Knowledge that Transforms

A corporate profits function is first developed in which gross profits depend positively on unlagged current dollar sales and capacity utilization rates and negatively on lagged sales. This function is tested for all two-digit manufacturing industries. It is found that the estimates differ substantially but similar results can be grouped into primarily competitive and primarily oligopolistic industries. Further testing with unit labor costs as an additional independent variable shows that competitive industries pass on increased labor costs in the form of higher prices much more readily than do oligopolistic industries. Finally, an aggregate econometric model is used to show that an overall increase in unit labor costs is reflected almost entirely in higher prices and decreases corporate profits very little. ALTHOUGH PROFITS are often considered to be one of the most important variables in our economic system, very little empirical analysis has been undertaken to establish the determinants of corporate profits, and even less work has been done at the two-digit industry level. This is somewhat surprising in view of the large amount of recent analysis of investment functions at the two-digit level and the often stated premise that investment depends partially on retained profits. Previous studies by Kuh2 and Schultze3 have been directed more toward an examination of the cyclical behavior of income shares rather than the determinants of profits per se. There is general agreement that these two aspects of profit behavior cannot be entirely separated, and it is argued later that one problem cannot be solved independently of the other. In this paper, however, we feel that it is preferable to specify a corporate profits function first and examine the relationship between profits and wages later. The purposes of this paper are threefold: (1) to determine a corporate profits function for two-digit industries; (2) to discuss and explain the interindustry similarities and differences; and (3) to show the relationships between profits and wages in the entire economy by use of a complete model. The model used for this purpose is one developed by the author and L.R. Klein, known as the WhartonEFU model.4 This is necessary in order to examine the redistribution of income through price changes and changes in the amount of labor demanded. In Section 1 ' The author is indebted to L. R. Klein and P. Davidson for numerous helpful suggestions and comments. M. Golubitsky was particularly helpful in writing the computer programs and performing most of the calculations for this paper. This is a project of the Econometric and Forecasting Unit of the

In this paper we show that a bargaining game will yield a negotiated solution with certain reasonable properties if the rules of the game are appropriately restricted. The basic idea is to provide an incentive for all the components to engage in a process of concessions until the point where some agreement is reached. The incentive consists of the threat of a preannounced imposed solution which will be enforced if no settlement can be reached. ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION MAKING is characterized by a multiplicity of partially conflicting objectives, all of which are desirable to some extent. Although the presence of multiple goal structures has been recognized for a long time in economic theory, the assumption of a unique goal of profit maximization has been made in nearly every analytical study of firm behavior, except in a few recent contributions.2 There are many reasons for this apparent lack of interest in the problem of multiple objectives and the failure to introduce them explicitly in models of firm behavior, though most of these are probably related to the difficulty of handling such objectives in a satisfactory way. For instance, a utility-if one exists-will generally fail to be a scalar function; more often it will be a multidimensional function.3 Furthermore, one must face the problem of aggregating the preferences of individual members into a group ordering which satisfies certain reasonable requirements.4 Several approaches have been developed to deal with the problem of resource allocation under multiple objectives; however, none are really satisfactory. Such