This article is based on the premise that the primary goal of a critical discussion in the accounting standard setting due process should be to reach conclusions by means of reasoned arguments. A normative model for achieving this goal is applied to some arguments made in recent accounting standard setting debates in the U.S. The model consists of eight maxims for advancing and defending arguments in a critical discussion in general and five presuppositions for a critical discussion about external financial reporting topics in particular. The normative model provides criteria for evaluating the validity of arguments, but it also is recognized that like all other language games the model does not (and cannot) carry within itself its own legitimation. The article concludes by considering how the standard setting debates can yield not only technical accounting outcomes but also changes in the nature of due process itself.

A common view is that there is little correlation between firm performance and CEO pay. Using a new fifteen-year panel data set of CEOs in the largest, publicly traded U. S. companies, we document a strong relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation. This relationship is generated almost entirely by changes in the value of CEO holdings of stock and stock options. In addition, we show that both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance have risen dramatically since 1980, largely because of increases in stock option grants.

Specialists in labor economics and public economics at 40 leading research universities provided opinions of policy proposals, quantitative best estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for economic parameters, and answers to values questions regarding income redistribution, efficiency versus equity, and individual versus social responsibility. Their positions on policy are more closely related to their values than to their estimates of relevant economic parameters. Average best estimates of the economic parameters agree well with the relevant literature, but individual best estimates are usually widely dispersed. The individual 95-percent confidence intervals are much narrower than the substantial cross-respondent variation in estimates would warrant.

We study the shareholder wealth effects of 270 proxy contests for board seats in the 1979–1994 period. We find that proxy contests create value, with the bulk of the wealth gains stemming from firms that are acquired. Restricting analysis to firms listed on Compustat imparts a downward bias on estimated wealth effects because such a restriction excludes a sizable fraction of the firms acquired during the proxy contest. For firms that are not acquired, the occurrence of management turnover has a significant, positive effect on shareholder wealth because firms replacing management are more likely to restructure following the contest.

This paper measures the impact of option introductions on the return variance of underlying stocks. Past research generally finds a significant reduction in stock return variance following the listing of options through 1986. Using a more extensive sample, I compare changes in the return variance of optioned stocks to changes in the return variance of a control group. Since the average change in the control group is statistically indistinguishable from the average change in the optioned stocks, I conclude that option introductions do not significantly affect stock return variance.

Extending the approach of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Strongin (1992), and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1994a, 1994b), we develop and apply a VAR-based methodology for measuring the stance of monetary policy. More specifically, we develop a "semi-structural" VAR approach, which extracts information about monetary policy from data on bank reserves and the federal funds rate but leaves the relationships among the macroeconomic variables in the system unrestricted. The methodologynests earlier VAR-based measures and can be used to compare and evaluate these indicators. It can also be used to construct measures of the stance of policy that optimally incorporate estimates of the Fed's operating procedure for any given period. Among existing approaches, we find that innovations to the federal funds rate (Bernanke-Blinder) are a good measure of policy innovations during the periods 1965-79 and 1988-94; for the period 1979-94 as a whole, innovations to the component of nonborrowed reserves that is orthogonal to total reserves (Strongin) seems to be the best choice. We develop a new measure of policy stance that conforms well to qualitative indicators of policy such as the Boschen-Mills (1991) index. Innovations to our measure lead to reasonable and precisely estimated dynamic responses by variables such as real GDP and the GDP deflator.;

Theories of asset pricing suggest that the amortized cost of the spread is relevant to investors' required returns. The amortized spread measures the spread's cost over investors' holding periods and is approximately equal to the spread times share turnover. We examine amortized spreads for Amex and NYSE stocks over the period 1983–1992. We find that stocks with similar spreads can have vastly different share turnover, and thus, a stock's amortized spread cannot be predicted reliably by its spread alone. Consistent with theories of transaction costs, we find stronger evidence that amortized spreads are priced than we find for unamortized spreads.

To investigate CEOs' incentives to liquidate their firms, we examine the effects of insider ownership and compensation in stock options on 30 voluntary liquidation decisions by industrial firms in the period 1975–1986. We find that liquidation decisions are influenced by CEO incentive plans and increase shareholder value. Firms with more outside board members, smaller market-to-book ratios, and attempts by outsiders to gain control are more likely to be liquidated. Although few top executives of liquidating firms subsequently take comparable jobs, at least 41% of CEOs who downsize are made better off by liquidation.