This study investigates whether an auditor's experience of litigation in the recent past affects subsequent financial reporting quality. At the audit firm level, we find accounting misstatements occur significantly less (more) often after audit firms are sued (not sued). At the audit office level, the negative association between past litigation and future misstatements is stronger for offices who were directly implicated in the litigation than for the non-accused offices of sued audit firms. Therefore, the litigation experiences of both audit firms and audit offices are incrementally significant predictors of future financial reporting quality.

This study investigates the audit firm’s decision to protect its partners’ personal assets by becoming a limited liability partnership (LLP). We find that the likelihood of an audit firm switching from unlimited to limited liability is increasing in its size and exposure to litigation risk. We find no evidence that audit firms supply lower audit quality, lose market share, or charge lower audit fees after they become LLPs. However, the mix of public and private clients in audit firms’ portfolios exhibits a significant shift toward riskier publicly traded companies after the switch to limited liability.

ABSTRACT We examine how often audit firms are sued in a large sample of accounting lawsuits that allege financial reporting failures. We find an insignificant relation between the likelihood of auditor litigation and restatements, but the likelihood of auditor litigation is strongly related to the types of alleged accounting deficiencies. We also find that the auditor's type influences the probability of the auditor being sued and the size of the payouts from auditor and nonauditor defendants. In particular, the Big N firms are approximately 7 percent less likely than non–Big N firms to be named as co‐defendants, and the auditor's contribution to the plaintiff's payout is significantly larger when a Big N firm is sued. Overall, our findings suggest that auditors are rarely blamed when there are allegations of financial reporting failures, but the types of accounting deficiencies and the auditor's type significantly influence the probability of the audit firm being sued and the outcomes of the lawsuits.

ABSTRACT Prior research finds that women receive lower salaries than men. Similarly, we show that female audit partners in Belgium receive significantly lower compensation than male partners. However, there are alternative explanations for the pay gap other than gender discrimination. For example, the gap in compensation could reflect that men are paid more because they have higher levels of productivity. We provide new predictions and tests of gender discrimination by comparing the fees generated by audit partners (a measure of partner productivity) and the types of clients assigned to partners. Consistent with our prediction of female partners having to meet higher performance thresholds than male partners, we show that female partners generate larger fee premiums, but they are less likely to be assigned to prestigious clients. To test whether these patterns are attributable to gender discrimination, we examine whether the results are stronger in male‐dominated offices, because this is where we would expect to find the most discrimination against women. We find the fee premiums generated by female partners are larger in male‐dominated offices, while the negative association between prestigious clients and female partners is stronger in male‐dominated offices. Collectively, our combined predictions and tests are consistent with female partners facing gender discrimination in audit offices that are dominated by male partners.

ABSTRACT Using the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's mandate of eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) as a natural experiment, this study investigates whether and how the decreased information‐processing costs brought about by XBRL influence firms’ breadth of share ownership. We find that the XBRL mandate is associated with an increase in the total number of a firm's shareholders. This finding is consistent with the notion that XBRL facilitates a more transparent environment and decreases information‐processing costs, thereby attracting more shareholders in general. More interestingly, we find that while XBRL adoption is associated with an increase in share ownership of individual and non‐U.S. foreign institutional investors, it is associated with a decrease in share ownership of U.S. domestic institutional investors. Further evidence shows that this asymmetric shift in share ownership is more pronounced for more complex firms. Our findings, taken together, suggest that the decreased information‐processing costs brought about by XBRL help firms establish a level playing field by reducing the information disadvantages of individual and foreign institutional investors over domestic institutional investors. Our results are robust to potential endogeneity concerns and alternative research designs.

Building on economic theories of cultural transmission, we examine how audit partners’ cultural trust influences audit outcomes. Based on the “presumptive doubt” perspective of professional skepticism, we propose that audit partners from trusting cultures are more likely to rely on management’s assertions, while still exercising a high degree of caution and not naively trusting management. Consistent with our prediction, we find that audit partners from trusting cultures commit fewer Type I errors when issuing going concern opinions, without significantly increasing Type II errors. The reduction in Type I errors is primarily found when audit partners normally tend to be more conservative, and it is attenuated when management is less trustworthy. At the same time, audit partners from trusting cultures are also associated with more within-GAAP earnings management, suggesting that increased trust entails a cost. Collectively, our findings offer new insights into how cultural trust affects the assurance of accounting information.

Exploiting mergers between lenders and shareholders of the same firm as an exogenous shock to shareholder–creditor conflicts, we examine the causal effect of these conflicts on firms' ex ante expected stock price crash risk evident in the options implied volatility smirk. The decrease in conflicts of interest between lenders and shareholders induces dual holders to encourage the disclosure of more information to alleviate costly information asymmetry with other investors and better execute their oversight role in constraining managers' bad news suppression. Consistent with expectations, we find that a firm's ex ante expected crash risk declines after a shareholder–creditor merger. We also report strong, robust evidence that the negative impact of mergers on firms' expected crash risk increases when institutional investors or lenders have a greater stake in the treatment firms or when shareholder–creditor conflicts are apt to be exacerbated. Additionally, we document that firms issue management earnings forecasts (especially bad news forecasts) more frequently after these mergers. Finally, we find that expected crash risk decreases more after mergers in firms suffering worse information asymmetry and with weak monitoring mechanisms. Our evidence suggests that option market participants value the dual holder's role in deterring managers' bad news hoarding.

ABSTRACT We exploit the staggered introduction of the PCAOB's international inspection program to examine the role that the stringency of public audit oversight plays in shaping US institutional investors' home bias. Analyzing a sample of foreign firms listed in the United States, we evaluate whether US institutional investors hold larger equity stakes in these firms—a longstanding issue that reflects investor portfolio decisions—if their auditors are exposed to the threat of a PCAOB inspection. In a differences‐in‐differences framework, we find that US‐listed foreign firms enjoy an increase in US institutional investors' equity positions after their auditors become subject to PCAOB inspection access. Cross‐sectional analysis implies that the benefit of the PCAOB inspection threat in mitigating US institutional investors' home bias is concentrated in foreign countries without a strict local audit oversight system; active US institutional investors that are known to value accounting transparency; and firms from countries that grant PCAOB access later (after the onset of its international inspection program in 2005). Our evidence suggests that foreign firms become better known in the capital markets under the PCAOB inspection program, which induces US institutional investors to acquire larger equity stakes in US‐listed foreign firms given the lower information asymmetry that ensues under the PCAOB inspection threat.

ABSTRACT Prior research finds that audit offices lose market share after they are involved in alleged audit failures. We examine whether such reputation effects are driven by private communications from rival auditors. We determine which offices are likely to be well informed about alleged audit failures by identifying the incoming office of the client accused of misreporting and by identifying law firm connections between each audit firm and the plaintiffs and defendants in each lawsuit. Consistent with private communications being a driver of auditor reputation effects, we find that tainted offices lose significantly more market share to rival offices that are likely to be informed about the alleged audit failure. JEL Classifications: M42.