This paper attempts to help explain the unforecasted, excess' personal income tax revenues of the last several years. Using panel data on executive compensation in the 1990s, it argues that because the gains on most stock options are treated as ordinary income for tax purposes, rising stock market valuations are directly tied to non-capital gains income. This blurred line between capital and wage income for has affected tax revenue in three ways, at least for these high-income people. First, stock performance has directly affected the amount of ordinary income that people report by influencing their stock option exercise decisions. Second, the presence of options gives executives more flexibility in changing the timing of their reported income and appears to make them much more sensitive to the short-run timing of tax changes, even accounting for the stock market changes of the period. Third, because of the tax rules on options, changing the capital gains tax rate, as the U.S. did in the late 1990s, can lead individuals to exercise their options early to convert the expected future gains into lower-taxed forms. The data show significant evidence of each of these effects and in all three cases, executives working in the new' economy and high-technology sectors(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Conventional wisdom holds that the social rate of return to R&D significantly exceeds the private rate of return and, therefore, R&D should be subsidized. In the U.S., the government has directly funded a large fraction of total R&D spending. This paper shows that there is a serious problem with such government efforts to increase inventive activity. The majority of R&D spending is actually just salary payments for R&D workers. Their labor supply, however, is quite inelastic so when the government funds R&D, a significant fraction of the increased spending goes directly into higher wages. Using CPS data on wages of scientific personnel, this paper shows that government R&D spending raises wages significantly, particularly for scientists related to defense such as physicists and aeronautical engineers. Because of the higher wages, conventional estimates of the effectiveness of R&D policy may be 30 to 50% too high. The results also imply that by altering the wages of scientists and engineers even for firms not receiving federal support, government funding directly crowds out private inventive activity.

This paper examines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995. The data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income. Indeed, this small group of executives may account for as much as 20 percent of the aggregate change in wage and salary income for approximately the one million richest taxpayers over this time period; one person alone can account for more than 2 percent. The decline, however, is almost entirely a short‐run shift in the timing of compensation rather than a permanent reduction in taxable income. The short‐run elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net‐of‐tax share exceeds one in this sample, but the elasticity after one year is at most 0.4 and probably closer to zero. Breaking out the tax responsiveness of different types of compensation shows that the large short‐run responses come almost entirely from a large increase in the exercise of stock options by the highest‐income executives in anticipation of the rate increases. Executives without stock options, executives with relatively lower incomes, and more conventional forms of taxable compensation such as salary and bonus show little responsiveness to tax changes.

This paper examines direct broadcast satellites (DBS) as a competitor to cable. We first estimate a structural consumer level demand system for satellite, basic cable, premium cable and local antenna using micro data on almost 30000 households in 317 markets, including extensive controls for unobserved product quality and allowing the distribution of unobserved tastes to follow a fully flexible multivariate normal distribution. The estimated elasticity of expanded basic is about -15, with the demand for premium cable and DBS more elastic. The results identify strong correlations in the taste for different products not captured in conventional logit models. Estimates of the supply response of cable suggest that without DBS entry cable prices would be about 15 percent higher and cable quality would fall. We find a welfare gain of between $127 and $190 per year (aggregate $2.5 billion) for satellite buyers, and about $50 (aggregate $3 billion) for cable subscribers.

In an effort to alleviate the perceived growth of a digital divide, the U.S. government enacted a major subsidy for Internet and communications investment in schools starting in 1998. In this paper, we evaluate the effect of the subsidy—known as the E-Rate—on Internet investment in California public schools. The program subsidized spending by 20%–90%, depending on school characteristics. Using new data on school technology usage in every school in California from 1996 to 2000 as well as application data from the E-Rate program, the results indicate that the subsidy did succeed in significantly increasing Internet investment. The implied first-dollar price elasticity of demand for Internet investment is between −0.4 and −1.1 and the greatest sensitivity is seen among urban schools and schools with large black and Hispanic student populations. Rural and predominantly white and Asian schools show much less sensitivity. Overall, by the final year of the sample, there were approximately 68% more Internet-connected classrooms per teacher than there would have been without the subsidy. Using a variety of test score results, however, we do not find significant effects of the E-Rate program, at least so far, on student performance.

Valuing Consumer Products by the Time Spent Using Them: An Application to the Internet by Austan Goolsbee and Peter J. Klenow. Published in volume 96, issue 2, pages 108-113 of American Economic Review, May 2006

This paper measures the degree of monopsony power in the US higher-education labor market by using school-specific labor demand instruments to directly estimate the residual labor supply curves facing individual universities. The results indicate that schools have significant monopsony power over tenure-track faculty but face perfectly elastic residual labor supply curves for non-tenure-track faculty. There is some evidence for three sources of monopsony power often discussed in the literature—employer concentration, search frictions/job-switching costs, and differentiated jobs. The results also suggest that monopsony over tenure-track faculty may have contributed to the trend toward hiring more non-tenure-track faculty.

We test whether textbook consumers are forward-looking, using a large new data set on textbooks sold in college bookstores during the ten semesters from 1997 to 2001. The data strongly support the hypothesis that students are forward-looking with low short-run discount rates and that they behave as if they have rational expectations of publishers' revision behavior. Data from a second new data set on the market prices of used books at Amazon Marketplace also support the hypothesis of rational, forward-looking behavior. Simulation results indicate that students are sufficiently forward-looking that publishers cannot consistently raise revenue by accelerating current revision cycles.

We examine how incumbents respond to the threat of entry by competitors (as distinct from how they respond to actual entry).We look specifically at passenger airlines, using the evolution of Southwest Airlines' route network to identify particular routes where the probability of future entry rises abruptly.We find incumbents cut fares significantly when threatened by Southwest's entry.Over half of Southwest's total impact on incumbent fares occurs before Southwest starts flying.These cuts are only on threatened routes, not those out of non-Southwest competing airports.The evidence on whether incumbents are seeking to deter or accommodate entry is mixed.