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What do public company audit clients want from their auditor?

Review of Accounting Studies 2026 31(2), 1403-1438 open access
We survey public company executives and directors to understand what audit clients want from their auditor in today’s regulated environment. Our results provide at least three important takeaways. First, executives and directors view elements of auditors’ service quality (e.g., timeliness of communications) as at least as important as auditors’ technical competence. Second, we find no evidence that stakeholders’ preferences for service quality replaces their expectation for technical competence. Third, we find that 57% of executives and 67% of directors feel they can very accurately assess audit quality after an audit’s completion, but we are unable to identify clear determinants of participants’ self-reported ability to assess quality. Our results highlight the challenges facing auditors as they attempt to please clients, protect shareholders, and comply with regulations, all while offering a product whose quality is inherently challenging for others to assess. Our findings motivate future research and inform regulatory efforts.

Could That Happen to Me? Auditor Response When Colleagues Are Named in Lawsuits

Contemporary Accounting Research 2026 open access
Litigation risk is an important source of motivation for auditors to conduct high‐quality audits, but theory suggests that certain lawsuits will have a more salient disciplining effect on auditor behavior. To this end, we identify lawsuits naming an individual partner as a co‐defendant along with the audit firm. We then examine how these lawsuits affect subsequent behavior of other auditors in the office of the sued partner. Relative to lawsuits naming only the firm, our results indicate that lawsuits naming individual partners as co‐defendants are significant office‐level events that motivate a meaningful response from non‐sued audit partners in the form of higher quality and fees on existing clients and more careful client portfolio management. These results have practical implications about how auditor litigation incentivizes individual auditors to fulfill their professional duties. For regulators and audit firms seeking to promote audit quality, these findings highlight the disciplining effect of auditors' concern for their personal reputation and litigation exposure. Furthermore, audit committees, clients, and investors may observe elevated audit quality, effort, and fees following partner‐level litigation in the local office.