Knowledge that Transforms

Prior research (e.g., Dechow, Huson, and Sloan ) documents that, on average, compensation practices appear to shield CEO pay from income‐decreasing special items. In some circumstances, compensation shielding can be efficient. For example, it may encourage CEOs with earnings‐sensitive pay to take an action that reduces current earnings but nevertheless enhances value. Compensation shielding can be inefficient in other circumstances, such as when a board of directors is captured by an overly powerful CEO or the magnitude of negative special items has been overstated (e.g., by shifting core expenses into special items). This paper explores whether strong governance can explain cross‐sectional variation in compensation shielding, and whether stronger governance and auditing are associated with less shifting of expenses. We find that strong corporate governance mechanisms, as captured by board (and committee) independence, the Sarbanes‐Oxley (2002) Act (SOX) and its related governance reforms, and switches to Big 4 auditors, are all associated with less compensation shielding. While our evidence suggests that strong overall governance is associated with a reduction in manipulation of core earnings through classification shifting in the cross‐section, we find inconclusive evidence to suggest that board independence or SOX influence classification shifting.

In this study, we investigate the consequences that auditors and their clients face when earnings announced in an unaudited earnings release are subsequently revised, presumably as a result of year‐end audit procedures, so that earnings as reported in the 10‐K differ from earnings as previously announced. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an auditor “losing the client” is greater following such revisions, and whether the likelihood of dismissal is influenced by revisions that more negatively impact earnings, that cause the client to miss important earnings benchmarks, by greater local auditor competition, or by auditor characteristics. We also examine audit pricing subsequent to audit‐related earnings revisions for evidence of pricing concessions to retain the client. Finally, we examine whether client executives experience a greater likelihood of turnover following an audit‐related earnings revision. Consistent with expectations, we find that auditor dismissals are more likely following audit‐related earnings revisions. We also find that dismissals are more likely when revisions cause clients to miss important benchmarks and when there is greater local auditor competition. Among nondismissing clients, we find that future audit fees are lower when the effect of the revision on earnings is more negative, consistent with auditors offering price concessions to retain clients when revisions are more displeasing. We also find a greater likelihood of future chief financial officer ( CFO ) turnover as the effect of the revision worsens. Our findings offer important insights into the consequences that auditors face when balancing their responsibility for high audit quality and client satisfaction, as well as into the consequences that CFO s face when releasing inflated but not fully audited earnings.

Consistent with the notion that dividends are very sticky, Daniel, Denis, and Naveen ( ) report evidence that firms manage earnings upward when pre‐managed earnings are expected to fall short of dividend payments. However, we find that this evidence is not robust when controlling for firms' tendency to manage earnings upward to avoid reporting earnings declines; only firms with high leverage exhibit a statistically weak tendency to manage earnings to close deficits of pre‐managed earnings relative to dividends. We further report that the decision to cut dividends depends on whether reported earnings fall short of past dividends, but not on earnings management that eliminates a shortfall in pre‐managed earnings relative to dividend payments. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms that face dividend constraints are more likely to cut dividends than to manage earnings to avoid dividend cuts.

This paper examines the relation between analyst coverage and whether firms meet or beat analyst earnings forecasts. We distinguish between whether a firm's reported quarterly earnings meet (i.e., equal or exceed by one cent) or beat (i.e., exceed by more than one cent) its consensus analyst earnings forecasts. We find a positive relation between analyst coverage and whether a firm meets or beats analyst forecasts. However, the more pronounced relation is that between analyst coverage and meeting analyst forecasts. Also, when we consider exogenous shocks to analyst coverage due to brokerage mergers or closures and conglomerate spinoffs, we continue to find a robust positive relation only between analyst coverage and meeting analyst forecasts. To shed light on the causal relation involved, we examine and find that greater analyst coverage is associated with a significantly larger market reaction to negative earnings surprises. We also document that firms with greater analyst coverage are more likely to guide analyst earnings forecasts downwards. Taken together, our evidence suggests that greater analyst coverage raises the pressure on managers to meet analyst earnings forecasts.

I investigate whether the alignment between individual investors’ expectations about forecast precision and actual forecast precision affects their estimates of firm value, and whether this relationship is mediated by individual investors’ perceptions of management credibility and future firm growth. Experimental results confirm that when expected and actual forecast precision align, individual investors estimate higher firm stock prices than when expected and actual forecast precision do not align. I also provide evidence of a mediation path through which the misalignment between expected and actual forecast precision affects individual investors’ perceptions of management credibility, future firm growth, and estimates of firm stock price. My findings help reconcile inconsistencies in prior earnings forecast literature and inform managers and researchers about strategies that lead to higher perceptions of management credibility and firm value.

