Abstract This paper analyzes the modified treasury stocks (MTS) method mandated by APB Opinion No. 15 for computing diluted Earnings Per Share (EPS) figures in cases where warrants are outstanding. It is shown that the MTS method suffers from two basic deficiencies. First, it assumes that funds obtained from exercising the outstanding warrants are used to reduce debt or to purchase Government securities. This introduces exogenous factors (e.g., interest rate) into the process of computing diluted EPS. Second this method is applicable even in those cases where the exercise price of the warrant exceeds the share price. As a result of these deficiencies, dilutive effects are often reduced and even nullified under certain conditions, Moreover, these effects are subject to managerial discretion and, hence, potential manipulation.

Abstract This article presents response of the author on comments made by scholar Stephen E. Leob on the paper "The Auditor-Firm Conflict of Interests: Its Implications for Independence" that was published in the October 1974 of the periodical "The Accounting Review." In his comment on the article, Leob has raised two issues. The first concerns the behavior model of independence. He argues that this model is lacking because it concentrates only on the economic power aspect while it does not give recognition to all the variables that may affect an auditor in such circumstances. Second, he makes a specific suggestion for improving the model. He introduces the three factors used by scholar Jerome Carlin to explain the behavior of deviant attorneys and suggests that by using the Carlin model one can perhaps obtain a more realistic view of the auditor's reaction to client's pressure and economic power. The authors argue that Loeb's criticism of their model is unjustified. It results from a failure to realize that in an earlier article they were not concerned at all with predicting the behavior of individual auditors when subjected to client's pressures. In that article, the authors dealt with a different problem, namely, explaining why the independence issue has become so prevalent in the auditing profession.

Abstract This article presents response of the author on comments made by scholars Nissim Aranya and Moshe Sarell on the paper "The Auditor-Firm Conflict of Interests: Its Implications for Independence" that was published in the October 1974 of the periodical "The Accounting Review." Students of the professions have traditionally focused on two types of issues. The first relates to the ability of the profession to become free of lay control, to be self-directing in matters such as recruitment, education, certification, and the policing of membership's professional behavior. This area of research is often known as professionalization, or professional autonomy, and has received most of the attention of students of the professions. Indeed, the list of references cited by Aranya and Sarell in their comment covers only a small part of this vast literature. The second area of research is concerned with deviations by professionals from professional rules of conduct as a result of pressures by clients and of various conflicts of interests.

Abstract This article focuses on how the autonomy of auditors in the performance of their professional duties has always been considered a cornerstone of the profession. In this respect, auditing is similar to other professions. There is a feeling, however, that the autonomy of auditors is being undermined. This is shown by the many rulings of professional bodies on this issue, the elaborate rules of conduct designed to strengthen autonomy, the many articles in professional journals devoted to this subject, and even by the coining of a special term to denote this problem: "independence." The purpose of this article is to explain why the independence issue has become so central in auditing, to indicate possible methods of dealing with this problem, and to suggest a framework for their evaluation. Auditing is defined as an examination intended to serve as a basis for an expression of opinion regarding the fairness, consistency, and conformity with accepted accounting principles of statements prepared by a corporation or other entity for submission to the public or to other interested parties.

Market returns, Accounting returns, Variability of earnings

Abstract. This study documents management's reactions to an inventory tax allowance that is based on inventory levels at the beginning of the year. Such an allowance was permitted by the tax authorities in Canada and Israel. The study develops a theoretical model which shows that a rational management should increase the firm's inventory levels on the balance sheet date beyond what the normal ordering policy would indicate. Moreover, tax authorities, in failing to anticipate this behavior, may, ceteris paribus , overcompensate firms for inflation. Empirical evidence shows that firms do, indeed, alter their ordering policies so that they will hold larger inventories on the balance sheet date. The study also shows that the tax authorities overcompensated firms in Israel, but did not overcompensate firms in Canada. Résumé. Cette étude documente les réactions du management à un dégrèvement fiscal afférent aux stocks basé sur les niveaux des stocks au début de l'année. Un tel dégrèvement était permis par les autorités fiscales au Canada et en Israël. L'étude développe un modèle théorique qui montre qu'un management rationnel devrait augmenter les niveaux des stocks de la firme à la date du bilan, au‐delà de ce que la politique normale d'approvisionnement pourrait indiquer. D'ailleurs, les autorités fiscales qui n'anticipent pas ce comportement peuvent ceteris paribus, sur‐idemniser les firmes pour l'inflation. L'évidence empirique montre en effet, que les firmes modifient leurs politiques d'approvisionnement de façon à avoir de plus gros stocks à la date du bilan. L'étude montre aussi que les autorités fiscales ont sur‐indemnisé les firmes en Israël, mais ne les ont pas sur‐indemnisées au Canada.