A central measure of the efficiency of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market is the extent to which issues are underpriced. We present new and comprehensive evidence covering British IPOs since World War I. During the period from 1917 to 1945, public offers were underpriced by an average of only 3.80%, as compared to 9.15% in the period from 1946 to 1986, and even more after the U.K. stock market was deregulated in 1986. The post-WWII rise in underpricing cannot be attributed to changes in firm composition, and occurred in spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the prestige of IPO underwriters.

The risk-return characteristics of art as an asset have been previously studied through aggregate price indexes. By contrast, we examine the long-run buy-and-hold performance of an actual portfolio, namely, the collection of John Maynard Keynes. We find that its performance has substantially exceeded existing estimates of art market returns. Our analysis of the collection identifies general attributes of art portfolios crucial in explaining why investor returns can substantially diverge from market returns: transaction-specific risk, buyer heterogeneity, return skewness, and portfolio concentration. Furthermore, our findings highlight the limitations of art price indexes as a guide to asset allocation or performance benchmarking. (JEL B26, C43, G11, G12, G14, Z11) Received: September 7, 2018: Editorial decision: November 24, 2019 by Editor: Nikolai Roussanov

The consensus view of the influential economist John Maynard Keynes is that he was a stellar investor. We provide an extensive quantitative appraisal of his performance over a quarter century and present detailed analysis of his archived trading records. His top-down approach initially generated disappointing returns with no evidence of any market-timing ability. However, from the early 1930s his performance improved as he evolved into a bottom-up stock picker with substantial active risk and pronounced size and value tilts. Our reconstruction of Keynes’s stock trading provides a unique record of realized performance and sheds light on how equity investing developed historically.

We study market segmentation effects using data on U.S. railroads that list their bonds in New York and London between 1873 and 1913. This sample provides a unique setting for such analysis because of the precision offered by bond yields in cost of capital estimation, the geography-specific nature of railroad assets, and ongoing substantial technological change. We document a significant reduction in market segmentation over time. While New York bond yields exceeded those in London in the 1870s, this premium disappeared by the early 1900s. However, the segmentation premium persisted in the more remote regions of the United States. Received June 18, 2015; editorial decision October 4, 2017 by Editor Robin Greenwood.

ABSTRACT A central measure of the efficiency of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) market is the extent to which issues are underpriced. We present new and comprehensive evidence covering British IPOs since World War I. During the period from 1917 to 1945, public offers were underpriced by an average of only 3.80%, as compared to 9.15% in the period from 1946 to 1986, and even more after the U.K. stock market was deregulated in 1986. The post‐WWII rise in underpricing cannot be attributed to changes in firm composition, and occurred in spite of improvements in regulation, disclosure, and the prestige of IPO underwriters.

This study exploits a new long-run data set of daily bid and offered exchange rates in spot and forward markets from 1919 to the present to analyze carry returns in fixed and floating currency regimes. We first find that outsized carry returns occur exclusively in the floating regime, being zero in the fixed regime. Second, we show that fixed-to-floating regime shifts are associated with negative returns to a carry strategy implemented only on floating currencies, robust to the inclusion of volatility risks. These shifts are typically characterized by global flight-to-safety events that represent bad times for carry traders.

Real estate—housing in particular—is a less profitable investment in the long run than previously thought. We hand-collect property-level financial data for the institutional real estate portfolios of four large Oxbridge colleges over the period 1901–1983. Gross income yields initially fluctuate around 5%, but then trend downward (upward) for agricultural and residential (commercial) real estate. Long-term real income growth rates are close to zero for all property types. Our findings imply annualized real total returns, net of costs, ranging from approximately 2.3% for residential to 4.5% for agricultural real estate.