The binary classification of firms into profits or losses represents a powerful heuristic. The literature that has examined the impact on the firm of this earnings heuristic has focused on the earnings management actions of small profit firms. The impact of this earnings heuristic on the actions of firms reporting accounting losses and the decision-making effects the heuristic may have other than earnings management have not been examined. In this study we hypothesize that reporting an accounting loss acts as a heuristic trigger for firms to exercise the abandonment option and discard unproductive investments. The results are consistent with the hypothesis. We find that there is a sharp and economically significant discontinuity around zero in the level of investment in labor between small profit and small loss firms. The discontinuity is due to loss firms having a lower-than-expected level of investment in labor, given their economic fundamentals. Further tests show that this discontinuity is due to the exercise of the abandonment option. We find that firms switching from a profit to a loss cut labor to a greater extent than other firms with similar changes in earnings that do not pass the loss threshold. Taken together the results are consistent with the accounting loss heuristic acting as a major disciplinary or incentive altering event that resolves agency problems.

ABSTRACT We investigate circumstances in which referral-based hiring can exacerbate rather than mitigate agency problems. When incentive contracts cannot fully align employees’ incentives with the interests of the firm, employees may behave opportunistically. Referred job candidates likely obtain inside information from existing employees about opportunistic incentive responses, and it is this information that exacerbates agency problems. Our research setting enables us to distinguish between referred and nonreferred employees. It also features a context in which the incentive contract consists of two measures with different properties (efficiency and quality), which allow for opportunistic incentive responses, i.e., sacrificing quality for efficiency. We find that referred employees focus more on efficiency and less on quality than nonreferred employees. We further document the persistence of this behavior and the differential departure likelihood of referred and nonreferred employees. Our findings suggest that referral-based hiring can exacerbate agency problems when incentive contracts allow for opportunistic gains. Data Availability: All data are proprietary. Confidentiality agreements prevent the authors from distributing the data.

ABSTRACT We examine how subjectivity in performance measurement and reward systems (PMRS) is used to mitigate incentive contracting risks. Drawing on data from 38 interviews with supervisory and subordinate managers in four firms, we provide a more comprehensive explanation of the role of subjectivity in risk mitigation than is evident in the prior literature. We provide empirical evidence of the importance firms place on the use of subjectivity to mitigate the risk of incentive misalignment and employee sorting errors relative to its well-documented role in mitigating employee compensation risk. We find that incentive misalignment arising from unanticipated behavioral responses to performance measures is a particularly important risk, managed through subjective performance assessments. The extent of subjectivity we observe poses a significant risk of errors and bias. We observe that both vertical and horizontal information gathering and review by calibration panels are key strategies to mitigate the downside risk of subjectivity. JEL Classifications: M49; M55; M52; M51.

Many organizations have professional employees on fixed-term and ongoing employment contracts. While hiring employees on fixed-term contracts offers organizations operational flexibility and other benefits, it also brings about challenges in the form of relatively lower goal alignment and ability of these employees, thus creating the need for management controls. At the same time, given the costs and constraints of designing and implementing a control system, we expect that the planned use of fixed-term workers would be affected by the type of control environment that organizations are willing or able to create. Hence, this study investigates whether an organization's choice of its control environment and its use of fixed-term professional employees are interdependent (i.e., made jointly). Using surveys from different sources and archival data from the education sector, we find that some types of controls (i.e., action controls and organizational culture) and the organization's choice of using fixed-term employees are interdependent, while other controls (i.e., employee selection practices and results control) are independent of this choice. We also find that the interdependence between the choice of using fixed-term employees and the control environment is generally weaker when organizations use fixed-term contracts as an implicit screening mechanism for ongoing employment. Finally, in additional analysis, we find evidence that the interdependence between controls and the use of fixed-term employees is primarily due to concerns related to goal alignment rather than ability.

ABSTRACT This study explores how initial control choice influences the ease with which outsourcing firms switch suppliers. We recognize that firms invest in controls to manage collaborative relationships, and argue that these investments generate switching costs, namely, opportunity and reinvestment costs. We collect data on outsourcing transactions by conducting semi-structured interviews across multiple field sites. Observed patterns across 53 cases show that firms with trust-based controls experience the most difficulty in switching suppliers, whereas firms with market-based controls experience the greatest ease. Firms with bureaucratic-based and hybrid controls generally lie between these extremes. Furthermore, in nearly 50 percent of our sample (25 cases), respondents indicate that the switching costs associated with control choices increase the difficulty of switching suppliers. We also find evidence that the magnitude and nature of switching costs vary with the types of controls chosen. Data Availability: Data used in this study cannot be made public due to confidentiality agreements with participating firms.

ABSTRACT Cross-border alliances expose firms to heightened risks, posing different governance and control challenges than domestic alliances. We examine the impact of differences in alliance partner countries' institutional environments. Analysis of survey data supports our contention that cross-border alliances involve a greater reliance on formal controls, particularly when firms collaborate with partners in countries with a weaker institutional environment. These relations exist regardless of governance structure (i.e., equity or non-equity alliance) that prior research considers a critical choice for addressing cross-border alliance risks. Additional analyses show that four subdimensions of institutional characteristics (voice and accountability, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) and one subdimension of formal controls (behavior controls) are the main drivers in the association between institutional distance and reliance on formal controls. These findings demonstrate the distinct impact of institutional environment as a country-level determinant of alliance control choices. Data Availability: Due to confidentiality agreements with respondents, the data cannot be released publicly. JEL Classifications: D23; D82; L22; M4.