Abstract We develop a measure (based on the relative slopes of the demand and supply schedules) quantifying the asymmetric presence of liquidity traders in the market: a steeper slope of the demand (supply) schedule indicates a concentration of liquidity traders on the demand (supply) side. Using the opening session of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, we demonstrate the predictive power of our measure. Consistent with theory, we find that the concentration of liquidity traders on the demand (supply) side is negatively (positively) correlated with future returns. We find that liquidity traders are likely to arrive at the market together (commonality).

Bond repurchases are widespread in the US and other markets but data limitations have thus far prevented market-timing analysis. Using unique Israeli daily data we show that firms time the market in their actual open market bond repurchases. Bond repurchases typically follow price decline and result in significantly positive abnormal returns in the following days: about 1 % in five trading days. The market reaction is quicker within a pre-announced repurchase program, and it is stronger when the firm repurchases high-yield bonds or when the repurchase is preceded by positive net insider share purchases. The results lend support to the information motive for bond repurchases benefiting ongoing stakeholders but detrimental to selling bondholders.

This paper studies the association between the market's expectations of Saddam Hussein's fall from power, as reflected in “Saddam contract” prices, and stock prices, oil prices and exchange rates. During the war, a rise in the probability of Saddam's fall, which also indicated a speedy end to the war, was positively and significantly associated with stock prices, strengthened the dollar against the Euro, and lowered oil prices. Before the war, a rise in the probability of Saddam's fall, which may also have indicated the probability of a costly war breaking out, lowered stock prices, which adjusted gradually to this information.

Abstract Using new monthly data, we investigate open-market repurchase executions of US firms. We find that firms repurchase at prices that are significantly lower than average market prices. This price discount is negatively related to size and positively related to market-to-book ratio. Firms’ repurchase activity is followed by a positive and significant abnormal return. Importantly, the market response occurs when firms disclose their actual repurchase data in earnings announcements, and this positive response is followed by a 1-month drift. Consistent with these results, we find that insider trading is positively related to actual repurchases.

We analyze a unique dataset that includes the full demand schedules of 27 Israeli IPOs that were conducted as nondiscriminatory (uniform price) auctions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the whole demand schedule for any asset is described. The demand schedules are relatively flat around the auction clearing price: The average elasticity is 27. The elasticity is low when the return distribution contains a large unique component. We also find a significant average abnormal return of 4.5% on the first trading day and a positive correlation between the abnormal return and the elasticity of demand.

[We analyze a unique dataset that includes the full demand schedules of 27 Israeli IPOs that were conducted as nondiscriminatory (uniform price) auctions. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time the whole demand schedule for any asset is described. The demand schedules are relatively flat around the auction clearing price: The average elasticity is 37. The elasticity is low when the return distribution contains a large unique component. We also find a significant average abnormal return of 4.5% on the first trading day and a positive correlation between the abnormal return and the elasticity of demand.]

We find round number clustering in orders submitted by investors in Israeli IPO auctions. Explanations offered for price clustering, such as dealer collusion or implicit agreement to simplify negotiations, cannot explain price clustering in this market. Therefore, this is direct evidence that investors prefer round numbers.

Abstract Using a unique database of aggregate daily flows to equity mutual funds in Israel, we find strong support for the “temporary price pressure hypothesis” regarding mutual fund flows: Mutual fund flows create temporary price pressure that is subsequently corrected. We find that flows are positively autocorrelated, and are correlated with market returns ( R 2 of 20%). Our main finding is that approximately one-half of the price change is reversed within 10 trading days. This support for the “temporary price pressure hypothesis” complements microstructure research concerning price impact and price noise in stocks by indicating price noise at the aggregate market level.

We investigate a proxy for monthly shifts between bond funds and equity funds in the USA: aggregate net exchanges of equity funds. This measure (which is negatively related to changes in VIX) is positively contemporaneously correlated with aggregate stock market excess returns: One standard deviation of net exchanges is related to 1.95% of market excess return. Our main new finding is that 85% (all) of the contemporaneous relation is reversed within four (ten) months. The effect is stronger in smaller stocks and in growth stocks. These findings support the notion of “noise” in aggregate market prices induced by investor sentiment.

ABSTRACT We use the move of Israeli stocks from call auction trading to continuous trading to show that investors have a preference for stocks that trade continuously. When large stocks move from call auction to continuous trading, the small stocks that still trade by call auction experience a significant loss in volume relative to the overall market volume. As small stocks move to continuous trading, they experience an increase in volume and positive abnormal returns because of the associated increase in liquidity. Overall, though, a move to continuous trading increases the volume of large stocks relative to small stocks.