Knowledge that Transforms

We provide evidence that the documented weakening of the accrual–cash flow association results not from a loss of accrual accounting usefulness per se, but from the deviation from accrual accounting as it relates to intangible investments. More specifically, the weakening of the negative association is driven by the combined effects of (1) increasing intangible investments, (2) the practice of expensing rather than capitalizing intangible investments, and (3) scaling accruals and cash flows by book value of assets, which are understated for intangible‐intensive firms. Treating intangible expenditures as capitalized investments and scaling accruals and cash flows by market value of equity, which reflects the value of intangible investments, (1) substantially strengthens the negative association between accruals and cash flows and (2) practically eliminates the apparent weakening trend in the association.

I examine the effects of occupational licensing on the quality of certified public accountants (CPAs). I exploit the staggered adoption of the 150‐hour rule, which increases the educational requirements for a CPA license. The analysis shows that the rule decreases the number of entrants into the profession, reducing both low‐ and high‐quality candidates. Labor market proxies for quality find no difference between 150‐hour rule CPAs and the rest. Moreover, rule CPAs exit public accounting at similar rates and have comparable writing quality to their nonrule counterparts. Overall, these findings are consistent with the theoretical argument that increases in licensing requirements restrict the supply of entrants and do little to improve quality in the labor market.

We examine whether investors consider foreign component auditors when assessing the value of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) using two sets of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international regulatory events. We find investors react negatively when the PCAOB is denied access to inspect foreign component auditors in jurisdictions where a U.S. MNC has significant operations and positively when those countries later allow inspection. For foreign component auditors that are inspected, we find investors react positively when they receive clean inspection reports and negatively when they fail to remediate quality control deficiencies. Consistent with PCAOB international oversight providing additional assurance about foreign component auditor quality, our collective results indicate investors consider foreign component auditors when valuing U.S. MNCs.

As of November 2016, SEC Regulation (“Reg”) AB II requires issuers of certain types of asset‐backed securities (“ABS”) to disclose the credit‐risk attributes of each asset in the underlying pool, a substantial expansion of prior disclosure requirements. We examine how ABS issuers’ asset‐level disclosures under Reg AB II affect the (e)valuation of ABS by investors and credit rating agencies. Using difference‐in‐differences models that compare affected and unaffected types of ABS, we find that these disclosures improve the ability of initial ABS yields and credit ratings to predict the performance of the underlying assets. These results are concentrated in deals with above‐median risk layering in the underlying assets and complexity in the tranching of credit risk. We further find that asset‐level disclosures are associated with lower yields. Lastly, we provide evidence that most prospective ABS investors download asset‐level information during the price formation period prior to ABS issuance.

We examine the speed and mechanism of the price discovery process following earnings announcements in the after‐hours market, a very illiquid trading environment. Prices reflect earnings surprises mostly through changes in quotes rather than through trades. Following positive announcement surprises, ask prices adjust quickly while bid prices are slower to adjust, and vice versa for negative surprises. Returns computed from trade prices underestimate the speed and magnitude of price reactions following announcements relative to returns computed from quotes. These findings emphasize the importance of using quotes and not trade prices when examining intraday price discovery. Because firm announcements such as earnings generally occur in the after‐hours market, using quotes is crucial as trading is sparse. We further illustrate the importance of quotes when examining the price discovery process around analyst recommendation revisions.

We find that mutual funds whose managers are socially connected with firm auditors hold more shares of these firms and generate superior portfolio returns. Cross‐sectional results reveal that the relation between social connections and mutual fund stockholdings is more pronounced: when the social connections are stronger, when the auditor is in a better position or has stronger incentives to acquire private information, when the fund manager exercises more power, for small audit firms, for auditors in areas with poor investor protection, and for public firms with greater business opacity or private information. Other results are consistent with fund managers electing to schedule their corporate site visits to coincide with the fieldwork of their connected auditors, as would be expected if fund managers time their visits to meet with these auditors to facilitate information transfer. Additionally, we observe associations between fund trading prior to earnings surprises and audit opinions, and the presence of social connections between fund managers and firm auditors. Finally, we show that mutual funds and firms in which they invest tend to appoint connected auditors and pay them higher fees. Collectively, we document empirical patterns that would arise if socially connected auditors and mutual fund managers share information.

Audit firms are investing billions of dollars to develop artificial intelligence (AI) systems that will help auditors execute challenging tasks (e.g., evaluating complex estimates). Although firms assume AI will enhance audit quality, a growing body of research documents that individuals often exhibit “algorithm aversion”—the tendency to discount computer‐based advice more heavily than human advice, although the advice is identical otherwise. Therefore, we conduct an experiment to examine how algorithm aversion manifests in auditor judgments. Consistent with theory, we find that auditors receiving contradictory evidence from their firm's AI system (instead of a human specialist) propose smaller adjustments to management's complex estimates, particularly when management develops their estimates using relatively objective (vs. subjective) inputs. Our findings suggest auditor susceptibility to algorithm aversion could prove costly for the profession and financial statements users.

Using a novel empirical approach and newly available administrative data on U.S. tax filings, we estimate the corporate elasticity of taxable income, decompose the elasticity into economic responses versus other tax‐motivated “accounting” transactions, and determine how responsiveness varies depending on accounting method, firm size, and interest rate. In response to a 10% increase in the expected marginal tax rate, private U.S. firms decrease taxable income by 9.1%, which indicates a discernibly more elastic response than prevailing estimates. This response reflects a decrease in taxable income of 3.0% arising from real economic responses to a firm's scale of operations and 6.1% arising from accounting transactions via (for example) revenue and expense timing. Responsiveness to the corporate tax rate is more elastic if a firm uses cash (9.9%) rather than accrual accounting (7.4%), if the firm is small (9.9%) rather than large (8.6%), and if the firm discounts future cash flows at a lower rate.

We study what determines the involvement of component auditors in multinational enterprise (MNE) group audits and the association with audit quality and audit fees. Using unique Australian disclosures of group audit fees paid to the principal and component auditors, we first document that MNE complexity, MNE internationalization, and auditor characteristics are associated with component auditor involvement, and extent and type of component auditor involvement. Next, we find that involvement of component auditors benefits audit quality as long as the principal auditor conducts a substantial amount of work. Once the involvement of component auditors exceeds a certain level, audit quality decreases. We also document that audit fees are higher in the presence of a component auditor and increase with the extent of involvement, irrespective of component auditor type. Our results contribute to the emerging literature on group audits and provide empirical evidence on regulatory concerns about group audit quality.

I study whether banks’ loan loss provisioning contributes to economic downturns, by examining the U.S. housing market. Specifically, I examine the aggregate effects of banks’ delayed loan loss recognition (DLR) on house prices during the Great Recession and the channels through which these potential effects arose. I construct ZIP‐code‐level exposure to banks’ DLR before the crisis and compare high‐ and low‐exposure ZIP codes during the crisis to examine the aggregate effects of banks’ DLR on the housing market. I find that high‐exposure ZIP codes experienced larger decreases in mortgage supply, larger increases in distressed sales, and larger decreases in house prices during the crisis. In addition, I conduct individual bank‐level analyses and find that high‐DLR banks reduced their mortgage supply more than low‐DLR banks, and mortgages issued by high‐DLR banks were more likely to become distressed during the crisis. Taken together, these findings suggest that banks’ DLR was associated with nontrivial effects on the housing market during the Great Recession, and the effects of DLR on house prices were likely driven by both the credit‐crunch and distressed‐sales channels.