A model of wage determination in unionized oligopolistic industries is developed and used to compare the outcome of collective bargaining under two different bargaining structures-one in which the workers of each firm are represented by separate and independent unions (local bargaining) and one in which a national union represents all workers in the industry. In both cases, the bargaining problem has a unique outcome with industrywide bargaining resulting in higher wages. In addition, industrywide unions are inherently stable in that there are no incentives for independent unions to attempt to cheat on the collusive agreement.

We develop a partial equilibrium matching model of the labor market in order to examine whether adoption of a reemployment bonus would displace workers not offered the bonus. We examine the displacement effect for (a) unemployment insurance (UI)-eligible workers who are offered but do not find a job in time to qualify for a bonus and (b) UI-ineligible workers who are never offered a bonus. The model predicts minimal displacement of the former group. But for the latter group, the model predicts an increase in unemployment duration of .2-.4 week and an increase in unemployment of up to 2 per thousand.

We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model in which equilibrium unemployment arises endogenously because of trading frictions in the labor market of one sector. Externalities inherent in the search process lead to inefficient equilibria, and this has important implication for the basic structure of the economy. In particular, the relationship between factor rewards and commodity prices is fundamentally different from the analogous relationship in a frictionless economy. One implication is that the economy's relative supply curve may be downward sloping, especially when the search sector is small. We also present several applications of the analysis.

We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model in which equilibrium unemployment arises endogenously because of trading frictions in the labor market of one sector. Externalities inherent in the search process lead to inefficient equilibria, and this has important implication for the basic structure of the economy. In particular, the relationship between factor rewards and commodity prices is fundamentally different from the analogous relationship in a frictionless economy. One implication is that the economy's relative supply curve may be downward sloping, especially when the search sector is small. We also present several applications of the analysis.

Recent theoretical analysis suggests that a reduction in the cost of exporting increases the degree of assortative matching between workers and firms in export-oriented industries. Changes that reduce the cost of imports have an ambiguous impact on matching. We combine detailed Swedish matched worker-firm data from 1995-2005 with tariff data to test these hypotheses. The data cover 94 sectors subject to international competition and include all firms with at least 20 employees. Our findings strongly support the theoretical predictions.