Drawing on Robert Michels's “iron law” of oligarchy, this study examines a governance crisis that unfolded at one of the world's largest professional accounting bodies (PABs)—CPA Australia. We leverage Michels's century‐old contribution to the social sciences to explore how this crisis sheds light on the challenges that PAB governance arrangements can pose when PAB leadership and membership priorities conflict. By applying Michels's seminal work to theorize the origins, escalation, leadership collapse, and eventual resolution of this PAB governance crisis, we illuminate how governance arrangements fueled conflict and fostered a democratic deficit that frustrated sections of the membership in their attempts to debate issues, exercise accountability on leadership matters, and become involved in governance reform. Overall, our analysis reveals that despite espoused principles of equity and participation, PABs are vulnerable to oligarchy impacting how their leaders relate to the interests of their members. Implications for the capacity of PABs to accommodate member conflict and for member participation in the current‐day professional context are discussed.

Advocacy movements play an increasingly prominent role in shaping corporate social responsibility (CSR) management and reporting practices. Prior research mainly studies advocacy movements who form and operate on the periphery of the organizational field(s) they seek to alter. We know comparatively little about how these movements materialize within fields and use established field networks, resources and power structures to transform CSR and CSR reporting norms. This paper examines how an advocacy movement formed and evolved within the Dutch investment field to embed a suite of social and environmental accountability mechanisms therein. We examine the evolution of VBDO, a membership association which promotes and polices corporate accountability among Dutch listed companies and investment institutions. We depict how a movement of diverse actors materialized in and around VBDO to stimulate responsible investment and sophisticated CSR reporting in the investment field. Insights from social movement theory and institutional work are integrated with Stark’s (2009) concept of organizing dissonance to theorise the conditions underpinning the movement’s emergence and influence. We uncover how rankings work - the co-creation, dissemination and policing of CSR benchmarks - and (institutional) work censorship - the strategic self-censoring of institutional work - coalesced to cultivate constructive collaborations among movement actors. We show how this enabled the creation of accountability mechanisms that facilitated VBDO’s transition into an influential and unique boundary organization. Our analysis extends prior research by revealing the role of institutional work in cultivating cooperation between advocacy movements and the targets of their reforms. By illustrating how actors’ opposing value frames co-existed peacefully as VBDO’s accountability mechanisms evolved, we offer a counterpoint to studies suggesting that compromise underpins the organization of dissonance among actors constructing corporate accounts.