[We develop a measurement theory of market integration, based on two notions of "integrated markets." First, two markets cannot be perfectly integrated in any sense if one can construct two portfolios, one from each market, that have identical payoffs but different prices. In that case, the law of one price is violated across the markets. Second, they cannot be integrated in a stronger sense if there are cross-market arbitrage opportunities. Two measures of market integration are developed, respectively reflecting these notions. The smaller the measures, the more closely integrated (in the respective senses) the markets. Among other things, they are interpreted as measuring pricing discrepancy between markets.]

We develop a measurement theory of market integration, based on two notions of “integrated markets”. First, two markets cannot be perfectly integrated in any sense if one can construct two portfolios, one from each market, that have identical payoffs but different prices. In that case, the law of one price is violated across the markets. Second, they cannot be integrated in a stronger sense if there are cross-market arbitrage opportunities. Two measures of market integration are developed, respectively reflecting these notions. The smaller the measures, the more closely integrated (in the respective senses) the markets. Among other things, they are interpreted as measuring pricing discrepancy between markets.

[Oil and gas firms using the full cost method during 1985-1986 faced a choice between taking a write-down in oil and gas properties or changing to the successful efforts method. In a time-series analysis, the executive bonuses of firms switching to the successful efforts method are found to be associated with accounting income, suggesting the effects of bonus plans on the switch decision. We also show that the firms choosing write-down reported more losses before the write-down during the decision year, and that the bonuses of these firms' executives are not affected by the write-down.]

This article tests a theoretical model of the basis and open interest of stock index futures. The model is based on the differences between stock and futures in terms of investors' ability to customize stock portfolios and liquidity. Empirical evidence confirms the model's prediction that increased volatility decreases the basis and increases open interest.

Focuses on executive bonus plans and accounting trade-offs in the oil and gas industry during the years 1985-86. Executive bonuses of firms switching to the successful efforts method; Firms that opted for write-down method.

This paper tests a theoretical model of the basis and open interest of stock index futures. The model is based on the differences between stock and futures in terms of investors' ability to customize stock portfolios and liquidity. Empirical evidence confirms the model's prediction that increased volatility decreases the basis and increases open interest.

This article tests a theoretical model of the basis and open interest of stock index futures. The model is based on the differences between stock and futures in terms of investors' ability to customize stock portfolios and liquidity. Empirical evidence confirms the model's prediction that increased volatility decreases the basis and increases open interest.