Knowledge that Transforms

When firms are forced to publicly disclose financial information, credit rating agencies are generally expected to improve their risk assessments. Theory predicts such an information quality effect but also suggests an adverse reputational concerns effect since credit analysts may become increasingly concerned about alleged rating failures. We empirically examine these predictions using a large-scale quasi-natural experiment in Germany, where a new compliance regime required firms to disclose annual financial statements publicly. Consistent with the reputational concerns hypothesis, we find an average increase in credit rating downgrades that is entirely driven by changes in the discretionary assessments of credit analysts rather than changes in firm fundamentals. Following public disclosure regulations, analysts tend to give positive private information less weight in their risk assessments while assigning greater weight to negative public information. A final set of results indicates that professional credit providers recognize that the resulting downgrades are not warranted.

This paper provides the first study on how management structure influences hedge fund performance and risk. We document that hedge funds less tied to traditional assets often choose solo management structures. Solo-managed funds outperform team-managed funds, exhibit better skills in market return, volatility, and crisis timing, and demonstrate greater activity in beta management, but have higher idiosyncratic and tail risks. They are also less likely to be liquidated, with fund flows less performance sensitive. Using a sample of switched funds, we find that fund performance, assets, and risk correlate with the management structure switching decision.

Prior literature shows decision fatigue reduces analysts' forecast accuracy. We study whether analysts strategically manage their decision fatigue. Firms within an analyst's research portfolio can differentially affect the analyst's reputation and career, with larger firms with greater trading volumes and institutional ownership being more important. We find that analysts choose to issue forecasts for more important firms when they are less decision fatigued, i.e., when the number of prior forecasts the analyst has issued in the day is lower. Young analysts, analysts in low-status brokerage houses, and analysts who become decision fatigued more easily manage fatigue more, and analysts experience more favorable career outcomes after strategically managing fatigue. Finally, fatigued analysts differentiate between more important and other firms in herding and self-herding.

Formal theory and empirical research are complementary in building and advancing the body of knowledge in accounting in order to understand real‐world phenomena. We offer thoughts on opportunities for empiricists and theorists to collaborate, build on each other's work, and iterate over models and data to make progress. For empiricists, we see room for more descriptive work, more experimental work on testing formal theories, and more work on quantifying theoretical parameters. For theorists, we see room for theories explicitly tied to descriptive evidence, new theories on individuals' decision making in a data‐rich world, theories focused on accounting institutions and measurement issues, and richer theories for guiding empirical work and providing practical insights. We also encourage explicitly combining formal theory and empirical models by having both in one paper and by structural estimation.

This paper examines the role of peer firm disclosures in shaping corporate research and development (R&D) investments. Drawing on models of two‐stage R&D races, I hypothesize that a firm could be either deterred or encouraged by peer disclosure of interim R&D success, depending on peer firms’ R&D strength in the race. Using granular, project‐level data on clinical trials in the drug development process, I find that a firm's R&D investments in a specific therapeutic area are deterred by disclosures of early‐phase trial initiation from strong rivals in the same area but encouraged by disclosures from weak rivals. Cross‐sectional analyses show that focal firm strength and disclosure relevance moderate the effects of peer firm disclosure. Overall, my evidence suggests that peer firms’ R&D disclosures can have both proprietary costs and deterrence benefits.

Connected financial journalists—those with working relationships, common school ties, or social media connections to company management—introduce a marked media slant into their news coverage. Using a comprehensive set of newspaper articles covering mergers and acquisition (M&A) transactions from 1997 to 2016, I find that connected journalists use significantly fewer negative words in their coverage of connected acquirers. These journalists are also more likely to quote connected executives and include less accurate language in their reporting. Moreover, they tend to portray other firms in the same network in a less negative light. Journalists’ favoritism bias has implications for both capital market outcomes and their careers. I find that acquirers whose M&As are covered by connected journalists receive significantly higher stock returns on the news article publication date. However, these acquirers’ stock prices reverse in the long term, suggesting market overreaction to news covered by connected journalists. Around M&A transactions, connected articles are correlated with increased bid competition and deal premiums. In terms of future career development, connected journalists are more likely to leave journalism and join their associated industries in the long run. Taken together, the evidence suggests that financial journalists’ personal networks promote news bias that potentially hinders the efficient dissemination of information.

This study examines how algorithmic trading (AT) affects forward‐looking disclosures in Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) of annual reports. We predict and find evidence that AT relates negatively to modifications in year‐over‐year forward‐looking MD&A disclosures. This evidence is consistent with AT reducing investors’ demand for fundamental information, which reduces managers’ incentives to supply costly forward‐looking disclosures. Cross‐sectional tests provide additional evidence that this negative relation is more pronounced for firms with larger earnings surprises and those with losses. We further validate our conclusion by demonstrating that investors’ fundamental information searches are a channel through which AT affects forward‐looking disclosures. The conclusion is robust to using the SEC's Tick Size Pilot Program as an exogenous shock to AT and to using alternative disclosure measures (e.g., tone revisions and number of sentences in forward‐looking MD&A disclosures). Overall, our study demonstrates that AT is a contributing factor to regulators’ concerns over the diminishing usefulness of forward‐looking information in MD&A disclosures.

Equity compensation is granted out of an equity incentive plan that must be approved by shareholders and cedes discretion over equity grants to boards of directors. We predict and find that equity plan proposals give boards more discretion over grants when the firm faces greater labor market forces and more volatile stock returns. When examining votes, we find that shareholders are less likely to support plans with abnormal discretion. We also find that boards with more discretion grant more equity in response to stock price declines. Lastly, we find that boards request additional shares when their ability to grant equity is more constrained by a smaller pool of available shares, and when they plan to increase equity grants. Overall our findings illuminate how firms balance needs to respond to labor market pressure and volatile operating environments against shareholder governance and oversight of equity compensation.

We study environmental and social (E&S) disclosures in annual reports. Using the word embedding model to examine over 210,000 annual reports from 24,271 public firms in 30 international countries/regions between 2001 and 2020, we create an E&S dictionary that allows us to document trends in annual report E&S disclosure. Specifically, we find: (1) increases in length and boilerplate language and (2) decreases in specificity. Our results also suggest that E&S disclosure quality improves after the adoption of voluntary ESG reporting frameworks but deteriorates after disclosure mandates. Our findings provide systematic evidence on the evolution of E&S disclosure in annual reports over the past two decades and shed light on how voluntary and mandatory standards have shaped global E&S reporting practices.

This paper offers the first systematic evidence on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures provided by a large global sample of private equity (PE) firms. Using historical websites from 2000 to 2022, we develop and validate a novel dictionary‐based measure of voluntary PE firm ESG disclosures. Descriptive statistics reveal an increasing time trend in these disclosures, with social topics becoming as important as environmental topics recently. Multivariate analyses show that the demand for ESG information from fund investors is a significant determinant of PE firms’ ESG disclosures. Leveraging data on PE firms’ portfolio companies, we document that more PE firm ESG disclosures are associated with better ESG outcomes at the portfolio company level, suggesting that voluntary ESG disclosures align with real actions for the average PE firm.