Knowledge that Transforms

Even superficial studies of the business career of John Jacob Astor emphasize its supposedly dualistic nature, and distinguish between the apparently sharply defined aspects of fortune-getting for which it stands. In fact, Astor's trading operations are frequently discussed as if they had not the slightest theoretical connection with his activities as an investor in land. It is the latter method of fortune-getting which is generally considered to afford exclusive opportunity for the appearance of an "unearned increment" (that is, gain of some sort, which cannot be attributed to the personal effort or personal ability of the beneficiary). Under the influence of this misconception, an attempt is made to distinguish between the profits arising from trade and the gains growing out of land investments on the ground that, in the one case, the size of the returns is conditioned by the degree of personal activity, whereas, in the other case, no appreciable amount of individual effort or ability is involved. Daniel Webster, for instance, in an address to the jury, when arguing against Astor's claim to lands in Putnam County, implied some such distinction between commercial exertions and land investments, in connection with the moral judgment that he passed upon Astor. True, his argument was impassioned and polemical in tone. Moreover, he was referring to a particular case of land investment characterized by certaini peculiar features. But the antithesis that he suggests is nevertheless significant-the more so, that it was designed to appeal to popular prejudices. His plea was that Astor had obtained possession of the land in dispute, not as he did that vast wealth than which no one envies him less than I do -not by fair and honest exertions in commercial enterprise, but by speculation, by purchasing up the forlorn hope of the heirs of a family driven from this country by a bill of attainder.'

During the last two or three decades, economic theory has been enriched by a continuous stream of writings, contributed from many sources. The Austrian school, originated by Menger, and developed by Wieser and Bdhm-Bawerk; the mathematical school, originated independently by Walras, in Switzerland, and Jevons, in England, and supported by Marshall, Edgeworth, Pareto, and numerous other writers, have done much to clear up the elusive mysteries surrounding the subject of value. These movements have given a special stimulus to economic literature in America, and have combined with the independent thought typified by the writings of Patten, Clark, Fetter, Carver, and others. Although the books and pamphlets which constitute this enormous mass of literature are related to each other, they have not formed any coherent or progressive whole. The writers have been related as mutual critics rather than as co-workers. So far as they have been of aid to each other, it has been through stimulus and controversy. Those who, like the present writer, believe in the fundamental value of economic theory, have derived a certain satisfaction from the great volume and vigor of these contributions from many lands, but most of us must in candor confess to disappointment that so few definitive results have been