Abstract We develop hypotheses regarding the association between two types of creditor rights and bank loan losses. Contrary to prior research conclusions, bank lending risk is negatively associated with both restrictions on reorganization and the secured creditor being paid first. Using accounting disclosures, we develop novel empirical measures of the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) at the loan-portfolio level. Different types of creditor rights have differential effects pertaining to PD and LGD and exhibit significant intertemporal variation. We corroborate our cross-country findings using the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) shock to creditor rights.

While the policy of too-big-to-fail has received wide attention in the literature, there is little agreement regarding economies of scale for financial firms. We take the stand that systemic risk increases when the larger players in the financial sector have a larger share of output. Calculations indicate that the cost to the macro-economy due to increased systemic risk is always much larger than the potential benefit due to scale economies. When distributional and intergenerational issues are considered, the potential benefits to economies of scale are unlikely to ever exceed the potential costs due to increased risk of a banking crisis.

ABSTRACT Using proprietary transaction‐level data on nonsyndicated construction loans, we provide some of the first empirical evidence on the drivers and consequences of bank monitoring through on‐site inspections. Banks trade off monitoring intensity with favorable origination terms. Monitoring intensity escalates in response to local economic downturns or the bank's financial instability. Borrowers with negative inspection reports have more draw requests denied, suggesting that monitoring outcomes impact credit decisions. Both the occurrence and threat of increased inspection frequency correspond to reduced defaults. Overall, our results provide empirical support for a substantial body of theoretical literature on bank monitoring.

Abstract Many policymakers and practitioners argue that corporations may become more stakeholder focused if employees are given more power. We study the causal impact of unionization on stakeholders by analyzing how close labor union elections affect environmental and social (E&S) scores. We find that unionization is associated with an increase in internal social scores that primarily benefit employees and a decrease in external E&S scores that primarily benefit non-employees. The negative effects on external E&S are amplified when firms have greater financial constraints. The effects on both internal and external E&S are magnified when labor unions have more bargaining power. Our results suggest that policymakers consider implications for all stakeholders before implementing policies that prioritize the corporate influence of one stakeholder group.