We analyze the incentives of investment banks to develop innovative products. We show that client characteristics and market structure affect these incentives significantly. Investment banks with larger market shares have greater incentives to innovate and smaller banks are likely to share their innovations with the largest bank. Innovation incentives increase in volatile environments and regulatory scrutiny actually encourages loophole exploitation activity. Our predictions are consistent with stylized facts and the analysis has broad testable implications for innovative activity in other markets similarly characterized by a lack of comprehensive protection for intellectual property rights, for example, the software industry
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis202459(2), 474-520open access
We build a novel comprehensive data set of new product trademarks as an output measure of product development innovation. We show that risk-taking incentives in CEO compensation motivate this type of innovation and that this innovation improves firm performance. Using an exogenous shock to executive compensation, we find that reductions in stock option compensation cause reductions in new product development. We also find that firms undertaking new product development experience increases in future cash flow from operations and return on assets. These findings suggest the importance of product development innovation to firms and new trademarks as a novel innovation measure
Journal of Accounting and Economics199519(2-3), 365-381
Diversified corporations have been widely criticized as being inefficient innovators with an orientation to maximizing short-term profits. This study investigates this criticism by testing whether the number of new products introduced per R&D dollar is lower among more diversified firms. We find no statistically discernible effect of diversification on innovative efficiency in a sample of 706 research-intensive firms in the 1981–1988 period. This suggests that diversified organizations are rationally designed to minimize incentive and communication problems which may hinder innovation. Consistent with this view, we find that diversified firms are more likely to have separate research and development centers
American Economic Review2013103(3), 398-401open access
I illustrate the effect of financial innovation on portfolio risks by using an example with risk-sharing needs and belief disagreements. I consider two types of innovation: product innovation, formalized as an expansion of new financial assets; and process innovation, formalized as a reduction in transaction costs. When belief disagreements are large, both types of innovation increase portfolio risks. Moreover, endogenous financial innovation is directed towards speculative assets that increase portfolio risks
Firms in younger labor markets produce more innovation. We establish this by instrumenting the current labor force with historical births in each local labor market in the United States. Analyses of firms and inventors allow us to rule out unobservable heterogeneity across local labor markets and firms, life cycles, and other effects. Corporate innovation in younger labor markets reflects the innovative characteristics of younger labor forces, and its market value is higher. Younger workers as a group, not merely inventors by themselves, produce more innovation for firms through the labor force channel rather than through a financing or consumption channel
The Review of Economics and Statistics2020102(5), 912-928
In this paper, we analyze how the physical layout of cities affects innovation by influencing the organization of knowledge exchange. We exploit a novel data set covering all census block groups in the contiguous United States with information on innovation outcomes, street infrastructure, as well as population and workforce characteristics. To deal with concerns of omitted variable bias, we apply commuting zone fixed effects and construct instruments based on historic city planning. The results suggest that variation in street network density may explain regional innovation differentials beyond the traditional location externalities found in the literature
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis201449(4), 957-1003
We develop a theory to show how external and internal corporate governance mechanisms affect innovation. We predict a U-shaped relation between innovation and external takeover pressure, which arises from the interaction between expected takeover premia and private benefits of control. Using ex ante and ex post innovation measures, we find strong empirical support for the predicted relation. We exploit the variation in takeover pressure created by the passage of antitakeover laws across different states. Innovation is fostered either by an unhindered market for corporate control or by antitakeover laws that are severe enough to effectively deter takeovers
Journal of Financial Economics2012106(2), 287-307open access
I estimate the effect of uncertainty on risky innovation using a panel of 11,417 manufacturing firms. I find that an increase in uncertainty has a large negative effect on the risky innovation of entrepreneurial firms, while it does not have any significant impact on other firms. This negative effect is stronger for the less diversified entrepreneurial firms in the sample. The estimation results are consistent with the innovation dynamics generated in a model in which entrepreneurs are risk averse and cannot diversify the risk of their business
I. The invention, 475. — II. The innovation: domestic lag, 475. — III. The innovation: international lag, 476. — IV. Explanation of the lag, 478. — V. Conclusion, 481
End-of-day stock price manipulation is generally associated with short-termism, long-term damage to equity values, and reduced incentives for employees to innovate. We use a sample of suspected stock price manipulation events based on intraday data for stocks from nine countries over eight years and find evidence of negative effects of market manipulation on innovation. We show that these negative effects are particularly harmful to innovation in markets with low intellectual property rights and high shareholder protection