We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded) bank loans and traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of external funds for industry. We contrast the theoretical conditions that favor each system with the historical conditions prevailing when these financial systems evolved during the British and German industrial revolutions. To study persistence, we consider an entry model where financiers take the industrial structure as given when they lend and firms take the financial system as given when they borrow. We show multiple equilibria can exist, compare equilibria in welfare terms, and discuss their robustness to coordination between lenders and borrowers.

We use a moral hazard model to compare monitored (nontraded) bank loans and traded (nonmonitored) bonds as sources of external funds for industry. We contrast the theoretical conditions that favor each system with the historical conditions prevailing when these financial systems evolved during the British and German industrial revolutions. To study persistence, we consider an entry model where financiers take the industrial structure as given when they lend and firms take the financial system as given when they borrow. We show multiple equilibria can exist, compare equilibria in welfare terms, and discuss their robustness to coordination between lenders and borrowers.

Harsanyi's impartial observer must consider two types of lotteries: imaginary identity lotteries (“accidents of birth”) that she faces as herself and the real outcome lotteries (“life chances”) to be faced by the individuals she imagines becoming. If we maintain a distinction between identity and outcome lotteries, then Harsanyi-like axioms yield generalized utilitarianism, and allow us to accommodate concerns about different individuals' risk attitudes and concerns about fairness. Requiring an impartial observer to be indifferent as to which individual should face similar risks restricts her social welfare function, but still allows her to accommodate fairness. Requiring an impartial observer to be indifferent between identity and outcome lotteries, however, forces her to ignore both fairness and different risk attitudes, and yields a new axiomatization of Harsanyi's utilitarianism.