Using U.S. bank holding company data, we study the impact of the crisis liquidity programs initiated by the U.S. Federal Reserve on bank-specific information production. We find empirical evidence that following the receipt of liquidity support there was a pervasive decrease in bank stock price informativeness that increased market synchronicity and crash risk. Our findings further suggest that these effects are mainly driven by bank participation in the Discount Window (DW) and Term Auction Facility (TAF) programs. On the bright side, we confirm that the liquidity programs served their purpose in targeting and supporting illiquid banks with low core stable funding sources through the crisis.

There is a current controversy concerning the appropriate size of banks’ capital requirements, and the trade-off between the costs and benefits of implementing higher capital requirements. We quantify the size of capital buffers required to reduce system-wide losses using confidential regulatory data for Australian banks from 2002 to 2014 and annual public accounts from 1978 to 2014. We find that a moderate increase in bank capital buffers is sufficient to maintain financial system resilience, even after taking economic downturns into consideration. Furthermore, while banks benefit from paying a lower cost of debt when they have a higher capital buffer, lending volumes are lower indicating that credit supply may be hampered if bank capital levels are too high within a financial system.