In this study, we examine whether environmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds' investment decisions are sensitive to the existence and extent of firms' voluntary environmental disclosures. We create our measures of voluntary environmental disclosure using bigrams extracted from the Global Reporting Initiative standards. We provide robust evidence that voluntary environmental disclosure in conference calls is associated with greater ESG fund ownership in the subsequent period, incremental to firms' ESG ratings. We also provide evidence that fund managers' reliance on environmental disclosure is concentrated in water, waste, emissions, and compliance disclosures. ESG fund ownership increases with environmental disclosure that is more positive and specific. Our primary finding persists both when we rely on the sustainability report as an alternative proxy for environmental disclosure and when we use fund‐level tests. Overall, our evidence is consistent with ESG funds relying on firms' disclosures when making investing decisions and inconsistent with recent regulatory concerns that ESG fund managers are not following through on their stated investing strategies

We provide an economics-based review of the pros and cons of ESG disclosures, emphasizing environmental disclosures from an investor-centric perspective. Our survey intends to guide corporate management and regulators in navigating the ESG disclosure terrain. Rather than summarizing the vast and growing ESG literature, we assess the economic arguments for ESG disclosure regulation and the form of this disclosure. We discuss investors’ demand for ESG information and its supply by publicly traded firms. We analyze the case for and against mandatory ESG disclosure. Finally, we weigh the efficiency of disclosure requirement characteristics, assuming mandatory ESG disclosure is warranted. We intend to be positive rather than prescriptive, providing a line of reasoning readers can employ to reach their own conclusions about what we ought to do

This paper examines the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on firm investment. The analysis characterizes the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that channels investors’ tastes for ESG into firm investment. Although it is tempting to think that the optimal ESG disclosure becomes more precise when investors care more about ESG, I show this intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Applying the analysis to a large economy, I show that mandating more precise climate disclosure than would be voluntarily provided motivates self-interested firms to act on common interests in reducing emissions. That is, a regulator can leverage market forces and a disclosure mandate to achieve a similar result as a Pigovian tax in motivating firms to internalize the externalities created by their climate-related investments

We provide the first large-sample evidence on third-party verification of firms’ environmental and social metrics in ESG reports (ESG assurance) in the United States. Focusing on the S&P 500 from 2010–2020, we document a striking increase in not only the number of firms with ESG assurance—in 2020 (2010), 76% (38%) of the S&P 500 had an ESG report and 46% (16%) involved assurance—but also the number of metrics assured. Unlike financial audits, ESG assurance varies widely in form and substance, including the choice of metrics assured, the level of assurance, and assuror identity. We show that firms’ decision to obtain ESG assurance is primarily driven by their adoption of ESG reporting frameworks and peer effects, with firm characteristics documented in prior literature playing only a minor role. Assurance is associated with improvements in ESG disclosure, ESG ratings, and the number of institutional investors holding the firm’s stock

We collect a novel dataset on images in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reports using deep learning and artificial intelligence (AI), to test hypotheses arising from experimental literature that visual impression management enhances audience perception. We further combine AI and manual methods to contrast images that lack information content (“generic images” evoking broad ESG themes) against images with information content (“specific images” depicting firm-specific ESG activities). We hypothesize and find that firms (1) operating in socially problematic industries (e.g., “sinful”, polluting, or controversial industries), (2) issuing less extensive textual ESG disclosures, and (3) experiencing poor ESG performance tend to use more images, especially generic images, consistent with strategic motivations. We then examine the impact of image usage on stakeholders, observing unduly enhanced perception in retail traders but seldom in institutional investors. We observe that ESG award committees reward specific images and penalize generic images. Our results show that ESG report visual impression management affects stakeholders in the real world, though its impact can be overcome by attention and expertise

Firms increasingly borrow via sustainability-linked loans (SLLs), contractually tying spreads to their ESG performance. SLLs vary widely in transparency of disclosure regarding sustainability-related contract details and tend to be issued to borrowers with superior ESG profiles. While high-transparency SLL borrowers maintain this performance, low-transparency SLL borrowers exhibit significantly deteriorating ESG performance after issuance. Both high- and low-transparency borrowers pay substantial fees to obtain SLLs. The results are consistent with high-transparency borrowers using SLLs to “certify” their preexisting ESG commitments, but low-transparency borrowers “greenwashing” with empty SLL labels. Evidence on drawdowns, renegotiations, and stock market reactions further supports these interpretations

We study the equilibrium effects of the “S” dimension of ESG under imperfect competition. ESG policies are pledges made by firms that constrain managers to treat their stakeholders better than market conditions alone dictate. Moderate policies limit market power and prompt managers to be more competitive; aggressive polices backfire, both for adopting firms and intended beneficiaries. In contrast to the “shareholder primacy” paradigm, competition in ESG policies under the “stakeholder capitalism” paradigm is a panacea for market power, delivering the first-best outcome in equilibrium. We discuss drivers behind the recent rise in ESG, ESG-linked compensation, and disclosure practices

This paper examines how increased competition among environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating agencies relates to ESG rating quality. We exploit the entry of Sustainalytics as a new ESG rating agency in 2010. We conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis and provide three main findings. First, we find that higher competition decreases incumbents' ESG rating disagreements of the same scope. The negative relation between competition and ESG rating disagreement persists for same‐scope rating metrics not covered by Sustainalytics, suggesting that neither learning nor herding drive the results. The relationship between competition and rating disagreement strengthens for firms with more ESG disclosures, which generally require more effort to analyze. Second, we find that incumbents' ratings of ESG concerns are more strongly associated with future negative ESG news for firms additionally covered by Sustainalytics. This finding is consistent with competition improving ratings' ability to predict future negative ESG incidents. Third, we find that incumbents evaluate more difficult‐to‐measure outcome metrics for firms covered by Sustainalytics, consistent with competition inducing more effort. Overall, our findings suggest that competition serves as an implicit disciplining mechanism of ESG rating agencies' quality

We analyze survey data on ESG beliefs and preferences in a large panel of retail investors linked to administrative data on their investment portfolios. The survey elicits investors’ expectations of long-term ESG equity returns and asks about their motivations, if any, to invest in ESG assets. We document four facts. First, investors generally expected ESG investments to underperform the market. Between mid-2021 and late-2023, the average expected 10-year annualized return of ESG investments relative to the overall stock market was −2.1%. Second, there is substantial heterogeneity across investors in their ESG return expectations and their motives for ESG investing: 48% of survey respondents do not see any reason to invest in ESG, 24% are primarily motivated by ethical considerations, 22% are driven by climate hedging motives, and 6% are motivated by return expectations. Third, there is a strong link between individuals’ reported ESG investment motives and their actual investment behaviors, with the highest ESG portfolio holdings among individuals who report ethics-driven investment motives. Fourth, financial considerations matter independently of other investment motives: we find meaningful ESG holdings only for investors who expect these investments to outperform the market, even among those investors who reported that their most important ESG investment motives were ethical or hedging reasons

We provide the most comprehensive analysis to date of the relation between ESG ratings and stock returns, using 16,000+ stocks in 48 countries and seven different ESG rating providers. We find very little evidence that ESG ratings are related to global stock returns between 2001 and 2020. This finding obtains across different regions, time periods, ESG (sub)ratings, ESG momentum, ESG downgrades and upgrades, and best-in-class strategies. We further find little empirical support for prominent hypotheses from the literature on the role of ESG uncertainty and of country-level ESG social norms, ESG disclosure standards, and ESG regulations in shaping the relation between ESG and global stock returns. Overall, our results suggest that ESG investing did not systematically affect investment performance during the past two decades