ABSTRACT This paper studies how a federal procurement regulation, known as the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), affects the competitiveness and execution of government contracts. TINA stipulates how contracting officials (COs) can ensure reasonable prices. Following TINA, for contracts above a certain size threshold, COs can no longer rely solely on their own judgment that a price is reasonable. Instead, they must either require suppliers to provide accounting data supporting their proposed prices or expect multiple bids. Using a regression discontinuity design, I find that above‐threshold contracts experience greater competition (i.e., more bids), improved performance (i.e., less frequent renegotiations and cost overruns), and reduced use of the harder‐to‐monitor cost‐plus pricing, compared to below‐threshold contracts. These findings suggest that TINA's requirements enhance competition and oversight for above‐threshold contracts.

We provide evidence on the role of perceived fairness in tax compliance. Are households more willing to pay taxes when they believe others contribute their fair share? We investigate this question with a natural field experiment in the context of U.S. property taxes. Using an information-disclosure experiment, we exogenously shifted households’ perceptions of the average tax rate paid by others. We find that higher perceived average tax rates increase perceptions of fairness and reduce the likelihood of tax appeals. Quantifying the effect, for every additional $1 paid by the average household, a taxpayer is willing to contribute $0.43 more. In the field experiment, subjects were informed about the average tax rate but not why it might differ from theirs. A complementary survey shows this context matters: when households learn others pay lower rates due to exemptions such as disability or advanced age, they are more willing to tolerate unequal rates.