Knowledge that Transforms

Most fraud research in accounting has focused on controls rather than offenders' subjective experience, meaning that our understanding of motive in fraud (defined as linguistic devices employed to justify, interpret, or excuse actions) remains underexplored. This is particularly the case for employee fraud, which has been largely neglected relative to top management fraud or financial statement fraud. To provide a richer understanding of how fraud offenders make sense of their offending, we interviewed 30 serious employee fraud offenders to better investigate their typal vocabularies of motive. We focus on holistic narrative accounts to provide insights into the common justifications and excuses presented by employee fraud offenders. We develop a taxonomy of narrative constructions based on the explanatory locus of the accounts offered by offenders. We identify three common justifications, (1) inconsequentiality motives, (2) permission motives, and (3) unfair treatment motives, and three common excuses, (4) personal crisis motives, (5) addiction motives, and (6) appeasement motives. We draw implications for researching fraud, organizational control, and ethics in accounting education.

Lenders are reluctant to finance firms' innovation activities because such activities tend to be opaque, with a high likelihood of negative outcomes that could hamper loan repayment. We posit that public credit registries (PCRs), which play an important role in credit information sharing in many countries, can facilitate financing by reducing adverse selection and moral hazard and increasing bank competition. Using the staggered establishment of PCRs in different countries and an international firm–patent data set, we find that credit information sharing positively affects firm innovation, especially in firms that experience a larger increase in bank debt financing after the establishment of a PCR. This finding is consistent with the notion that credit information sharing promotes firm innovation by easing bank debt financing frictions. We also find a stronger effect in countries that experience a large increase in bank competition after the establishment of a PCR—consistent with increased bank competition serving as a channel through which credit information sharing facilitates bank debt financing, thereby generating a positive effect on firm innovation. The positive effect is more pronounced when the established PCR has features that promote credit information sharing. It is also more pronounced for opaque firms and firms in innovation‐intensive industries, indicating that credit information sharing helps to reduce financing frictions. Finally, we posit and find evidence that firm efficiency in transforming innovation inputs into outputs improves after the establishment of a PCR. Overall, our paper offers novel insights into how credit information sharing facilitates firm innovation.

Deferred compensation is often proposed as an instrument to prevent managerial myopia. However, empirical studies show that its practical use is limited when it comes to managerial retirement. We study the optimal design of accounting‐based deferred compensation for retiring managers. While deferred compensation is useful in establishing long‐term incentives, it causes contracting frictions in subsequent periods. Deferred bonuses of retiring managers imply inefficiently weak incentives for incoming managers. This down‐scaling effect renders deferred compensation less useful in providing long‐term incentives. We also find that the down‐scaling effect has implications for the desirability of accounting timeliness—that is, the timely recognition of future cash flows in current accounting earnings—from a stewardship perspective. If managers' long‐term actions are sufficiently important, higher timeliness can cause more myopic managerial incentives.

This study finds that accounting standards play an important role in cross‐border investor reactions to peer firm earnings. Specifically, we document that when international peer firms report under the same accounting standards, investors overreact to peer firms' earnings announcements. Using a sample of 35,116 firm‐pair‐years from 51 countries between 2000 and 2010, we show that heightened information transfers for international same‐standard firms are followed by predictable price reversals when investors observe own‐firm earnings. However, overreactions are not present for international firm‐pairs that follow different accounting standards. While we find that institutional investors learn over time, overreactions do not decline among retail investors. Additional tests suggest that overreactions cause significant excess volatility, which results in economically significant costs. Collectively, our findings document an unintended consequence of financial reporting harmonization in the form of increased investor overreactions.

Common values auction models, where bidder decisions depend on noisy signals of common values, provide predictions about Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) outcomes. In settings where these common values can be estimated, these predictions can be tested. We propose a series of tests, robust to assumptions about the signal structure, to determine whether the observed data could have been generated by a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In the setting of oil and gas lease auctions in New Mexico, we find evidence that participation decisions are correlated and that participants systematically underbid in light of ex post outcomes.

I present a new theory of oligopoly and markups in general equilibrium, based on an innovative, scalable hedonic demand system, which I take to the data for the universe of US public firms. In my model, firms compete in a network of product market rivalries that emerge endogenously out of the characteristics of the products they supply. I estimate that consumer surplus is almost three times as large as profits; decompose firm-level markups into metrics of quality-adjusted productivity and market centrality; and analyze the extent, evolution, and drivers of monopoly power in the United States between 1995 and 2021.

In additive instrumental variables models, the robustness to some failure of instrumental validity or additive separability depends on the strength of a priori restrictions on the structural relationship between outcomes and treatments. I provide theoretical analysis of the problem, discuss the implications for empirical practice, and demonstrate with a numerical study calibrated on real-world data.

This paper leverages nationally representative surveys across 60 countries and 64,000 respondents to present novel stylized facts about the relationship-specific nature of altruism. Across individuals, universalist preferences systematically vary with demographics such as age and religiosity and are predictive of many left-wing political views, albeit in culturally highly heterogeneous ways. Across countries, universalism is strongly linked to a broader radius of trust. Looking at origins, universalism varies with the economic, political, and religious organization of societies in ways that are consistent with the idea that the scope of altruism is partly shaped by economic incentives and democracy.

This paper shows that self-employment shapes labor market power in low-income countries, with implications for industrial development. Using Peruvian data, we find that wage-setting power increases with employer concentration but less so where self-employment is more prevalent. A general equilibrium model shows that in oligopsonistic labor markets, self-employment raises the supply elasticity of wage labor, weakening employer market power. However, by the same mechanism, procompetitive policies aimed at expanding wage employment and reducing reliance on self-employment may unintentionally strengthen labor market power, undermining their objectives.