Credit default swaps can be used to lower the capital requirements of dealer banks entering into uncollateralized derivatives positions with sovereigns. We show in a model that the regulatory incentive to obtain capital relief makes CDS contracts valuable to dealer banks and empirically that, consistent with the use of CDS for regulatory purposes, there is a disconnect between changes in bond yield spreads and in CDS premiums, especially for safe sovereigns. Additional empirical tests related to the volume of contracts outstanding, effects of regulatory proxies, and the corporate bond and CDS markets support that CDS contracts are used for capital relief.

Brian Huge, David Lando; Swap Pricing with Two-Sided Default Risk in a Rating-Based Model *, European Finance Review, Volume 3, Issue 3, 1 January 1999, Pa

This article provides a Markov model for the term structure of credit risk spreads. The model is based on Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), with the bankruptcy process following a discrete state space Markov chain in credit ratings. The parameters of this process are easily estimated using observable data. This model is useful for pricing and hedging corporate debt with imbedded options, for pricing and hedging OTC derivatives with counterparty risk, for pricing and hedging (foreign) government bonds subject to default risk (e.g., municipal bonds), for pricing and hedging credit derivatives, and for risk management.

Distance-to-default (DD) is a measure of default risk derived from observed stock prices and book leverage using the structural credit risk model of Merton (1974). Despite the simplifying assumptions that underlie its derivation, DD has proven empirically to be a strong predictor of default. We use simulations to show that the empirical success of DD may well be a result of its strong robustness to model misspecifications. We consider a number of deviations from the Merton model which involve different asset value dynamics and different default triggering mechanisms. We show that, in general, DD is successful in ranking firms’ default probabilities, even if the underlying model assumptions are altered. A possibility of large jumps in asset value or stochastic volatility challenge the robustness of DD. We propose a volatility adjustment of the distance-to-default measure that significantly improves the ranking of firms with stochastic volatility, but this measure is less robust to model misspecifications than DD.

We consider the estimation of credit rating transitions based on continuous-time observations. Through simple examples and using a large data set from Standard and Poor's, we illustrate the difference between estimators based on discrete-time cohort methods and estimators based on continuous observations. We apply semi-parametric regression techniques to test for two types of non-Markov effects in rating transitions: Duration dependence and dependence on previous rating. We find significant non-Markov effects, especially for the downgrade movements.

We revisit a method used by Das et al. (2007) (DDKS) who jointly test and reject a specification of firm default intensities and the doubly stochastic assumption in intensity models of default. The method relies on a time change result for counting processes. With an almost identical set of default histories recorded by Moody’s in the period from 1982 to 2006, but using a different specification of the default intensity, we cannot reject the tests based on time change used in DDKS. We then note that the method proposed by DDKS is mainly a misspecification test in that it has very limited power in detecting violations of the doubly stochastic assumption. For example, it will not detect contagion which spreads through the explanatory variables “covariates” that determine the default intensities of individual firms. Therefore, we perform a different test using a Hawkes process alternative to see if firm-specific variables are affected by occurrences of defaults, but find no evidence of default contagion.

We analyze a six-factor model for Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, and swap rates and decompose swap spreads into three components: a convenience yield from holding Treasuries, a credit risk element from the underlying LIBOR rate, and a factor specific to the swap market. The convenience yield is by far the largest component of spreads. There is a discernible contribution from credit risk as well as from a swap-specific factor with higher variability which in certain periods is related to hedging activity in the mortgage-backed security market. The model also sheds light on the relation between AA hazard rates and the spread between LIBOR rates and General Collateral repo rates and on the level of the riskless rate compared to swap and Treasury rates.

Credit default swaps can be used to lower the capital requirements of dealer banks entering into uncollateralized derivatives positions with sovereigns. We show in a model that the regulatory incentive to obtain capital relief makes CDS contracts valuable to dealer banks and empirically that, consistent with the use of CDS for regulatory purposes, there is a disconnect between changes in bond yield spreads and in CDS premiums, especially for safe sovereigns. Additional empirical tests related to the volume of contracts outstanding, effects of regulatory proxies, and the corporate bond and CDS markets support that CDS contracts are used for capital relief. (

We study the implications of imperfect information for term structures of credit spreads on corporate bonds. We suppose that bond investors cannot observe the issuer’s assets directly, and receive instead only periodic and imperfect accounting reports. For a setting in which the assets of the firm are a geometric Brownian motion until informed equityholders optimally liquidate, we derive the conditional distribution of the assets, given accounting data and survivorship. Contrary to the perfect-information case, there exists a default-arrival intensity process. That intensity is calculated in terms of the conditional distribution of assets. Credit yield spreads are characterized in terms of accounting information. Generalizations are provided.

We analyze liquidity components of corporate bond spreads during 2005–2009 using a new robust illiquidity measure. The spread contribution from illiquidity increases dramatically with the onset of the subprime crisis. The increase is slow and persistent for investment grade bonds while the effect is stronger but more short-lived for speculative grade bonds. Bonds become less liquid when financial distress hits a lead underwriter and the liquidity of bonds issued by financial firms dries up under crises. During the subprime crisis, flight-to-quality is confined to AAA-rated bonds.