Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for monetary policy, household risk management, and financial stability. We show that the FRM market share is sharply lower when mortgages are difficult to securitize, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in access to liquid securitization markets generated by a regulatory cutoff and time variation in private securitization activity. We interpret our findings as evidence that lenders are reluctant to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk embedded in FRMs. The form of securitization (private versus government backed) has little effect on FRM supply during periods in which private securitization markets are well functioning.

[Because most mortgages in the United States are securitized in agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), yield spreads on MBS are a key determinant of homeowners’ funding costs. We study variation in MBS spreads in the time series and across securities and document that MBS spreads show a pronounced cross-sectional smile with respect to the securities’ coupon rates. We present a new pricing model that uses “stripped” MBS prices to identify the contribution of non-interest-rate prepayment risk to spreads and find that this risk explains the smile, whereas the time-series spread variation is mostly accounted for by nonprepayment risk factors.]

Abstract We evaluate financial assets with payoffs linked to individual labor income, as conceived by Shiller (2003) and others. Using a realistically calibrated life-cycle model, we find that such assets can generate nontrivial welfare benefits, depending on the precise structure of the instrument. However, the assets we consider can only eliminate a relatively small fraction of the welfare costs of labor income risk over the life cycle. We highlight the fact that although the purpose of such assets is to smooth consumption across states of nature, one must also consider the assets' effects on households' ability to smooth consumption over time.

ABSTRACT Comparing mortgage rates that borrowers obtain to rates that lenders could offer for the same loan, we find that many homeowners significantly overpay for their mortgage, with overpayment varying across borrower types and with market interest rates. Survey data reveal that borrowers' mortgage knowledge and shopping behavior strongly correlate with the rates they secure. We also document substantial variation in how expensive and profitable lenders are, without any evidence that expensive loans are associated with a better borrower experience. Despite many lenders operating in the U.S. mortgage market, limited borrower sophistication may provide lenders with market power.

We use a strategic household survey to study the sensitivity of intended homeownership decisions to financing constraints. We find that the average stated likelihood of buying a home is strongly sensitive to the size of the required down payment, which we vary exogenously across three scenarios. This sensitivity is particularly high for respondents that appear more liquidity constrained based on observable characteristics (including current renters, or owners with low savings or low home equity). For renters, expectations of future rent inflation and of improvements to their personal financial situation also predict intention to buy.

Abstract We use survey questions about spending in hypothetical scenarios to investigate features of propensities to consume that are useful for distinguishing between consumption theories. We find that (1) responses to unanticipated gains are vastly heterogeneous (either zero or substantially positive); (2) responses increase in the size of the gain, driven by the extensive margin of spending adjustments; (3) responses to losses are much larger and more widespread than responses to gains; and (4) even those with large responses to gains do not respond to news about future gains. These four findings suggest that limited access to disposable resources, and frictions in adjusting consumption, are important determinants of consumption behaviour. We also find that (5) households do not respond to the offer of a one-year interest-free loan, suggesting that this is not a consequence of short-term credit constraints; and (6) people do cut spending in response to news about future losses, suggesting that neither is this a consequence of myopia. A calibrated precautionary savings model with utility costs of changing consumption, and a sufficient fraction of low-wealth households, can account for these features of propensities to consume on both the extensive and intensive margins.

Abstract Home price expectations are believed to play an important role in housing dynamics, yet we have limited understanding of how they are formed and how they affect behaviour. Using a unique “information experiment” embedded in an online survey, this article investigates how consumers’ home price expectations respond to past home price growth, and how they impact investment decisions. After eliciting respondents’ priors about past and future local home price changes, we present a random subset of them with factual information about past (one- or five-year) changes, and then re-elicit expectations. This unique “panel” data allows us to identify causal effects of the information, and provides insights on the expectation formation process. We find that, on average, year-ahead home price expectations are revised in a way consistent with short-term momentum in home price growth, though respondents tend to underpredict the strength of momentum. Revisions of longer-term expectations show that respondents do not expect the empirically-occurring mean reversion in home price growth. These patterns are in line with recent behavioural models of housing cycles. Finally, we show that home price expectations causally affect investment decisions in a portfolio choice experiment embedded in the survey.

While evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes with respect to reference points, little is known about what determines them. We conduct two experiments that show that reference points are determined, at least in part, by expectations. In an exchange experiment, we endow subjects with an item and randomize the probability they will be allowed to trade. Subjects that are less likely to be able to trade are more likely to choose to keep their item. In a valuation experiment, we randomly assign subjects a high or low probability of obtaining an item and elicit their willingness-to-accept for it. The high probability treatment increases valuation of the item by 20–30%.

Fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) dominate the U.S. mortgage market, with important consequences for monetary policy, household risk management, and financial stability. We show that the FRM market share is sharply lower when mortgages are difficult to securitize, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in access to liquid securitization markets generated by a regulatory cutoff and time variation in private securitization activity. We interpret our findings as evidence that lenders are reluctant to retain the prepayment and interest rate risk embedded in FRMs. The form of securitization (private versus government backed) has little effect on FRM supply during periods in which private securitization markets are well functioning.

ABSTRACT We introduce a new measure of the price charged by financial intermediaries for connecting mortgage borrowers with capital market investors. Based on administrative lender pricing data, we document that the price of intermediation reacts strongly to variation in demand, reflecting capacity constraints of mortgage originators. This positive comovement of price with quantity reduced the pass‐through of quantitative easing. We also find a notable upward trend in this price between 2008 and 2014, likely due to increased legal and regulatory burden in the mortgage market. The trend led to an implicit cost to borrowers of nearly $100 billion over this period.