Abstract This paper uses a large sample containing the complete return histories of 2300UK openended mutual funds over a 23-year period to measure fund performance. We find some evidence of underperformance on a risk-adjusted basis by the average fund manager, persistenceof performance and the existence of a substantial survivor bias. Similar findings have been reported for US equity mutual funds. New findings not previously documented for other markets include evidence that mutual fund performance varies substantially across different asset categories, especially foreign asset categories. We also identify some new patterns in performance related to the funds' distance from their inception and termination dates: underperformance intensifies as the fund termination date approaches, while, in contrast, there is some evidence that funds (weakly) outperform during their first year of existence.

Meghnad Desai, David Blake, Modelling the Ultimate Absurdity: A Comment on "A Quantitative Study of the Strategic Arms Race in the Missile Age", The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Nov., 1981), pp. 629-632

Abstract Most empirical studies suggest that mutual funds do not persistently outperform an appropriate benchmark in the long run. We analyze this lack of persistence in terms of two equilibrating mechanisms: fund flows and manager changes. Using data on actively managed US equity mutual funds, we find that if neither mechanism is operating, winner funds (top-decile ranked in previous year) continue to significantly outperform loser funds (bottom-decile ranked in previous year) by 4.08 percentage points per annum. However, the difference between previous winner and loser funds declines to zero within one year if the two mechanisms are acting together. Thus, equity mutual fund out- and underperformance are unlikely to persist in well-functioning financial markets.

Never has there been so much media interest in pensions as there is currently. Never has the pensions world changed so rapidly as it has over the last few years; we have seen the introduction of a new state supplementary pension scheme, new stakeholder pensions, and a flood of companies closing their final salary schemes and replacing them with defined contribution schemes. Never have there been so many complaints about our pension system; about the state pension falling behind earnings, about the misselling of personal pensions, about the perceived poor value of annuities, and about high charges and poor investment performance. This new edition of Pension Schemes and Pension Funds in the United Kingdom provides the latest information on all the key state and private pension schemes operating in the UK, including: the basic state pension, minimum income guarantee and pension credit; the state second pension; company pension schemes; and personal and stakeholder pension schemes. It does this within the context of the long historical development of the UK pensions system since medieval times. It also examines government pensions policy over the last twenty years, in particular the reduction in state pensions and the transfer of the burden of pension provision to the funded private sector. It also examines future trends and future concerns, such as increasing longevity and the adequacy of savings for retirement when people are young and in work. As most pension schemes are funded, the author also examines the latest issues in pension funding, such as the new accounting standard FRS17, active and passive fund management, investment risk budgeting and management, global investment performance standards, short-termism and the Myners review of institutional investment. The book concludes with a proposal for the Ideal Pension Scheme.

We compare two bootstrap methods for assessing mutual fund performance. The first produces narrow confidence intervals due to pooling over time, whereas the second produces wider confidence intervals because it preserves the cross correlation of fund returns. We then show that the average U.K. equity mutual fund manager is unable to deliver outperformance net of fees under either bootstrap. Gross of fees, 95% of fund managers on the basis of the first bootstrap and all fund managers on the basis of the second bootstrap fail to outperform the luck distribution of gross returns.

We show a positive relation between network centrality and risk-adjusted performance in a delegated investment management setting. More connected managers take more portfolio risk and receive higher investor flows, consistent with these managers improving their ability to exploit investment opportunities through their network connections. Greater network connections are shown to be particularly important in reducing the diseconomies of scale for large managers who are well connected. We also use the exogenous merger of two investment consultants, which creates a sudden change in the network connections of the managers they oversee, to provide evidence that a greater number of connections translates into better portfolio performance.

ABSTRACT Using a unique data set, we document two secular trends in the shift from centralized to decentralized pension fund management over the past few decades. First, across asset classes, sponsors replace generalist balanced managers with better‐performing specialists. Second, within asset classes, funds replace single managers with multiple competing managers following diverse strategies to reduce scale diseconomies as funds grow larger relative to capital markets. Consistent with a model of decentralized management, sponsors implement risk controls that trade off higher anticipated alphas of multiple specialists against the increased difficulty in coordinating their risk‐taking and the greater uncertainty concerning their true skills.