Building upon the premise that, under certain conditions, the ability of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to pressure the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is limited, we develop a measure of CFO resistance that captures the ability of the CFO to resist undue pressure from the CEO to manage earnings. In doing so, we consider various sources of power for both the CEO and CFO, and a market setting where CFO resistance is perceived to be high. We find that firms with resistant CFOs are less likely to engage in earnings management than firms with non-resistant CFOs, ceteris paribus. Additionally, while confirming prior evidence that CEOs with strong incentives are more likely to manage earnings, we show that this effect is significantly less pronounced in the presence of resistant CFOs. Overall, our findings suggest that firms can improve the quality of financial reporting by creating conditions that enable CFO resistance.

This paper examines the extent to which Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) affect corporate cash holding policies. We construct an index (CFO index) that enables us to distinguish between “strong” and “weak” CFOs based on their ability to influence firm outcomes. We find that firms with strong CFOs hold substantially less cash than firms with weak CFOs, ceteris paribus. Importantly, the CFO effect documented in our study goes beyond the effect caused by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) on cash holdings. Our findings provide the first direct empirical evidence that firms with strong CFOs are well positioned to hold less cash due to their relatively weak precautionary motive and superior ability to raise external financing during periods of financial stress. Consistent with an agency explanation, our results also show that strong CFOs fulfill a monitoring role in firms with higher agency costs.

We examine how sovereign rating downgrades affect firms' environmental, social, and governance (ESG) policies, leveraging the sovereign “ceiling” rule as a quasi-natural experiment that generates exogenous variation in corporate credit ratings. Under this rule, firms originally rated at or above the sovereign rating (bound firms) face a higher likelihood of downgrade following a sovereign downgrade. Using a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting, we find that bound firms experience a decline in ESG performance following a sovereign downgrade. This decline occurs only after the downgrade, not before, validating the parallel trends assumption. Our analysis further indicates that this effect is not driven by financing frictions and is concentrated in countries with a shareholder-centric orientation, and among firms with low institutional ownership from countries with strong social norms. Additional evidence suggests that affected firms experience an increase in ESG-related incidents, damaging their reputation post-downgrade. Overall, our findings underscore the crucial role of sovereign risk in shaping corporate sustainability practices.

This study proposes a new price impact ratio as an alternative to the widely used Amihud’s (2002) Return-to-Volume ratio. We demonstrate that the new price impact ratio, which is deemed Return-to-Turnover ratio, has a number of appealing features. Using daily data from all stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange over the period 1991–2008, we provide overwhelming evidence that this ratio, while being unequivocal to construct and interpret, is also free of a size bias. More importantly, it encapsulates the stocks’ cross-sectional variability in trading frequency, a relatively neglected but possibly important determinant of stock returns given the recently observed trends in financial markets. Overall, our findings argue against the conventional wisdom that there is a simple direct link between trading costs and stock returns by strongly suggesting that it is the compound effect of trading frequency and transaction costs that matters for asset pricing, not each aspect in isolation.

Abstract Based on textual analysis and a comparison of cybersecurity risk disclosures of firms that were hacked to others that were not, we propose a novel firm-level measure of cybersecurity risk for all U.S.-listed firms. We then examine whether cybersecurity risk is priced in the cross-section of stock returns. Portfolios of firms with high exposure to cybersecurity risk outperform other firms, on average, by up to 8.3% per year. Yet, high-exposure firms perform poorly in periods of high cybersecurity risk. Reassuringly, the measure is higher in information-technology industries, correlates with characteristics linked to firms hit by cyberattacks, and predicts future cyberattacks. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online