This is the raw data that is used for "Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia." The data contains a household survey, key informant survey, meeting surveys, and an engineering road survey.

Abstract Colonial powers typically organized economic activity in the colonies to maximize their economic returns. While the literature has emphasized long-run negative economic impacts via institutional quality, the changes in economic organization implemented to spur production historically could also directly influence economic organization in the long-run, exerting countervailing effects. We examine these in the context of the Dutch Cultivation System, the integrated industrial and agricultural system for producing sugar that formed the core of the Dutch colonial enterprise in 19th century Java. We show that areas close to where the Dutch established sugar factories in the mid-19th century are today more industrialized, have better infrastructure, are more educated, and are richer than nearby counterfactual locations that would have been similarly suitable for colonial sugar factories. We also show, using a spatial regression discontinuity design on the catchment areas around each factory, that villages forced to grow sugar cane have more village-owned land and also have more schools and substantially higher education levels, both historically and today. The results suggest that the economic structures implemented by colonizers to facilitate production can continue to promote economic activity in the long run, and we discuss the contexts where such effects are most likely to be important.

This paper tests whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. We designed a study in which surveyors accompanied Indonesian truck drivers on 304 trips, during which they observed over 6,000 illegal payments to police, soldiers, and weigh station attendants. Using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of checkpoints, we show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments. We further show that corrupt officials use complex pricing schemes, including third‐degree price discrimination and a menu of two‐part tariffs. Our findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anticorruption policy.

Abstract Environmental externalities—uncompensated damages imposed on others—lie at the root of climate change, pollution, deforestation and biodiversity loss. Empirical evidence is limited, however, as to how externalities drive private decision making. We study one such behaviour, illegal tropical forest fires, using 15 years of daily satellite data covering over 107,000 fires across Indonesia. Weather-induced variation in fire spread risk and variation in who owns surrounding land allow us to identify how far externalities influence the decision to use fire. Relative to when all spread risks are internalized, we find that firms overuse fire when surrounded by unleased government lands where property rights are weak. In contrast, and consistent with the Coase Theorem, firms treat risks to nearby private concessions similarly to risks to their own land. Government sanctions, concentrated on fires spreading to populated areas, also deter fires, consistent with Pigouvian deterrence.

Abstract Performance pay for tax collectors has the potential to raise revenues, but might come at a cost if it increases the bargaining power of tax collectors vis-à-vis taxpayers. We report the first large-scale field experiment on these issues, where we experimentally allocated 482 property tax units in Punjab, Pakistan, into one of three performance pay schemes or a control. After two years, incentivized units had 9.4 log points higher revenue than controls, which translates to a 46% higher growth rate. The scheme that rewarded purely on revenue did best, increasing revenue by 12.9 log points (64% higher growth rate), with little penalty for customer satisfaction and assessment accuracy compared to the two other schemes that explicitly also rewarded these dimensions. The revenue gains accrue from a small number of properties becoming taxed at their true value, which is substantially more than they had been taxed at previously. The majority of properties in incentivized areas in fact pay no more taxes, but instead report higher bribes. The results are consistent with a collusive setting in which performance pay increases collectors’ bargaining power over taxpayers, who have to either pay higher bribes to avoid being reassessed or pay substantially higher taxes if collusion breaks down.

Economic growth within countries varies sharply across decades.This paper examines one explanation for these sustained shifts in growth-changes in the national leader.We use deaths of leaders while in office as a source of exogenous variation in leadership, and ask whether these plausibly exogenous leadership transitions are associated with shifts in country growth rates.We find robust evidence that leaders matter for growth.The results suggest that the effects of individual leaders are strongest in autocratic settings where there are fewer constraints on a leader's power.Leaders also appear to affect policy outcomes, particularly monetary policy.The results suggest that individual leaders can play crucial roles in shaping the growth of nations."There is no number two, three, or four . . .

Bureaucracies often post staff to better or worse locations, ostensibly to provide incentives. Yet we know little about whether this works, with heterogeneity in preferences over postings impacting effectiveness. We propose a performance-ranked serial dictatorship mechanism, whereby bureaucrats sequentially choose desired locations in order of performance. We evaluate this using a two-year field experiment with 525 property tax inspectors in Pakistan. The mechanism increases annual tax revenue growth by 30–41 percent. Inspectors whom our model predicts face high equilibrium incentives under the scheme indeed increase performance more. Our results highlight the potential of periodic merit-based postings in enhancing bureaucratic performance. (JEL C93, D73, H71, H83, J45, M54, O17)

This paper investigates the remarkable extremes of growth experiences within countries and the changes that occur across growth transitions. We find two main results. First, virtually all but the very richest countries experience both growth miracles and failures over substantial periods. Second, growth accelerations and collapses are asymmetric phenomena. Collapses typically feature reduced investment amidst increasing price instability, whereas growth takeoffs are primarily associated with large expansions in international trade. The results show that even very poor countries regularly grow rapidly, but sustaining growth is difficult and may pose a very different set of challenges than starting it. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

A rapidly growing body of research applies panel methods to examine how temperature, precipitation, and windstorms influence economic outcomes. These studies focus on changes in weather realizations over time within a given spatial area and demonstrate impacts on agricultural output, industrial output, labor productivity, energy demand, health, conflict, and economic growth, among other outcomes. By harnessing exogenous variation over time within a given spatial unit, these studies help credibly identify (i) the breadth of channels linking weather and the economy, (ii) heterogeneous treatment effects across different types of locations, and (iii) nonlinear effects of weather variables. This paper reviews the new literature with two purposes. First, we summarize recent work, providing a guide to its methodologies, datasets, and findings. Second, we consider applications of the new literature, including insights for the “damage function” within models that seek to assess the potential economic effects of future climate change. (JEL C51, D72, O13, Q51, Q54)

This paper uses international trade data to examine the effects of climate shocks on economic activity. At the aggregate level, Melissa Dell, Benjamin F. Jones, and Benjamin A. Olken (2008) (hereafter, DJO) have demonstrated that higher temperatures in a given year reduce the growth rate of GDP per capita, but only in poor countries. The analysis of trade data in this paper builds on that finding, with three principal motivations. First, international trade links the fortunes of countries, providing potentially important conduits for geographically limited climatic impacts to have global economic effects. Second, international trade data is the best available source for identifying economic activity worldwide separately by narrowly defined sectors. Examining international trade data, one can thus say more precisely what sectors are affected by climatic changes. Finally, the trade data, collected by the importing country, provides a check on the potentially low-quality national accounts data provided by the home country.