This paper examines whether the motivation of institutional investors in monitoring a firm is positively related to the relative importance of the firm's stock in their portfolios. We find that greater motivated monitoring institutional ownership is associated with a higher marginal value of corporate cash holdings, which cannot be explained by other corporate governance measures and institution types. Further, we find that the economic effect of institutional monitoring on the marginal value of cash falls with decreasing institutions' monitoring motivation. Based on these findings, we construct a monitoring motivation-weighted institutional ownership measure and document a positive relation between it and the marginal value of cash. Our results are robust after controlling for the endogeneity of institutional ownership, three cash regimes, firm size, and changes in US public firms over time.

Anthony Saunders, Charles Ward, Richard Woodward, Stochastic Dominance and the Performance of U. K. Unit Trusts, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 1980), pp. 323-330

This study focuses on S&P500 inclusions and deletions, examining the impact of potential overnight price adjustment after the announcement of an S&P500 index change. We find evidence of a significant overnight price change that diminishes the returns available to speculators although there are still profits available from the first day after announcement until a few days after the actual event. More importantly, observing the tick-by-tick stock price performance and volume effects on the key days during the event window for the first time, we find evidence of consistent trading patterns during trading hours. A separate analysis of NASDAQ and NYSE listed stocks allows for a detailed examination of the price and volume effect at an intra-day level. We find that index funds appear to cluster their rebalancing activities near to and after the close on the event date, suggesting that they are more concerned with tracking error than profit.