Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines whether better performance on the Certified Public Accountant (CPA) exam is associated with an auditor's career success and whether any relation differs based on gender. Our study adds to prior studies on the career development of auditors by showing that the auditor's performance on the exam predicts success during the auditor's career. Although there is little difference in the average CPA exam scores of male versus female auditors, we document gender differences in the relation between performance on the CPA exam and career success. Male auditors who pass the exam with superior results receive higher annual compensation than those with weaker results. They are also more likely to become partners in Big 4 accounting firms and have larger client portfolios. For female auditors, we find weaker or no association between CPA exam scores and compensation or other indicators of career success. Our path analysis shows that the mechanisms underlying career success work differently for men and women. CPA exam scores of male auditors have a direct effect on compensation and an indirect (mediating) effect through promotion to partner and client portfolio size. However, for female auditors, exam scores have no effect on promotion to partner or client portfolio size, and exam scores have a much smaller effect on compensation. Our findings suggest that CPA exam scores translate into career success for male auditors but not for female auditors.

We examine the implications of the PCAOB international inspection program for US companies' exports. Our difference‐in‐differences analyses suggest that, following the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad, (1) US companies' exports to that country increased, and (2) US companies' major customers in that country reported higher accounts payable. Probing further, the effect on US exports is stronger for companies requiring more relationship‐specific investments and for foreign countries with less transparency, weak auditor oversight, and low social trust. Our findings suggest that the release of the initial PCAOB inspection report in a country abroad serves as a public signal of oversight that increases trust in financial reporting integrity abroad, thereby facilitating growth in trade credit and an increase in US exports to companies in that country. Our findings suggest that stakeholders other than investors benefit from PCAOB international inspection reports and highlight a novel externality of the PCAOB international inspection regime benefiting US companies.

Evaluating organizational effectiveness is a significant challenge for nonprofit donors making donation allocation decisions. Donations may be misallocated if organizational effectiveness is inadequately assessed, and donors, who are often organizational outsiders, rely on nonprofit disclosures on IRS Form 990 to make such assessments. We examine whether donors value volunteer commitment, as measured by the number of volunteers that nonprofits disclose on Form 990, alongside financial and governance disclosures in assessing organizational effectiveness. Donors and volunteers prefer to make respective gifts of money and time to nonprofits that are effective in furthering their missions. Based on the premise that volunteers, as organizational insiders, are better positioned than donors to judge the impact of their contributions, we hypothesize that volunteer commitment provides value‐relevant information to donors for use in assessing imprecise effectiveness signals—namely, the program ratio and corporate governance disclosures. Consistent with this, we find that the value relevance of the program ratio and corporate governance disclosures to donors is increasing with the level of volunteer commitment. These results suggest that donors view volunteer commitment as a signal of effectiveness, useful in interpreting other signals of effectiveness. The evidence is more pronounced among nonprofits that report more credible volunteer disclosures, have a larger proportion of sophisticated donors, and are more complex. These findings have implications for regulators considering nonprofit disclosure policies, as well as nonprofit managers and directors engaging volunteers.

The IASB asserts that global stakeholder participation in the standard‐setting process is critical for developing and maintaining high‐quality accounting standards. However, the myriad languages used in countries that apply IFRS may impede this participation. We find that the IASB is less likely to receive comment letters from stakeholders in countries with languages that are linguistically distant from English. We also find that comment letters from more linguistically distant stakeholders are less likely to be quoted in IASB staff‐prepared comment letter summaries, suggesting that they have less influence in the redeliberation process. Path analyses show that this result arises from language frictions being associated with reduced writing quality and originality. We also find that language frictions prevent participation in other standard‐setting communication channels. Collectively, language frictions appear to impede the IASB's efforts to equitably obtain and consider valuable global feedback.

This study examines whether PCAOB inspection reports are useful for signaling the risk of misstatements in future periods and the extent to which different types of audit deficiencies predict future misstatements. We find that, after the inspection report is issued, PCAOB‐identified audit deficiencies are positively associated with future misstatements for the audit firm's entire client portfolio. When we examine different types of deficiencies, we find that an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies is the most detrimental type of deficiency for future reporting quality. We also examine the deficiency types for Big 4 versus non–Big 4 firms separately. The results show that an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies is the only deficiency type that is positively associated with future misstatements for Big 4 firms. For non–Big 4 firms, however, future misstatements are predicted by an auditor's failure to understand the client's accounting procedures or policies, inadequate substantive testing, and inadequate going‐concern assessments. Our study has important implications given the concerns raised by auditors regarding the usefulness of PCAOB inspections.

