How does firm value change in response to a minimum wage hike? This paper exploits the announcement of a big change in the UK minimum wage that was both totally unanticipated and free of uncertainty. The stock market response to this is examined in an event study setting. The analysis uncovers significant falls in the stock market value of low-wage firms. In light of this finding, the paper concludes by discussing magnitudes of response, including longer-term modes of firm adjustment to the cost shock induced by the minimum wage hike.

The evolution of rent sharing is studied. Based on a panel of the top 300 publicly quoted British companies over 35 years and using excess stock market returns to patenting activity as an instrument for economic rents, the paper reports evidence of a significant fall over time in the pass-through from rents to wages. It confirms that wages do respond to firm-level shocks to economic rents, but by significantly less after 2000 than during the 1980s and 1990s. The evidence of decline is robust, corroborated with alternative instruments and industry-level analysis for the United States and the European Union.

We provide new evidence on the growth in pay at the very top of the wage distribution in the United Kingdom. Sectoral decompositions show that workers in the financial sector have accounted for the majority of the gains at the top over the last decade. New results are also presented on the pay of CEOs in the United Kingdom. We show how improved measurement of pay points to a stronger pay-performance link than previously estimated. This link is stronger, and more symmetric, for those firms in which institutional investors play a larger role.

Abstract Recessions lead to short-term job loss, lower happiness, and decreasing income levels. There is growing evidence that workers who first join the labor market during economic downturns suffer from poor job matches that can have sustained detrimental effects on wages and career progressions. This paper uses U.S. and U.K. data to document a more disturbing long-run effect of recessions: young people who leave school during recessions are significantly more likely to lead a life of crime than those entering a buoyant labor market. Thus, crime scars resulting from higher entry-level unemployment rates prove to be long lasting and substantial.

Abstract This paper focuses on empirical connections between crime and immigration, studying two large waves of recent U.K. immigration (the late 1990s/early 2000s asylum seekers and the post-2004 inflow from EU accession countries). The first wave led to a modest but significant rise in property crime, while the second wave had a small negative impact. There was no effect on violent crime; arrest rates were not different, and changes in crime cannot be ascribed to crimes against immigrants. The findings are consistent with the notion that differences in labor market opportunities of different migrant groups shape their potential impact on crime.

We provide a unifying empirical framework to study why crime reductions occurred due to a sequence of state-level dropout age reforms enacted between 1980 and 2010 in the United States. Because the reforms changed the shape of crime-age profiles, they generate both a short-term incapacitation effect and a more sustained crime-reducing effect. In contrast to previous research looking at earlier US education reforms, we find that reform-induced crime reduction does not arise primarily from education improvements. Decomposing short- and long-run effects, the observed longer-run effect for the post-1980 education reforms is primarily attributed to dynamic incapacitation.