Public expenditure under uncertainty is modeled as the problem of determining the quantities of l public goods and m private goods to be provided to n consumers when the private goods are claims to a single commodity, "dollars," which are contingent upon the occurrence of one of m possible states of nature. A real-valued "net benefit function" is identified, and criteria based upon this function are provided which are both necessary and sufficient for Pareto-improving or Pareto-efficient solutions to this problem.

Journal Article Multi-sector Economic Models with Continuous Adaptive Expectations Get access Edwin Burmeister, Edwin Burmeister University of Pennsylvania Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Daniel A. Graham Daniel A. Graham Duke University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 41, Issue 3, July 1974, Pages 323–336, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296752 Published: 01 July 1974

Daniel A. Graham, E. Roy Weintraub; On Convergence to Pareto Allocations12, The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 42, Issue 3, 1 July 1975, Pages 469–472,

Bidder coalitions at English auctions frequently distribute collusive gains among members via a secondary auction or "knockout." When coalition members are sufficiently heterogeneous, nested coalition structures are observed in which a knockout is conducted at each level of nesting. The nested knockout's characteristics are investigated. Within many settings we find that the expected payments to coalition members via the nested knockout equal the Shapley value. Incentive compatibility problems of the nested knockout are also analyzed.

Comments on S. Besen and R. Soligo's article about the economics of the network-affiliate relationships in the television broadcasting industry in the U.S. Sale of advertising time on network programs; Supply curve of cleared time; Definition of the nondiscrinating monopsonist solution; Demand for network programming. (Из Ebsco)

Irreplaceable commodities, 144.—Insuring irreplaceable commodities, 148.—The value of collective protection, 151.—Appendix, 155.