Given the importance of research resource allocation within brokerage firms, we examine key factors that influence the issuance of individual versus team analyst reports. Using a comprehensive sample of analyst reports from China for the 2008–2021 period, we find that this decision is influenced by (1) the brokerage firm's client interests, whereby firms held by the brokerage firm's mutual fund clients and firms that are the brokerage firm's underwriting clients receive more team than individual reports from the brokerage firm, and (2) the nature of corporate events, whereby routine events receive more team reports and nonroutine events receive more individual reports. Additional analyses suggest that analysts' personal traits and analyst team characteristics also affect the decision. Our findings further the understanding of the factors that affect the organization and resource allocation of sell‐side equity research.

Management teams often avoid answering questions during conference call question and answer sessions (Q&As). Viewing this as an information asymmetry issue, accounting scholars have suggested that this behavior is ill‐advised and that non‐answers signal to investors the suppression of bad news. In this article, we demonstrate that this argument lacks nuance. Instead, we argue that answers and non‐answers necessarily coexist and are codependent. Our contribution stems from our social interactionist lens, whereby we draw on interdisciplinary perspectives of workplace silence to make sense of our data. We propose three explanations for managerial non‐answers, namely that they are used (1) defensively, (2) reflectively, and (3) negotiatively. Despite the seeming complexity, analysts claim they can make sense of what managers are able to say in this forum, and by extension, what they do (or perhaps, can) not. From here, we argue that analysts are socialized to managerial non‐answers. Despite this, there is general concern that investors allow an innate fear of “silence” to prejudice their judgment of non‐answers. Thus, we highlight a communication gap between management, intermediary, and investor. On the one hand, this implies a source of market inefficiency, but on the other it points toward a source of potential value in sell‐side analyst work, specifically, their experience and expertise in social interaction.

Leadership is considered a core competency for auditors. This study examines how auditors' leadership ability affects their labor market outcomes and audit firm performance. Using Swedish military data on qualified auditors (CPAs), we first show that auditors' leadership ability, measured at around age 18, is a strong predictor of their income and career success. However, our results also suggest that the audit labor market compensates for auditors' leadership ability at a much later stage than the general labor market. Second, we examine whether the value of leadership ability derives from higher‐quality auditing, commercial performance, or both. We find strong evidence that leadership ability enhances auditors' commercial performance and some evidence on leadership ability being associated with higher audit quality. Third, at the audit firm level, we find that auditors' leadership ability significantly benefits audit firm performance measured as client portfolio size and audit firm profitability. Finally, we investigate leadership talent attraction and retention in the auditing profession. We find that the auditing profession attracts better leadership talent than the general labor market. Although nearly a quarter of CPAs leave the profession over the sample period, there is no significant difference in leadership ability between those who stay and those who leave. Overall, our results have important practical implications for audit firms' talent management.

Although it has always been important for firms that employees innovate predefined processes, the working environment in which employees implement these processes has significantly changed. Currently, the working environment is often characterized by employee surveillance; that is, the way in which employees conduct a process is monitored. In the current study, we present the results of an experiment examining the effect of process monitoring on process improvements by employees. Although previous accounting literature has reported negative effects of monitoring techniques on several organizational outcomes, we show that process monitoring can have a positive effect on employees' implementation of process improvements in the absence, but not in the presence, of a firm's error avoidance policy. Without an error avoidance policy, employees are motivated to create a favorable impression in front of management by implementing process improvements. This finding has important implications for business practice. From a broader perspective, we show that the influence of action controls depends on the parameters of a cultural control.

Reciprocity plays a critical role in the way employees respond to managerial control decisions. The current consensus is that employees punish managers for implementing unkind controls (negative reciprocity) more than they reward managers for implementing kind controls (positive reciprocity). We challenge this consensus. Prior research focuses on settings that emphasize employees' immediate reciprocal responses. However, in the workplace, employees often respond over long periods of time to sticky control decisions (e.g., budgets, pay, decision rights). Focusing on these long‐term settings, we predict and find that, while negative reciprocity is initially stronger than positive reciprocity, it also fades more over time than positive reciprocity. This differential fading is so pronounced in our setting that positive reciprocity is stronger overall in the long run. Thus, in long‐term settings, positive responses to kind controls may play a more important role than negative responses to unkind controls. Our results inform managerial decisions about the use of kind versus unkind controls and suggest potential long‐term benefits of pay disparity and other policies that treat employees differentially.