This paper examines national regulators’ incentives to intervene in a multinational bank’s activities and the extent to which these incentives differ with the bank’s foreign representation choice (branch or subsidiary). Shared liability leads to higher incentives for intervention than legal separation. Cross-border deposit insurance, on the other hand, yields less intervention than when regulators compensate local depositors only. Based on these results, we derive implications for multinational banks’ and regulators’ preference on foreign expansion and representation

This paper conducts the first empirical assessment of theories concerning risk taking by banks, their ownership structures, and national bank regulations. We focus on conflicts between bank managers and owners over risk, and we show that bank risk taking varies positively with the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Moreover, we show that the relation between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities depends critically on each bank's ownership structure, such that the actual sign of the marginal effect of regulation on risk varies with ownership concentration. These findings show that the same regulation has different effects on bank risk taking depending on the bank's corporate governance structure

We study the efficiency of banking regulation under financial integration. Banks freely choose the jurisdiction where to locate their activities and have private information about their efficiency level. Regulators non-cooperatively offer any regulatory contract that satisfies information and participation constraints of banks. We show that the unique Nash equilibrium of the regulatory game is a simple pooling contract: financial integration is characterized by the inability for regulators to discriminate between banks with different efficiency levels. This result is driven by the endogenous restriction caused by regulatory arbitrage on the capacity of regulators to use several regulatory instruments

We estimate the causal effect of liquidity regulation on bank balance sheets. We take advantage of the heterogeneous implementation of tighter liquidity regulation by the UK Financial Services Authority in 2010. We find that banks adjusted the composition of both assets and liabilities, increasing the share of high quality liquid assets and non-financial deposits while reducing intra-financial loans and short-term wholesale funding. We do not find evidence that the tightening of liquidity regulation caused banks to shrink their balance sheets, nor reduce the amount of lending to the non-financial sector

Regulators often delegate monitoring to local supervisors, which can improve information collection, but can also lead to agency problems and capture. We document that following the closure of a US bank regulator’s field offices, the banks they previously supervised actively increased their risk of failure by distributing cash, increasing leverage, and lending more than similar banks at the same time and place. Supervisor proximity is a channel through which these effects operate. Our findings suggest that local supervision is an important part of regulation, as it facilitates collection of information imperfectly reflected in reported measures, and that switching from onsite to offsite supervision can increase bank risk

We find that regulators can implement identical rules inconsistently due to differences in their institutional design and incentives, and this behavior may adversely impact the effectiveness with which regulation is implemented. We study supervisory decisions of U.S. banking regulators and exploit a legally determined rotation policy that assigns federal and state supervisors to the same bank at exogenously set time intervals. Comparing federal and state regulator supervisory ratings within the same bank, we find that federal regulators are systematically tougher, downgrading supervisory ratings almost twice as frequently as do state supervisors. State regulators counteract these downgrades to some degree by upgrading more frequently. Under federal regulators, banks report worse asset quality, higher regulatory capital ratios, and lower return on assets. Leniency of state regulators relative to their federal counterparts is related to costly outcomes, such as higher failure rates and lower repayment rates of government assistance funds. The discrepancy in regulator behavior is related to different weights given by regulators to local economic conditions and, to some extent, differences in regulatory resources. We find no support for regulator self-interest, which includes “revolving doors” as a reason for leniency of state regulators

We show that in an imperfect information environment the equity value of an impaired bank may increase or decrease when it is required to meet a capital standard. Regardless of the change in the bank's equity value, however, its stock price will fall in response to a forced recapitalization, consistent with recent empirical evidence. Simulations of our model suggest that this stock price decline is likely to be larger the smaller is the share of ownership held by the managers of the bank, also consistent with recent empirical evidence in the literature. Our model further predicts a rise in bank's non-interest expenses following a required recapitalization. Given the increase in the regulator's exposure that would accompany a reduction in the bank's market value of equity, the regulator may choosenotto enforce the regulation. Hence, capital regulation may be time-inconsistent in this situation and consequently not have its intended risk-mitigating incentives

Bank regulators tend to disagree with the idea that markets can play a role in bank regulation. The markets for bank securities are viewed by regulators as inefficient and lacking the necessary information to demand sufficient risk premiums on bank obligations to affect bank management decisions. On the other hand, bankers who have an active market for their securities tend to place faith in market assessments to determine the cost of management policies; therefore, they tend to think that the market plays an important role in “regulating” bank management decisions. The regulators are perhaps correct about the markets for small and medium–sized banks, but for those banks which have an active market for their securities, do investors adjust rates of return for the presence of increased potential of bankruptcy? If so, when does the adjustment take place

Bank liquidity shortages during the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 led to the introduction of liquidity regulations, the impact of which has attracted the attention of academics and policymakers. In this paper, we investigate the impact of liquidity regulation on bank lending. As a setting, we use the Netherlands, where a Liquidity Balance Rule (LBR) was introduced in 2003. The LBR was imposed on Dutch banks only and did not apply to other banks operating elsewhere within the Eurozone. Using this differential regulatory treatment to overcome identification concerns and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the LBR increased the volume of lending by Dutch banks relative to other banks located in the Eurozone. Increased equity, an inflow of retail deposits and subsequent increase in balance sheet size allowed Dutch banks to increase lending despite having to meet the LBR requirements. The LBR also affected the loan composition of Dutch banks (with corporate and retail lending increasing more than mortgage lending) and the maturity profile of loan portfolios. Our results have relevance for policymakers tasked with monitoring the impact of liquidity regulations on banks and the real economy

We explore and summarize the evolution in bank capital regulations and bank risk after the global financial crisis. Using a new survey of bank regulation and supervision covering more than 120 economies, we show that regulatory capital increased, but some elements of capital regulations became laxer. Analyzing bank-level data, we also document the importance of defining bank regulatory capital narrowly as the quality of capital matters in reducing bank risk. This is particularly true for banks that have more discretion in the computation of regulatory capital ratios and are subject to weaker market monitoring