We examine employee responses to CEO activism, the increasingly common practice of CEOs taking public stances on socio-political issues. CEO activism may bolster employees' identification with their organizations and strengthen shared beliefs among employees. Alternatively, CEO activism may alienate employees if CEO stances contrast with employees' ideologies. We find that employee satisfaction is higher when CEOs engage in activism that is aligned with employees’ ideologies. Furthermore, firms with CEO activism experience a net inflow of productive, ideologically-aligned inventors, which contributes to increased firm-level innovation. The improvements in employee satisfaction and innovation constitute an important channel that connects aligned CEO activism to increased firm value.

We study the determinants and the informational role of firms' fixed income conference calls, a unique form of voluntary disclosure that deviates from the traditional multi-purpose firm disclosures intended for all stakeholders. We find that fixed income calls are more likely to be held by firms that have more debt, lack credit ratings or have publicly traded equity, are foreign, or are experiencing losses. In a content analysis using a sample of public firms, we find that these calls discuss debt-equity conflict events, such as share repurchases, to a greater degree relative to a matched sample of earnings conference calls. Finally, we document that credit markets react to these calls, consistent with the calls providing investors new information. Overall, these results are consistent with fixed income calls meeting the differential informational demands of debt versus equity investors.