the other, the inability of innovators to capture all the benefits tends to make the amount too small. When all benefits are captured by the innovator either there is no economic growth due to innovations or else innovators are the sole beneficiaries from that growth. When benefits are diffused the innovation will always lead to economic growth, but only by sheer coincidence will it lead to maximum growth, which may be missed because the innovation is introduced either too early or too late. The rate of growth is always positive if the innovation is introduced too late. It may fall to zero with too-early introduction or even become negative if innovational activity is subsidized

This article explores the relationship between a firm’s legal contracting environment and its innovation incentives. Using granular data from the pharmaceutical industry, we examine a contracting mechanism through which incumbents maintain market power: “pay-for-delay” agreements to delay the market entry of competitors. Exploiting a shock where such contracts become legally tenuous, we find that affected incumbents subsequently increase their innovation activity across a variety of project-level measures. Exploring the nature of this innovation, we also find that it is more “impactful” from a scientific and commercial standpoint. The results provide novel evidence that restricting the contracting space can boost innovation at the firm level. However, at the extensive margin we find a reduction in innovation by new entrants in response to increased competition, suggesting a nuanced effect on aggregate innovation

This study examines the impact of managerial foreign experience on corporate innovation using manually collected data of Chinese listed companies. We find that managerial foreign experience is positively associated with corporate innovation. This association is robust to a series of robustness checks, including the use of Heckman two-step sample selection model, propensity score matching procedure, and the market reaction to the appointing announcements of managers with foreign experience. Further analyses indicate that senior managers with foreign experience have a more significant impact on corporate innovation than junior managers with foreign experience; both foreign study experience and foreign work experience have important impacts on corporate innovation; managers with foreign experience in private enterprises have more initiatives to innovate than in state-owned enterprises; and managers who gain foreign experience in the United States tend to be more influential and innovative than those who have foreign experience from other countries or regions. Overall, our results suggest that managerial foreign experience matters for corporate innovation in emerging markets

While innovation matters for competitiveness, it may expose firms to survival risks. Using plant-product data for Chile and discretetime hazard models, we show that innovating plants have a lower hazard of exit. However, risk has a strong impact on the innovation-exit relationship: only innovators that retain diversified sources of revenue or face lower market risk are less likely to die. Single-product innovators are at greater risk of exiting. Exposure to technical risk does not affect exit probabilities differentially. We provide tentative evidence that singleproduct innovators have higher profits, which helps to rationalize their innovation decision despite the increased risk of exit

We develop a real options model in which an entrepreneur facing ambiguity makes optimal investment and financing decisions for an innovation project. We introduce jumps in innovation returns and model investors’ aversion to ambiguity in both diffusion and jump risks. Debt accelerates investment by lowering the threshold and shortening expected waiting time, thereby increasing project value. This effect strengthens under greater ambiguity, offering a novel rationale for why debt—not equity—fosters innovation. Our results provide a coherent explanation for recent empirical findings on debt’s role in innovation and contribute to the broader literature on investment under uncertainty

We use Tobin’s q models of investments to estimate the relationship between corporate governance and the level of innovative activity. Simple ordinary least squares (OLS) models suggest that poor governance reduces innovative activity. However, OLS results are sensitive to controlling for serial correlation, unobserved effects, or using instrumental variables to control simultaneity. Controlling for these effects substantially reduces or eliminates the relationship between governance and innovative activity