Firms’ Corporate Social Responsibility ( CSR ) reports typically frame their strategies in terms of either community or global efforts (i.e., “strategy frame”). Further, the style used to depict CSR performance in reports often highlights either pictures or words (i.e., “presentation style”). These two prominent disclosure features of CSR reports promote a natural fit or misfit in the focus (relatively low‐level or high‐level focus) investors adopt when thinking about the firm and its CSR efforts. Further, these disclosure features likely have different effects on investors depending on their numeracy or, in other words, the way that they naturally process numerical information. In this study, we predict and find that a fit between the strategy frame and the presentation style of a firm's CSR report causes less numerate investors to be more willing to invest than when a fit is not present. Specifically, we find that a fit leads less numerate investors to experience subjective feelings of processing fluency and, in turn, positive affect that serves as a cue that the positive CSR performance information can be relied upon, which positively influences willingness to invest. Our results have implications for both CSR reports as well as other types of firm disclosures that increasingly vary along similar disclosure characteristics. Our results also contribute to both the growing literature on presentation effects in accounting, as well as the broader business literature on CSR reporting.

Enterprise systems ( ES s) are widely used to support business processes along the enterprise value chain. It has been shown that ES s, by integrating business functions and making information about day‐to‐day activities available, enhance operational transparency and improve the internal information environment. However, while ES ‐based business infrastructures can offer many benefits, their prevalence and increased complexity have also brought new challenges to external auditors. Motivated by the prominence of this issue for auditors and regulators and by the scarcity of research jointly examining ES s and auditors’ work, we investigate whether the presence and extent of client firms’ ES implementations are related to the quality and efficiency of auditors’ work. Using proprietary archival data on ES implementations and controlling for self‐selection, we find that ES implementation improves the quality and efficiency of current and future years’ audit work. Specifically, there are fewer restatements, a greater likelihood of auditors issuing going‐concern opinions to firms that do not survive, higher accruals‐based auditing quality, a lower likelihood of Form 10‐K filing delays, and generally lower audit fees. We further show that the benefits of ES s generally increase with the scope of implementation and are generally greater when the ES includes accounting and finance systems. Inconsistent with improvement in the quality of auditors’ work, we find no evidence that ES s help auditors identify material weaknesses in advance of restatement announcements and we find that, even in the presence of ES s, auditors issue an excessive number of going‐concern opinions to clients that survive.

This study examines the extent to which parsimonious and general cross‐sectional valuation models, restricted to include only publicly available historical accounting information, explain share prices in the cross section, identify periods when market mispricing may be more pervasive, and also identify which shares within those cross sections are more likely to be mispriced. Our model simply includes historical book value, earnings, dividends, and growth, but it explains on average over 60 percent of the cross‐sectional variation in share prices in annual estimations across 1975–2011. We also examine the extent to which the residuals indicate mispricing. The quintile of stocks picked by our model as most likely underpriced outperform the quintile of stocks picked as most likely overpriced by an average of 9.9 percent over the following 12 months, after controlling for size. We also predict and find that value residuals are better predictors of future abnormal returns: (i) among firms that are not covered by analysts; (ii) among firms that face fewer accounting measurement challenges; and (iii) when we estimate value model parameters by industry/year. We also predict and find our approach works better in periods when the mapping of fundamentals into prices is weaker. This study contributes a novel and straightforward approach to map accounting fundamentals into share prices in order to identify mispricing in time‐series and in the cross section.

This study investigates whether or not related party transactions serve as “red flags” that warn of potential financial misstatement. We hand‐collect related party transactions for S&P 1500 firms in 2001, 2004, and 2007 and find a positive correlation between these transactions and future restatements, suggesting restatements are more likely when a firm engages in related party transactions. The association is concentrated among transactions that appear to reflect “tone at the top” rather than arguably more necessary business transactions. We also find RPT firms pay lower audit fees. However, “tone RPT ” firms that subsequently restate pay higher audit fees, providing evidence that auditors recognize the individual restatement risks of these firms. Our results suggest that tone‐based RPT s serve as signals of higher risk of material misstatement.

Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non‐ GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability that a company will disclose a non‐ GAAP adjusted earnings metric in its earnings press release and the likelihood that it will do so aggressively. We first investigate situations where managers already meet analysts’ expectations either based on strong operating performance or after employing real and accruals management. We find that when solid operating performance alone allows firms to meet expectations, managers do not employ earnings management or non‐ GAAP reporting. However, when managers meet expectations using real and accruals management, they are significantly less likely to report a non‐ GAAP earnings metric. Next, we explore scenarios where companies fall short of expectations. We find that when they just miss expectations after managing GAAP earnings, they are significantly more likely to employ non‐ GAAP reporting, suggesting that the timing and relatively costless nature of non‐ GAAP reporting allows managers to appear to meet expectations on a non‐ GAAP basis when managed GAAP earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that companies are more likely to report non‐ GAAP earnings (and to do so aggressively) when (i) they are unable to use real or accruals earnings management, (ii) are constrained by prior‐period accruals management, and (iii) their operating performance is poor. Taken together, our results are consistent with a substitute relation between non‐ GAAP reporting and both real and accruals management.